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ABSTRACT 
 
The present research investigates the delayed failure of software components and 
addresses the problem that the conventional approach to software testing is unlikely to 
reveal this type of failure. Delayed failure is defined as a failure that occurs some time 
after the condition that causes the failure, and is a consequence of long-latency error 
propagation. This research seeks to close a perceived gap between academic research 
into software testing and industrial software testing practice by showing that stochastic 
testing can reveal delayed failure, and supporting this conclusion by a model of error 
propagation and failure that has been validated by experiment. The focus of the present 
research is on software components described by a request-response model. Within this 
conceptual framework, a Markov chain model of error propagation and failure is used to 
derive the expected delayed failure behaviour of software components. Results from an 
experimental study of delayed failure of DBMS software components MySQL and 
Oracle XE using stochastic testing with random generation of SQL are consistent with 
expected behaviour based on the Markov chain model. Metrics for failure delay and 
reliability are shown to depend on the characteristics of the chosen experimental profile. 
SQL mutation is used to generate negative as well as positive test profiles. There appear 
to be few systematic studies of delayed failure in the software engineering literature, 
and no studies of stochastic testing related to delayed failure of software components, or 
specifically to delayed failure of DBMS. Stochastic testing is shown to be an effective 
technique for revealing delayed failure of software components, as well as a suitable 
technique for reliability and robustness testing of software components. These results 
provide a deeper insight into the testing technique and should lead to further research. 
Stochastic testing could provide a dependability benchmark for component-based 
software engineering. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1   Introduction 
 
“Success is only a delayed failure” – Graham Greene, A Sort of Life (1971) 
 
The subject of this thesis is delayed failure of software components using stochastic 
testing. Failure of computer software is a serious problem in a society increasingly 
dependent on software-based systems, for example Lake (2010) describes eleven 
‘infamous software bugs’ affecting space-exploration mission software, business system 
software, medical and military software. Software failures are caused by errors that 
arise due to faults in the software that have been introduced during software 
development (Ammann & Offutt, 2008). A delayed failure is defined for the present 
research as a failure that occurs some time after the condition that causes the failure; 
this thesis advances the proposition that delayed failure of software components is a 
consequence of long-latency error propagation and that the conventional approach to 
software testing is unlikely to detect this type of software failure. 
 
The present research has conducted an experimental study of delayed failure of data 
base management system (DBMS) software components (MySQL and Oracle XE) 
using stochastic high volume automated testing (HVAT) with random generation of 
SQL (structured query language). The scope and context of the present research is 
limited to software components described by a ‘stateless’ request-response model, and 
delayed failures resulting from long-latency error propagation described by a state-
transition model of error propagation and failure; these two models together provide the 
‘conceptual framework’ for the research. 
 
This chapter presents an introduction to software component testing and terminology, 
motivation for the present research, an introduction to delayed failure, the research 
problem, experimental studies of DBMS, key elements and focus of the research, the 
contributions to knowledge, and lastly the structure of the thesis. 
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1.2   Software Component Testing 
 
Software component testing is a relatively new and very active area of research that 
reflects the increasing use of components in software engineering. The British 
Computer Society (BCS) Testing Standards Working Party defined BS 7925-2 Standard 
for Software Component Testing (working draft 3.4) in 2001; Reid (2000) discusses the 
development of this standard. The software component testing standard BS 7925-2 
(2001) defines a software component as “a minimal software item for which a separate 
specification is available”. 
 
Software testing has been defined as “the process of executing software with the intent 
of detecting faults” (Myers, et al., 2004). Software testing is concerned with the 
assessment of software quality factors, such as correctness, performance, reliability, and 
security (Pan, 1999-b). 
 
In conventional software testing, testers use their skill and judgement to select 
appropriate conditions (typically, particular combinations of input value and software 
state) as test cases to be executed against the software under test (SUT). The resulting 
behaviour of the SUT (typically, a particular output value) is compared with the 
expected behaviour and if these are different, a failure has occurred and a fault in the 
software is suspected (Myers, et al., 2004). In general, the output value produced by a 
software component depends on both the input value and on the current software state; 
the software ‘state’ is the aggregate of the values of all program variables held in 
memory at an instant of time (IEEE, 1991). 
 
Since a software component may have many thousands of possible input values and 
many thousands of possible states, exhaustive testing of all combinations of input value 
and state is not usually possible (Kaner, 2003-a). Consequently, faults can often remain 
undetected after testing and these may lead to failure of the software after it has been 
released. 
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This section introduces fundamental approaches to software testing, high volume 
automated testing, component-based software engineering, software component 
reliability, reliability measures, software component robustness, and stochastic testing. 
1.2.1  Fundamental Approaches to Software Testing 
 
Software testing techniques have been categorised on the basis of their contrasting 
fundamental approaches: static vs. dynamic testing, and black-box vs. white-box testing 
(Lewis, 2009). In static testing, the software specification and/or program code is 
examined for faults without executing the program; while in dynamic testing, faults are 
revealed by running the program on a computer and observing its behaviour. In black-
box testing, test cases are based on the functional and other specified requirements of 
the software without considering the details of the program code; while in white-box 
testing, test cases are based on knowledge of the program code and design (Beizer, 
1990; Utting & Legeard, 2007). These fundamental approaches to software testing 
suggest categories of software testing techniques, represented as a quadrant diagram in 
Figure 1. 
 Static Dynamic  
Black-box  ×  
White-box   
 
 
Figure 1: Fundamental approaches to software testing 
 
Each of the four quadrants in Figure 1 may be considered an important area of software 
testing research in its own right, for example the upper left-hand quadrant in Figure 1 
can be characterised as static black-box testing in which the functional and other 
specified requirements of the software are examined without executing the program. 
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However, the focus of the present research falls within the upper right-hand quadrant 
marked as an X in Figure 1, characterised as dynamic black-box testing. Within the 
category of dynamic black-box testing, two further contrasting fundamental approaches 
can be identified: positive testing vs. negative testing. Positive testing employs only 
valid input values in order to demonstrate that software conforms to its specification 
(conformance testing), whereas negative testing employs invalid input values (or a 
mixture of valid and invalid values) to test software robustness; software testing will 
generally include both positive and negative testing (Beizer, 1990; Utting & Legeard, 
2007). 
1.2.2  Component-Based Software Engineering 
 
The goal of component-based software engineering is to build software systems by the 
composition of pre-existing software components; this is expected to lead to 
improvements in software reliability and reduced cost, especially with the advent of 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components (Gao, Tsao & Wu, 2003). 
 
It is usual to test software components both individually before composition and 
afterwards as an integrated system (Bhor, 2001) because software systems may exhibit 
emergent behaviour that cannot be predicted by considering the components in isolation 
(Johnson, 2006). 
 
A necessary corollary of the goal of component-based software engineering is to be able 
to predict the properties of the assembled system, and for this it is first necessary to 
characterise the properties of the individual components (Hamlet, Mason & Woit, 
1999). Firesmith (2005) gives the following quality factors for software components: 
‘capacity, correctness, dependability, interoperability, performance, and utility’; 
dependability is itself composed of the quality factors availability, defensibility, 
reliability, and robustness, while defensibility is in turn composed of the quality factors 
safety, security, and survivability. Since stochastic testing can be used to characterise 
the reliability and robustness of software components, these properties are investigated 
in the present research. 
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1.2.3  Software Component Reliability 
 
Reliability has been defined as “the ability of a software component to perform its 
required functions under stated conditions for a specified period of time, or for a 
specified number of operations” (IEEE, 1991). 
 
In principle, software component reliability might be determined by the use of statistical 
testing, that is random testing with a probability distribution (‘operational profile’) 
based on the expected use of the component in operation (Musa, 1993; Koziolek, 2005). 
In practice, an operational profile is difficult to define for a software component, 
because all the possible ways in which the component might be used are unknown, and 
measures of software reliability using operational profiles are open to criticism (Hamlet, 
1994). However, components might be compared on the basis of their measured 
reliability for a specified test profile as one factor of design trade-off in component-
based software engineering (Hamlet, Mason & Woit, 1999). 
1.2.4  Reliability Measures 
 
Pan (1999-a) has remarked: “Measuring software reliability remains a difficult problem 
because we don't have a good understanding of the nature of software. There is no clear 
definition to what aspects are related to software reliability. We can not find a suitable 
way to measure software reliability, and most of the aspects related to software 
reliability.” A further difficulty is that measures of software reliability depend on the 
operational profile used, so that testing with a different operational profile is likely to 
result in a different value for measured reliability (Whittaker & Voas, 2000). 
Nevertheless, reliability measures originally derived from theories of hardware 
reliability have been applied to software reliability (Fenton & Pfleeger, 1997). 
 
A commonly used measure of software reliability is the Mean Time To Failure 
(MTTF); MTTF is a statistical measure defined as “the expected time that a system will 
operate before the first failure occurs” (Storey, 1996). 
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An equivalent measure of software reliability is failure rate, denoted by λ and defined as 
“failures per unit time or per number of transactions” (IEEE, 1991); for a constant 
failure rate λ then MTTF = 1/λ (Storey, 1996). 
 
In software testing, an alternative measure to MTTF is the F-measure defined as “the 
number of test cases required to detect the first program failure”. The F-measure can 
be shown to be equivalent to MTTF (Chen, Kuo & Merkel, 2004). 
 
Other measures of software reliability include the Mean Time Between Failures 
(MTBF) defined as “the expected or observed time between consecutive failures in a 
system or component” and availability A defined as “the degree to which a system or 
component is operational and accessible when required for use” (IEEE, 1991). 
 
The Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) is defined as “the expected or observed time 
required to recover a system or component and return it to normal operation” (IEEE, 
1991). The MTTR is also known as the Mean Time To Recovery (Kyne, et al. 2010). 
 
By definition, MTBF = MTTF + MTTR and A = MTTF / MTBF (Teorey & Ng, 1998). 
 
The reliability measures MTBF and availability are not used in the present research, 
since these depend on the MTTR and this is not a factor in the experiments. 
 
In the present research, the F-measure during stochastic testing with a ‘positive’ profile 
containing only valid input values will be recorded, and it is argued that this provides a 
comparative measure of software component reliability. 
1.2.5  Software Component Robustness 
 
IEEE (1991) defines robustness as “the degree to which a component or system can 
function correctly in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful environmental 
conditions.” From this definition it can be inferred that robustness testing is negative 
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testing, employing only invalid input values (or a mixture of valid and invalid input 
values) (Varpiola & Takanen, 2008). 
 
One approach to the generation of negative test cases is by ‘mutation’ of positive test 
cases (data mutation) as described by BS 7925-2 (2001) and Shan & Zhu (2006, 2007) 
and this is the approach taken in the present research. 
 
Robustness testing is generally not concerned with the correctness of the software 
(comparison with the expected result) but with ‘terminal’ failures such as a software 
crash or hang; robustness testing therefore does not require a sophisticated test oracle, 
beyond the general principle that the software should not crash or hang (Koopman, et al. 
2002). 
 
In the present research, the F-measure during stochastic testing with a ‘negative’ profile 
containing only invalid input values (or a mixture of valid and invalid values) will be 
recorded, and it is argued that this provides a comparative measure of software 
component robustness. 
1.2.6  Dependability 
 
Reliability and robustness are subsumed in the more general concept of dependability, 
as discussed by Avizienis, Laprie & Randell (2004), Firesmith (2005) and Koziolek 
(2005). 
 
Vieira & Madeira (2009) define a dependability benchmark as “a specification of a 
standard procedure to measure both the dependability and performance of computer 
systems or components”. Several authors have discussed software dependability 
benchmarks; Madeira, et al. (2002) present a framework for dependability benchmarks 
and give examples including general purpose operating systems, on-line transaction 
processing systems, and embedded systems. 
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Such dependability benchmarks might be used as a basis for comparison of software 
components. 
1.2.7  Stochastic Testing 
 
Stochastic testing is a software testing technique that employs an extended random 
sequence of test cases to exercise the software under test; stochastic testing is expected 
to be an effective testing technique for software reliability and robustness (Mao & Lu, 
2005). 
 
Stochastic testing effectively traces a path between random points in the ‘test space’ of 
input value and software state; this is illustrated by a two-dimensional scatter diagram 
of random points with axes of software state and input value in Figure 2. The diagram 
in Figure 2 was generated using a computer program written by the author. 
 
  Input Value 
 
        Software State 
 
Figure 2: Random data points in the test space 
 
Stochastic testing is important for the present research because an extended sequence of 
test cases does not continually reset the software state, unlike the conventional approach 
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to software testing with test ‘setup’ and ‘cleanup’ steps. Stochastic testing allows 
software errors to propagate beyond a single test case and is therefore a good candidate 
as a testing technique for delayed failure. 
1.3   Terminology 
 
This section gives definitions of special technical terms used in this thesis: fault, failure, 
error, error propagation, and latency. Definitions of general software testing 
terminology can be found in the following standard references: 
 
BS 7925-1 (2004) Glossary of Software Testing Terms 
IEEE (1991) Standard Computer Dictionary 610 
ISTQB (2007) Standard Glossary of Terms used in Software Testing. 
1.3.1  Fault, Failure, and Error 
 
Prasad, McDermid & Wand (1996) have noted that the terms fault, failure, and error 
are not used consistently in the software engineering literature. The following 
definitions are adapted from software testing terminology in the standard references, 
and will be used throughout this thesis: 
 
Fault Deviation of program code from its intended design, or a mistake in the 
component design; a fault is also known as a defect or a bug. 
 
Failure Deviation of software component behaviour from its specification, where a 
specification is defined as “a description of a component's function in terms of 
its output values for specified input values under specified preconditions” (BS 
7925-1, 2004). 
 
Error An incorrect software state; a state that was not intended by the designers of 
the component. 
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1.3.2  Error Propagation and Latency 
 
Yim, Kalbarczyk & Iyer (2009) introduce the following terms in the context of a model 
of error propagation and latency, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Activation A fault is dormant until it is activated and causes an error. Activation 
may occur for example due to execution of program code that contains a 
fault. 
 
Propagation An error is latent until it causes a failure. An error may be transformed 
into other errors in a chain of error propagation until a failure occurs. 
 
Latency Fault activation latency is the period between the start of software 
execution and fault activation. Error propagation latency is the period 
between fault activation and failure. 
 
Fault → Error → Failure 
 
Fault Activation 
Latency 
 
Error Propagation 
Latency 
 
 
Figure 3: Error propagation and latency 
 
1.4   Motivation 
 
The author worked as a software test engineer in the telecoms industry from 1987 to 
2004. The motivation for the present research originated in the author’s (unpublished) 
experience of high-volume automated testing and model-based testing (MBT) between 
1997 and 1999. 
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This section describes a fundamental problem encountered in software testing, how this 
problem led to the idea of using a stateless request-response model in software testing, 
and how this model in turn led to the idea of delayed failure of software. 
1.4.1  A Fundamental Problem in Software Testing 
 
A fundamental problem encountered in software testing is the ‘coverage problem’ – the 
location of software faults in the test space is unknown, and the region of the test space 
covered in testing may or may not overlap the region of the test space containing faults, 
as illustrated by Slutz (1998). This problem can be paraphrased as, ‘how to do sufficient 
testing?’ given that “complete testing is impossible” Kaner (1997). 
 
In the author’s experience, manual test case design was found to be too slow to allow a 
sufficiently large testing space to be covered with reasonable time and effort, and so an 
attempt was made to address this problem by using high volume automated testing to 
vastly increase the covered region of the test space. 
1.4.2  High Volume Automated Testing 
 
Automated software-testing tools can perform automatic test execution and automated 
comparison of results, and these tools can increase testing speed and reduce testing 
errors; however, even with automatic test execution, manual generation of test cases 
places a serious limitation on the volume of tests that can be executed. High volume 
automated testing (HVAT) addresses this problem by the automatic generation and 
execution of very large numbers of test cases (Kaner, Bond & McGee, 2003). 
 
With HVAT, either deterministic or randomly generated test cases are produced 
automatically from a specification or model of the SUT, by the use of suitable software 
tools. For automated test execution, automatic comparison of test results with the 
expected outputs is performed, and so automatic generation of expected outputs by a 
‘test oracle’ is required. Since the output response from the SUT generally depends on 
both the input request and on the state of the software, the test oracle must include a 
description of the software state (Nyman, 2000). However, in the author’s experience, 
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the creation and maintenance of a state-based automated test oracle with reasonable 
time and effort was a problem, and a simpler approach was sought; a ‘stateless request-
response’ model of the SUT was devised in response to this problem. 
1.4.3  Stateless Request-Response Model 
 
A common model of communication between software components is the request-
response, or client-server model as described by Martin-Flatin (2005) and shown in 
Figure 4. In this communication model, a client sends a request to a server, and the 
server sends back a response containing the requested information. 
 
Client 
Request 
→ 
Response 
← 
Server 
 
Figure 4: Client-server model 
 
In the stateless request-response model devised by the author, the SUT is regarded as a 
‘black box’ that regardless of its internal state, should either accept a valid input 
request, or reject an invalid input request. For any given input request, it should be 
possible to determine from the software specification if this is a valid request that 
should be accepted, or if this is an invalid request that should be rejected. This stateless 
request-response model provided the basis of a simplified automatic test oracle. With 
this oracle, a failure of the SUT should be detected if a valid input request is rejected, or 
if an invalid input request is accepted (or if no output response is returned at all, as in 
the case of a crash or hang of the SUT) regardless of the software state. 
1.4.4  Delayed Failure 
 
Despite the more limited ability to detect failures, compared to a state-based oracle, in 
the author’s experience the stateless request-response model provided a cost effective 
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approach, complementary to manual testing; however, this approach raised the question 
of what was the resulting state of the SUT, if an invalid input request was accepted. 
 
The present research into delayed failure of software components was motivated by the 
following questions: If the SUT continues to correctly process subsequent input 
requests after accepting an invalid input request, can it be relied upon to continue to 
operate correctly? Might it fail unpredictably some time later, due to being left in an 
incorrect, but non-observable state?  
 
These questions immediately suggested the further idea, that delayed failure might 
potentially also occur when processing valid input requests, leading to ‘invalid’ and 
‘valid’ instances of delayed failure, and furthermore it seemed likely from the author’s 
experience that delayed failures might not be detected by the ‘conventional’ approach to 
software testing. 
1.4.5  The Conventional Approach To Software Testing 
 
The conventional approach to software testing (whether manual or automated) is to 
include ‘setup’ and ‘cleanup’ steps in test cases, so that the test cases are executed 
independently and with predictable results. This avoids the need for a complex state-
based test oracle, and keeps test traces short and hence easier to investigate following a 
test failure (see ‘identifying failing input requests’ in Chapter 2); a test trace is a history 
of requests and responses during the execution of a test case. 
 
Typical steps in a conventional test case are (Haftmann, Kossmann & Lo, 2007): 
 
1. Test setup  (initial software state for test) 
2. Test execution (request-response sequence) 
3. Test cleanup (undo changes to software state) 
 
However, this approach prevents software errors from propagating beyond a single test 
case (Nyman, 2000) and so this approach is unlikely to reveal delayed failures that 
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result from long-latency error propagation; faults that cause delayed failures might 
therefore avoid detection and remain in released software, resulting in lower reliability 
and robustness. 
1.5   Delayed Failure 
 
A delayed failure is a failure that occurs some time after the condition that causes the 
failure. Delayed failure in a software component can be a result of long-latency error 
propagation. As well as delayed software failure, the phenomenon of delayed failure is 
also known from failure delay systems and the delayed failure of brittle materials in 
materials science. 
1.5.1  Failure Delay Systems 
 
The ubiquitous presence of software in the modern world, and the potentially insidious 
nature of software faults, was recently impressed on the author, on being unable to start 
his car and discovering the battery to be flat. It turned out that the Multiplex Integrated 
Control Unit (MICU) of the vehicle was failing to enter a ‘sleep mode’ after the ignition 
was switched off, resulting in a parasitic battery drain that would flatten the battery if 
the car was left standing for a sufficiently long period. According to the manufacturer, 
the fault was caused by a software error and the MICU was replaced. The operation of 
the MICU is described in United States Patent Application 20100082198, ‘Vehicle 
Load Control Device’. 
 
An interesting feature of this failure is that, although the MICU entered an incorrect 
state shortly after the ignition was switched off, the car only failed to start if left 
standing for several hours. A general class of systems where failure does not occur 
immediately, but only after a delay are known as failure delay systems. These have been 
studied by Limnios (1988), who states that a characteristic of these systems is that 
failure occurs if and only if the conditions for failure are maintained for a sufficient 
time. Limnios (1988) gives the example of a water reservoir fed by a pump; if the pump 
stops working, the flow of water from the reservoir does not fail, provided the pump is 
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restarted before the reservoir is empty. However, if the pump stops working for a 
sufficiently long time, then the flow of water from the reservoir will fail. 
 
The failure of the vehicle MICU is an example of a failure delay system involving a 
software component, although not a delayed failure of software, as such. 
1.5.2  Delayed Software Failure 
 
Although the existence of delayed failure in software was reported as early as 1971 
(Pyle, McLatchie & Grandage) a review of the software engineering literature has found 
few systematic studies of delayed software failure. There are a small number of studies 
of error propagation, such as that of Yim, Kalbarczyk & Iyer (2009), however these are 
not linked to software testing techniques. 
 
There are several possible reasons why delayed failure of software during testing might 
not have been recognised as important; first, because of the use of ‘setup’ and ‘cleanup’ 
in test cases, conventional software testing is unlikely to detect delayed failures. 
Second, any delayed failures found in testing could be difficult to recreate for 
debugging and so might simply be ignored as ‘irreproducible’. Third, if the delay is 
sufficiently long then another type of software failure may occur before the delayed 
failure, thus ‘masking’ the delayed failure. 
1.5.3  Delayed Failure of Brittle Materials 
 
Delayed failure (‘static fatigue’) of brittle materials such as ceramics, glass, and steel is 
well known and has been extensively reported in the literature of materials science, for 
example: Fischer-Cripps (2007) “Depending on environmental conditions, brittle solids 
may exhibit time-delayed failure, where fracture may occur some time after the initial 
application of load”. This behaviour has been studied for a considerable time, as noted 
by Fuller, Luecke & Freiman (2001) “As early as the 1920s, the strength of glass and 
other brittle materials was understood to be limited by the presence of small cracks. 
Under stress, the small cracks would grow into larger cracks until reaching a critical 
size, at which point the material would fracture catastrophically.” 
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Software systems have, indeed sometimes been called ‘brittle’ by analogy with the 
failure behaviour of brittle materials; Forsberg, Mooz & Cotterman (2005) “The 
inability of software to deal with unexpected inputs is sometimes referred to as 
brittleness” while Bellovin (2006) discusses the ‘brittleness’ of software in the context 
of software security. 
 
Bush, Hershey & Vosburgh (2000) have attempted to construct a theory of brittle 
systems based on this analogy: “This behaviour is characterized by a sudden and steep 
decline in performance as the system state changes. This can be due to input 
parameters which exceed a specified input, or environmental conditions which exceed 
specified operating boundaries”. A theory of delayed failure of software by analogy 
with delayed failure of materials, with error propagation in software playing the role of 
crack propagation in materials, might be interesting, however this is beyond the scope 
of the present research. 
1.6   Research Problem 
 
This section states the research problem and explains why investigation of this problem 
is worthwhile; and discusses an alternative approach to that taken in the present 
research, the technique of ‘extended random regression’ (ERR). 
1.6.1  Problem Statement 
 
The research problem: Faults that cause delayed failures are likely to avoid 
detection by the conventional approach to software testing and remain in released 
software, resulting in lower reliability and robustness (than if they had been removed). 
Little is known from the software engineering literature of the failure delay 
characteristics and failure delay mechanisms of software components, of effective 
testing techniques for revealing delayed failure, or of the effect of delayed failure on 
software component reliability and robustness. 
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1.6.2  Why Investigation of this Problem Is Worthwhile 
 
The argument was put forward in the ‘Motivation’ section of this chapter that the 
conventional approach to software testing is unlikely to detect faults that cause delayed 
failures, because this approach prevents software errors from propagating beyond a 
single test case. If this is correct then these faults are likely to remain in released 
software after testing, provided no additional testing techniques (such as stochastic 
testing) are employed. There is some evidence that testing techniques that could reveal 
this type of fault have only recently begun to be more widely employed, for example, 
tools supporting random testing of DBMS such as MySQL and Oracle (Stoev, 2009; 
Naraine, 2009). Indeed, the present research provides examples of faults resulting in 
delayed failure that have been found in released versions of commercial software 
components using stochastic testing. 
 
To the extent that delayed failure affects software reliability and robustness, these faults 
can be expected to result in lower reliability and robustness of released software, than if 
they had been removed. Limnios (1988) describes reliability modelling of failure delay 
systems, however, there appear to be few systematic studies of delayed failure in the 
software engineering literature, and the effect of delayed failure on software component 
reliability and robustness does not appear to be well understood. 
 
It is known that long test traces present difficulty in debugging (Zeller & Hildebrandt, 
2002) and so faults resulting in delayed failure after software release can be expected to 
be particularly costly to identify and fix. Better understanding of testing techniques that 
effectively and efficiently reveal delayed failure should contribute to improved 
reliability and robustness, and reduced cost of software components. 
1.6.3  Extended Random Regression 
 
Kaner, Bond & McGee (2003) present a case study of ‘extended random regression’ 
(ERR) a HVAT approach that addresses the oracle problem by choosing a large 
collection of existing tests that the SUT has already passed, and re-executing these in a 
 36 
random order. Although the tests are designed to be independent of one another, test 
execution may have unintentional side effects that change the software state; the order 
of execution of tests affects the outcome of the test run and some tests in the run may 
fail. The success of extended random regression as a test technique suggests that 
conventionally written software tests do in fact have an ability to detect some faults that 
cause delayed failures, provided tests are run multiple times in long random sequences, 
however this is not the conventional way of executing tests, which are usually executed 
in a fixed order. 
 
Berndt & Watkins (2005) give examples of complex, distributed system failures in 
which long sequence testing might have been effective; failures of the Patriot Missile 
System, London Ambulance Service, Railway Switching in Germany, Kaner’s (1997) 
example of a phone system, and the NASA Mars Rovers. 
1.7   Experimental Studies of DBMS 
 
The motivation behind the present research was to study delayed failure of software 
components in general; however, a concrete example of a software component must be 
chosen as the focus for experimental study, and DBMS were identified as a suitable 
choice of subject. The present research therefore includes a contribution to the 
experimental study of DBMS and DBMS testing techniques. There is a growing 
literature in this area since the work of Slutz (1998) and Costa & Madeira (1999). The 
choice of DBMS as the subject for experimental study clearly influences the research 
methodology experimental procedures, and the domain of validity of the conclusions 
that can be drawn. 
 
Experimental studies of DBMS fall within the relatively new field of experimental 
software engineering, exemplified by Basili (1996). 
 
This section discusses the choice of DBMS as a subject of study, then introduces 
DBMS and SQL and the chosen DBMS components MySQL and Oracle XE, and 
finally describes the experimental approach adopted in the present research. 
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1.7.1  Choice of DBMS as a Subject of Study 
 
In considering an experimental investigation of delayed failure of software components, 
the choice of DBMS as a subject of study was guided by the following criteria: 
 
1. There is a perceived gap between academic research into software testing and 
industrial software testing practice (Reid, et al., 1999) therefore the chosen component 
should be a real software product, ideally in widespread commercial and industrial use. 
DBMS meet this criterion and MySQL and Oracle XE were chosen as being 
representative examples of commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) DBMS products. 
 
2. The chosen component should be a ‘stable’ production software release, having 
presumably passed the component supplier’s quality control and release test process. 
Although precise details of the suppliers’ test process are not known, they may be 
assumed to represent a baseline ‘industry standard’ practice. If the research method 
reveals faults that were not removed during release testing then it might be the case that 
the ‘industry standard’ testing process is not as effective at revealing these faults. 
MySQL and Oracle DBMS have documented release histories extending over several 
years, and in the case of MySQL there is a public ‘bugs database’ containing a detailed 
history of known faults and bug fixes and details of test suites. 
 
3. The chosen component should be freely and easily available to researchers to 
allow replication of the research. The MySQL and Oracle XE DBMS may be 
downloaded from the suppliers’ websites free of charge under appropriate licensing 
terms. 
 
4. The specification of the chosen component should be freely and easily available. 
This is necessary in order to be able to specify test cases for the component. Both 
MySQL and Oracle XE have extensive documentation, both downloaded from the 
suppliers’ websites and in published textbooks, and there is an international standard for 
SQL (ISO/IEC 9075, 2008). In the case of MySQL, program code is freely available as 
Open Source. 
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5. The chosen component should have an easily accessible and well-documented 
interface allowing automated testing. The Perl database interface (DBI) is freely 
available and supports both the MySQL and Oracle DBMS. Furthermore, the author 
already had some previous experience of using the Perl database interface for MySQL. 
 
6. For the present research, the chosen component must conform to the ‘stateless 
request-response model’ of the conceptual framework described in Chapter 3. DBMS 
architecture typically follows a request-response model (Date, 2004) and any SQL 
request can be determined to be syntactically valid or invalid, regardless of the database 
state, by reference to the DBMS specification, such as the MySQL 5.0 Reference 
Manual (2010) or the Oracle® Database SQL Reference (2005). 
 
7. The chosen component should be the subject of related work in the software 
engineering literature. Experimental studies of DBMS and DBMS testing are active 
areas of current research as discussed in Chapter 2; for example Slutz (1998), Haritsa 
(2006), Tuya, Suárez-Cabal & de la Riva (2006), Finnigan (2009), Garcia (2009), 
Naraine (2009), Stoev (2009), Khalek & Khurshid (2010). 
 
8. The state of a DBMS is a combination of the software state and the database 
state. Although the software state of a component cannot usually be observed, in the 
case of a DBMS the content of database tables may be examined using the SQL 
statements SHOW TABLES, SHOW COLUMNS table and SELECT * FROM table 
thus providing some partial information about the DBMS state. 
1.7.2  Introduction to DBMS and SQL 
 
An introduction to DBMS and DBMS architecture can be found in Date (2004); a block 
diagram of a typical DBMS architecture is shown in Figure 5. Typically this 
architecture follows the request-response model described in Chapter 1 as shown in 
Figure 4. The client sends a request to the DBMS, which causes a database operation to 
be requested. The database returns a response to the DBMS with the result of the 
operation and the DBMS finally returns a result to the client. The DBMS typically 
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manages transactions composed of sequences of database operations and provides the 
capability to ‘roll back’ transactions in the event of detecting an error (Greenwald, 
Stackowiak & Stern, 2004; Vaswani 2004). 
 
Client 
↓ ↑ 
DBMS 
↓ ↑ 
 
Database 
 
Figure 5: Block diagram of DBMS architecture 
 
The database holds logically organised data; in the case of a relational database, the data 
is organised as a collection of tables. SQL (structured query language) provides a syntax 
and semantics for communication between the client and the DBMS and has facilities 
for creating, reading, updating, and deleting database tables. An introduction to SQL 
can be found in Date (2004) and in Greenwald, Stackowiak & Stern (2004). The SQL 
international standard is ISO/IEC 9075 (2008), however both MySQL and Oracle offer 
a core sub-set of the earlier 2003 version of this standard, along with proprietary 
extensions. 
1.7.3  MySQL 
 
MySQL is a freely available Open Source relational DBMS that provides storage and 
management of data held in tables using SQL. Oracle Corporation acquired Sun 
Microsystems in 2010 and so acquired ownership of MySQL. 
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MySQL 5.0 release history from the MySQL 5.0 Reference Manual (2010) is shown in 
Table 1. MySQL 5.0.1 was released in 2004 (still with some open critical bugs) 
however the version of MySQL under test (5.0.22) was released in 2006 as a stable 
production version. 
 
Version Release Date Notes 
MySQL 5.0.0 22 December 2003 Alpha release 
MySQL 5.0.1 27 July 2004 Still some open critical bugs 
MySQL 5.0.2 01 December 2004 - 
MySQL 5.0.22 24 May 2006 - 
 
Table 1: MySQL 5.0 release history 
 
A technical guide to MySQL can be found in Vaswani (2004); MySQL provides a well-
documented programming interface through the Perl database interface (DBI) as 
described in the MySQL Administrator’s Guide (2004), the MySQL 5.0 Reference 
Manual (2010) and by Robert (2010). 
 
The MySQL database server returns either error responses or success responses to the 
client. The error responses syntax error and empty query do not depend on the DBMS 
state. Other error responses and success responses are dependent on the software state 
or the database state; an SQL statement may be accepted (stateless behaviour) even 
though it does not succeed (state-based behaviour). The MySQL client-server protocol 
is described in the MySQL Internals Manual (2005). Schumacher (2005) describes the 
handling of invalid inputs in MySQL 5.0. 
1.7.4  Oracle XE 
 
Oracle Database 10g Express Edition (Oracle XE) is a free ‘starter’ edition of Oracle 
10g based on Oracle Database 10g Release 2, but limited to running on a single 
processor with up to 1 GB of RAM and 4 GB of user data as described in the Oracle® 
Database Express Edition Installation Guide (2007). The beta version was released in 
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2005. All of the Oracle Database 10g product family are based on the same database 
engine architecture as described in Greenwald, Stackowiak & Stern (2004). 
 
A programming interface for Oracle Database is available through the Perl database 
interface (DBI) as described by Robert (2010). 
 
Oracle’s programming language extension to SQL is called PL/SQL and is described in 
the Oracle® Database SQL Reference (2005) and by Murray (2008). 
1.7.5  Experimental Approach 
 
The experimental approach taken in the present research investigates the reliability, 
robustness and delayed failure characteristics of software components by comparing 
measures made on two DBMS using two stochastic testing techniques. Both testing 
techniques execute randomly generated SQL against a random database. 
 
Positive tests for reliability comparison are performed using randomly generated 
syntactically valid SQL in an approach similar to that of Slutz (1998). Negative tests for 
robustness comparisons are performed using randomly generated invalid SQL produced 
by SQL mutation. This approach applies for DBMS the concept of testing with ‘hostile 
data streams’ as described by Jorgensen (2002). The experimental approach for 
determining F-measure and failure delay is based on an analysis of the state transition 
model of error propagation and failure, described in Chapter 3. 
 
The experimental approach takes account of frameworks and guidelines for empirical 
studies of test techniques, based on a review of the literature of experimental software 
engineering presented in Chapter 2. Some of the methodological challenges encountered 
with the experimental approach were differences in SQL syntax between MySQL and 
Oracle XE, the need for automatically separating valid and invalid SQL statements 
following SQL mutation, and reproducibility of failures, as described in Chapter 5. 
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1.8   Key Elements and Focus of the Research 
 
This section describes the key elements, and focus, of the research. 
1.8.1  Key Elements of the Research 
 
The key elements of the present research are: 
 
a) Software component testing and delayed failure. The research problem arises 
from considering software component testing in the context of delayed failure. 
The investigation of the research problem should demonstrate an effective test 
method for revealing delayed failure of software components. 
 
b) Reliability and robustness of software components. Reliability and robustness 
are important quality factors for software components and so these are 
interesting in the context of delayed failure. 
 
c) Stochastic testing. Stochastic testing is likely to be an effective method for 
revealing delayed failure as well as a suitable technique for reliability and 
robustness testing of software components. 
 
d) Experimental studies of DBMS. The MySQL and Oracle XE DBMS were 
selected as suitable subjects of study for an experimental approach to the 
research problem. 
 
e) The conceptual framework. The conceptual framework described in Chapter 3 
provides a context for the experimental approach and a model of delayed 
software failure that can be validated by experiment. 
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1.8.2  Research Focus 
 
A Venn diagram as shown in Figure 6 may be helpful in illustrating the focus of the 
present research. This diagram shows the focus of the present research marked as an X 
at the overlap of fours areas: delayed failure, DBMS research, stochastic testing, and 
experimental software engineering. Venn diagram image is from Wikimedia Commons. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Research focus 
 
1.9   Contributions to Knowledge 
 
This section briefly summarise the contributions to knowledge of the present research. 
A full summary of contributions appears in Chapter 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
Delayed 
Failure 
DBMS 
Stochastic 
Testing 
Experimental 
Software 
Engineering 
× 
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a) That delayed failure is an important failure mode of software components. 
b) That the conventional approach to software testing is unlikely to detect delayed 
failure. 
c) A methodology for benchmarking software component dependability. 
d) That stochastic testing is an effective technique for revealing delayed failure. 
e) Corroboration of related work in DBMS testing using random generation of 
SQL. 
f) A state transition model of delayed failure in software components. 
g) That the research problem can be solved, at least for the components considered 
in the study. 
1.10   Thesis Structure 
 
This section gives a brief summary of each chapter of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an introduction to software component testing and terminology, 
the motivation for the present research, an introduction to delayed failure, the research 
problem, experimental studies of DBMS, key elements and focus of the research, the 
contributions to knowledge, and lastly the structure of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents a review of the software engineering literature in the areas of 
software component testing techniques, software component reliability, software 
component robustness, stochastic testing, alternative approaches to stochastic testing, 
experimental studies of DBMS, and delayed failure. 
 
Chapter 3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter presents the simple stateless request-response model and a refinement of 
this model developed during the present research – the partitioned request-response 
model; along with the state transition model of error propagation and failure, the 
Markov chain model, and the process of delayed failure. 
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Chapter 4. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES 
This chapter presents a statement of the research question, the research hypotheses H1 
and H2 together with the associated null hypotheses, calculations of expected values of 
F-measure and failure delay using the Markov chain model, and why answering this 
question is worthwhile. 
 
Chapter 5. METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
This chapter first presents the research goals, a generic procedure for testing the 
hypotheses, the experimental design, experimental configurations, methods for random 
generation of SQL and SQL mutation, DBMS initialisation, database creation, and the 
method for identifying minimal test sequences. This chapter then presents the 
procedures to be followed in the 1st experiment - MySQL (invalid and valid SQL) and 
the 2nd experiment - Oracle XE (valid SQL), and discusses methodological challenges, 
experimental questions, and data analysis. 
 
Chapter 6. RESULTS 
This chapter presents results for the 1st experiment using MySQL with invalid and valid 
SQL, MySQL bugs found during the experiment, and results for the 2nd experiment 
using Oracle XE with valid SQL. 
 
Chapter 7. ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents an analysis of the experimental results. This analysis looks for 
differences between experimental profiles P1 and P2 with the same SUT and for 
differences between SUT S1 and S2 with the same experimental profile, as well as 
considering the accuracy of the response profile regression analysis and the statistical 
distribution of the results. 
 
Chapter 8. DISCUSSION 
This chapter presents a discussion of the present research within the context of 
stochastic testing, SQL mutation, experimental studies of DBMS, fault detection 
effectiveness and efficiency, the conceptual framework, delayed failure, the research 
problem, and threats to validity. 
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Chapter 9. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents a summary of the conclusions of the present research, a summary 
of the contributions to knowledge, and areas for future research. 
 
Chapter 10. REFERENCES 
This chapter presents references to the software engineering literature as given in this 
thesis. 
 
APPENDIX A. DBMS RESPONSE PROFILE RESULTS 
This appendix contains the full experimental results for MySQL and Oracle XE DBMS 
response profiles. 
 
APPENDIX B. TEST MACHINE CONFIGURATIONS 
This appendix records the hardware and software configurations for the MySQL and 
Oracle XE test machines. 
 
APPENDIX C. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS FOR 1st EXPERIMENT 
This appendix describes the data sets and experimental results for the 1st experiment and 
gives details of the program and data files used to automate the experimental procedure. 
 
APPENDIX D. CONFERENCE PAPER (TAIC PART 2006) 
Abstract of conference paper presented at the Testing Academic & Industrial 
Conference – Practice And Research Techniques, (TAIC PART) 2006. 
 
APPENDIX E. CONFERENCE PAPER (UKSMA 2009) 
Abstract of conference paper presented at the 20th Annual Conference of the United 
Kingdom Software Metrics Association, (UKSMA) 2009. 
 
APPENDIX F. NORMAL PROBABILITY PLOTS 
This appendix presents normal probability plots of F-measure results. These results 
appear to be approximately normally distributed. 
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1.11   Summary 
 
This chapter presented an introduction to software component testing and terminology, 
the motivation for the present research, an introduction to delayed failure, the research 
problem, experimental studies of DBMS, key elements and focus of the research, the 
contributions to knowledge, and lastly the structure of the thesis. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews relevant areas of the software engineering literature and shows 
how the major topics relate to each other, and how they relate to the rest of the present 
research. The review covers every technique used in the research, including statistical 
tools and measures of reliability, and includes a description of the investigated methods, 
a description of alternative methods, and related work. 
 
Remarkably, there appear to be few systematic studies of delayed failure in the software 
engineering literature, and in particular, there appear to be no studies of stochastic 
testing as related to delayed failure, or studies of delayed failure of DBMS. This gap in 
knowledge provides further justification for the present research. 
 
This chapter presents a review of the software engineering literature in the areas of 
software component testing techniques, software component reliability, software 
component robustness, stochastic testing, alternative approaches to stochastic testing, 
experimental studies of DBMS, and delayed failure. 
2.2   Software Component Testing Techniques 
 
Software component testing was introduced in Chapter 1, where testing techniques were 
categorised on the basis of the fundamental approaches of static, dynamic, black-box, 
and white-box testing techniques (Lewis, 2009) and the focus of the present research 
was identified as falling within dynamic black-box testing techniques. 
 
Software component testing techniques must address the problem of the size of the test 
space and the ‘oracle problem’ (Kaner, 1997; Kaner & Bach, 2005). One approach to 
the test space problem is to employ high volume automated testing techniques, for 
example exhaustive high-volume testing, random function equivalence testing, and 
extended random regression (Kaner, Bond & McGee, 2003). 
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Software components are prone to a large number of different types of faults and 
several ‘taxonomies’ of software faults have been collected, such as Beizer (1990). 
Several empirical studies of software component testing techniques have been 
conducted which compare their fault detection effectiveness and efficiency, such as 
Reid (1997). 
 
Software component testing techniques are complementary to the process of debugging 
and removal of faults, and this process begins with identifying failing input requests 
(Zeller & Hildebrandt, 2002) and this process is informed by models of error 
propagation and failure such as that of Yim, Kalbarczyk & Iyer (2009). 
 
This section reviews the test space problem, the oracle problem, high volume automated 
testing, fault taxonomies, empirical studies of test techniques, fault detection 
effectiveness and efficiency, identifying failing input requests, and models of error 
propagation and failure. 
2.2.1  The Test Space Problem 
 
The size of the test space is a fundamental problem in software testing; Kaner (1997) 
says that “complete testing is impossible”, since this would require testing every 
possible input value with every possible software state. Kaner, Falk & Nguyen (1993) 
and Myers, et al. (2004) advance similar arguments. Binder (2000) (in the introduction 
to Chapter 5: Test Models) says: “Testing can be viewed as a search problem. We are 
looking for those few input and state combinations that will reach, trigger, and 
propagate bugs out of trillions and trillions, which will not. Brute force is impotent at 
this scale. Testing by poking around is a waste of time that leads to unwarranted 
confidence.” 
 
The large size of the testing space for software-intensive digital electronic systems is 
illustrated by the following example given by Kaner, Falk & Nguyen (1993), Kaner 
(1997, 2000) and Kaner, Bond & McGee (2003). This was a software bug in a phone 
system, where a specific sequence of events caused a stack overflow resulting in a 
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system crash. The bug was reported as being very specific and unlikely to be found by a 
conventional approach to software test design; this bug and several other ‘long-
sequence’ bugs in the phone system were eventually found by using stochastic testing 
together with diagnostic instrumentation of the program code. The state diagram of the 
phone system as derived from Kaner (1997) is shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: State diagram of phone system 
 
In the phone system, up to ten callers would be placed on a hold queue; however, there 
was a bug in this system such that if a caller hung up while on hold, the data for that call 
was not properly removed from the system stack. After twenty such errors had 
accumulated on the stack, placing another call onto the hold queue would overflow the 
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stack, causing a system crash. The number of possible call scenarios that would have to 
be tested to catch this bug is very large, and Kaner considers it unlikely that manual test 
generation from the model would include the specific crashing bug case. Kaner relates 
in passing that the system developers originally missed off the transition from ‘On 
Hold’ to ‘Caller hung up’ (dotted line) from the model, showing that even simple 
software models may contain errors. 
2.2.2  The Oracle Problem 
 
Kaner & Bach (2005) summarise the oracle problem with the question “How will you 
know whether the program passed or failed the test?” and note that “our ability to 
automate testing is fundamentally constrained by our ability to create and use oracles”. 
 
The output of a software system or component typically depends on both the input and 
the software state; the input, process, output, storage (IPOS) model shown in Figure 8 
provides a general model of a system with this property (Stair & Reynolds, 2008). 
 
Input → Process → Output 
 ↑ ↓  
 Storage  
 
Figure 8: IPOS model 
 
Predicting the outcome of a long sequence of test cases therefore requires a test oracle 
having a state-based model of the software component. State-based models of complex 
software-intensive systems can be very large and the construction and maintenance of 
these models presents a practical challenge, for example Nyman (2000) makes the 
following observation on the use of state-based models: “The greatest single cost is 
generating the model or state table. It’s not unusual to need a 50,000-
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for a moderately complex product. Continuing to add new features results in state 
explosion in which the number of nodes increases geometrically. So creating the model 
is seldom a one-time cost; for large models or tables, maintenance becomes a major 
cost factor”. However, Nyman adds: “they may be cost effective for critical parts of a 
project where the state table can be kept small”. 
 
The effort of building and maintaining a state-based model can be comparable to the 
effort that would be involved in conventional manual test design; Utting (2007) and 
Utting & Legeard (2007) report case studies in which test design effort with MBT was 
17% to 35% less than manual test design. 
2.2.3  High Volume Automated Testing 
 
High volume automated testing (HVAT) was introduced in Chapter 1. HVAT consists 
of the automatic generation and execution of very large numbers of test cases, and 
usually employs a very simple test oracle, such as ‘did the software crash?’ (Nyman, 
2000; Kaner, 2003-b). 
 
Kaner, Bond & McGee (2003) have discussed HVAT as a response to the test space 
problem. Kaner (2003-b) notes that “although the individual tests are often weak, they 
make up for low power with massive numbers”; however, HVAT produces long test 
traces that require analysis to derive ‘minimal’ test cases (see ‘identifying failing input 
requests’). McGee & Kaner (2004) list the types of fault they expect HVAT to be able 
to find: “buffer overruns and security holes, special cases, timing related errors, 
corrupt memory or stack, memory or resource leaks, resource exhaustion”. 
 
McGee & Kaner (2004) suggest that HVAT techniques can “dramatically increase the 
reliability of software that must run for long periods of time without stopping or 
rebooting” and that “[HVAT] techniques are much more effective on code that is 
already fairly stable and passes basic functional tests. For such code, we believe it can 
lead to substantial increases in reliability.” They note “there is very little empirical 
research on [HVAT] techniques”. 
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Kaner (2000) describes the following HVAT techniques, as discussed by several 
authors (these are discussed in more detail later on in this chapter, in the sections on 
‘stochastic testing’ and ‘alternative approaches to stochastic testing’): 
 
a) Exhaustive high-volume testing (Hoffman & Kaner, 2003) 
b) Random function equivalence testing (Hoffman & Kaner, 2003) 
c) Stochastic testing using ‘dumb monkeys’ (Nyman, 2000) 
d) Stochastic testing with diagnostic instrumentation of program code 
(this is the phone system example given by Kaner (1997) as discussed in ‘the 
test space problem’ and shown in Figure 7) 
e) Stochastic testing using a state model (Whittaker, 1997) 
 
Kaner, Bond & McGee (2003) add extended random regression and ‘hostile data 
stream’ testing (Jorgensen, 2002) to this list. 
2.2.4  Fault Taxonomies 
 
Several authors have developed extensive classification schemes (‘taxonomies’) of 
software faults and failures. These are useful to software testing practitioners and 
researchers in identifying common types of software faults and failures, and the testing 
techniques that may be able to reveal them. 
 
Beizer (1990) as amended by Vinter (2001) provides an appendix ‘Bug Taxonomy and 
Statistics’ that classifies many types of fault and includes statistics of the occurrence of 
these faults in real software projects. Kaner, Falk & Nguyen (1993) provides an 
appendix of ‘common software errors’ that describes over 400 software faults. 
 
A comprehensive classification scheme can be found in the IEEE Computer Society 
Standard Classification for Software Anomalies (IEEE, 1993). The classification 
scheme for recognition of software ‘anomalies’ given in this standard assigns reference 
codes (prefixed RR for ‘recognition’) to several ‘symptoms’ of failure, and a selection 
of these are shown in Table 2. 
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Symptom of Failure Code 
Operating system crash RR510 
Program hang-up RR520 
Program crash RR530 
Correct input not accepted RR541 
Wrong input accepted RR542 
Wrong output format RR551 
Incorrect output result/data RR552 
Incomplete/missing output RR553 
Failed required performance RR560 
Perceived total product failure RR570 
System error message RR580 
 
Table 2: Classification of failure symptoms 
 
Siewiorek, et al. (1993) give the following failure classifications for robustness testing 
with invalid input values: ‘no error detected’ (considered to be a failure), ‘time-out’ 
(late response), ‘incorrect output’, ‘crash’, ‘crash with error message’ (‘abort’); correct 
behaviour is considered to be a response with an error message. 
2.2.5  Empirical Studies of Test Techniques 
 
Experimental or empirical software engineering is a relatively new field of research 
exemplified by Basili (1996): “Software engineering needs to follow the model of other 
physical sciences and develop an experimental paradigm for the field”. 
 
Several authors have pointed out the need for a consistent framework for reporting 
empirical studies in software engineering: 
 
Jedlitschka & Pfahl (2005) say: “One major problem for integrating study results into a 
common body of knowledge is the heterogeneity of reporting styles: (1) It is difficult to 
locate relevant information and (2) important information is often missing. Reporting 
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guidelines are expected to support a systematic, standardized presentation of empirical 
research, thus improving reporting in order to support readers in (1) finding the 
information they are looking for, (2) understanding how an experiment is conducted, 
and (3) assessing the validity of its results”. They give a set of guidelines for reporting 
experimental results, and suggest the research community should evaluate these 
guidelines. 
 
Kitchenham, et al. (2007) critique the guidelines proposed by Jedlitschka & Pfahl 
(2005) and conclude: “The current guidelines need to be revised and then subjected to 
further theoretical and empirical validation”. 
 
Channon & Koch (2007) propose that full details of software engineering experiments 
should be made available, including raw data, methodology, source code, execution 
profile, tools, and documentation. 
 
Harman, et al. (1999) and Reid, et al. (1999) point out the need for a consistent 
framework for reporting empirical studies in software testing; Reid, et al. (1999) 
propose a framework in which the following experimental factors are to be recorded: 
subjects, objects, treatments, state variables, and response variables. Briand (2007) 
notes that: “Empirical studies are crucial to software testing research in order to 
compare and improve software testing techniques and practices”. 
 
Several empirical studies of test techniques have been conducted: for example, Reid 
(1997) reported a comparison of Equivalence Partitioning, Boundary Value Analysis, 
and random testing which concluded that “an implementation of BVA was found to be 
most effective, with neither EP nor random testing half as effective. The random testing 
results were surprising, requiring just 8 test cases per module to equal the effectiveness 
of EP, although somewhere in the region of 50,000 random test cases were required to 
equal the effectiveness of BVA”. 
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2.2.6  Fault Detection Effectiveness and Efficiency 
 
Reid, et al. (1999) define test effectiveness as “the ability of a technique to detect faults 
in software” and give the mathematical formulation shown in equation (1). 
 
Test effectiveness = Number of faults detected / Total number of faults (1) 
 
Test effectiveness as defined in equation (1) is difficult to measure in practice since the 
total number of faults cannot be known with certainty; the existence of faults must be 
deduced from observed failures and there need not be a one-to-one relationship between 
fault and failure. Furthermore, faults may lie dormant for some time after software is 
released into service (Reid, et al., 1999). 
 
Reid, et al. (1999) define test efficiency as “the number of faults detected divided by the 
time taken to perform the testing” and give the mathematical formulation shown in 
equation (2). 
 
Test efficiency = Number of faults detected / Total time  (2) 
 
The total time (in person-hours) may be taken to include the effort to create the test 
cases, and any models or oracles, as well as for test execution and analysis of results. 
 
Despite earlier work such as that of Reid (1997) and Reid, et al. (1999), BS 7925-2 
(2001) (Annex C - Test technique effectiveness) notes that, “Research into the relative 
effectiveness of test case design and measurement techniques has, so far, produced no 
definitive results”. 
 
Measures of fault detection effectiveness include the E-, F- and P-measures defined in 
Table 3 as discussed by Chen, Kuo & Merkel (2004), Chen & Merkel (2007), Liu & 
Zhu (2008) and Parizi, et al. (2009). Liu & Zhu (2008) also define the S-measure as the 
sample standard deviation of any one of the previous three measures and state that “the 
smaller the S-measure, the more reliable the testing method”. 
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Measure Definition from Liu & Zhu (2008) 
E The expected (average) number of failures detected by the test set 
F The number of test cases required to detect the first failure 
P The probability of detecting at least one failure in a given test set 
S The variation of fault detecting ability 
 
Table 3: Measures of effectiveness 
 
2.2.7  Identifying Failing Input Requests 
 
Identifying failing and ‘precondition’ requests in long test traces is important to assist 
debugging and removal of faults (Zeller & Hildebrandt, 2002). This is a particular 
problem for HVAT, where a test trace might contain many thousands of requests and 
responses. One approach to this problem is simplification of the test trace by the 
elimination of ‘redundant’ test steps to produce a ‘minimal’ test case; that is, a short 
sequence of input requests that reproduces the original failure. 
 
Zeller & Hildebrandt (2002) and Cleve & Zeller (2005) describe an automated 
technique for simplifying test traces known as ‘delta debugging’ by repeatedly 
executing altered versions of a failing test sequence until a passing sequence is found; 
the difference between the two sequences is (presumably) the cause of the failure. 
 
Slutz (1998) describes automatic simplification of randomly generated SQL statements 
to aid debugging during DBMS testing. The simplified SQL statement produces the 
same failure behaviour as the original statement, although semantically the two 
statements may not be equivalent. 
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2.2.8  Models of Error Propagation and Failure 
 
Two basic types of software failure model are described in the software engineering 
literature: a linear cause-effect model and a probabilistic state transition model. 
 
The first type of software failure model is a linear cause-effect sequence of error 
propagation: fault → error → failure where a dormant fault is first activated and causes 
an error, and then the error propagates as a chain of errors until a failure eventually 
occurs. However, in the model a dormant fault will not necessarily be activated and an 
error will not necessarily produce a software failure. This model of error propagation 
and failure is discussed by: Koopman (1999); Avizienis, et al. (2004); Avizienis, Laprie 
& Randell (2004); Cleve & Zeller (2005); and Yim, Kalbarczyk & Iyer (2009). 
 
An earlier, yet more sophisticated model was presented by Prasad, McDermid & Wand 
(1996); this is a state transition model of fault activation, error propagation and failure 
referred to as the DAP (dormant, active, propagation) model. Although this transition 
model is not probabilistic, it allows more complex failure behaviour than the strictly 
linear cause-effect sequence model. 
 
Ammann & Offutt (2008) propose an alternative terminology, ‘RIP’ (‘reachability, 
infection, propagation’) for error propagation and failure. In this model, fault activation 
is called ‘reachability’ as program execution reaches a fault in program code, and an 
incorrect software state (error) is called an ‘infection’ which propagates by program 
execution to cause a failure. The three conditions of reachability, infection, and 
propagation must all be present for software failure to occur. 
 
None of the previous authors explicitly mention latency or delay in the model; however 
Yim, Kalbarczyk & Iyer (2009) introduce the concepts of fault activation latency and 
error propagation latency, as shown in Figure 3 (refer to Chapter 1, Terminology). 
 
The second type of software failure model is a probabilistic state transition model 
(Markov chain model) in which probabilities are assigned to transitions between 
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software states, including failure states. Transitions between software states take place 
as the result of the software processing input requests. This model allows a statistical 
approach and provides a model for software reliability (Whittaker & Thomason, 1994; 
Thomason & Whittaker, 1999). However, these authors do not explicitly mention error 
propagation in their failure models, nor do they explicitly mention latency or delay in 
the models. 
 
A software design approach called ‘software rejuvenation’ seeks to reduce the 
frequency of software failure by periodically restarting running software, thus 
preventing errors from propagating to the point of failure. This approach is described 
by: Huang, et al. (1995), Bernstein (2002), Bernstein & Kintala (2004), and Trivedi & 
Vaidyanathan (2008). The approach is described in terms of a probabilistic state 
transition model containing an initial ‘robust’ state, a ‘failure probable’ state, a 
‘rejuvenation’ state, and a ‘failure’ state; probability distributions are assigned to 
transitions between the states. Software failure occurs as the result of transitions from 
the ‘robust’ state via the ‘failure probable’ state to the ‘failure state’. ‘Rejuvenation’ 
occurs when transitions take place from the ‘failure probable’ state via the 
‘rejuvenation’ state back to the ‘robust’ state. 
 
Shukla (1994) and Brukman, Dolev & Kolodner (2003) discuss ‘self-stabilisation’ of 
software; this process may delay or prevent the ultimate failure of a software component 
by returning the component to the ‘robust’ state. 
 
Both rejuvenation and self-stabilisation must be ‘fail-stop’ to be effective, that is, the 
error detection latency must be small, otherwise an error state can propagate to the 
component output before action is taken, perhaps even being written to persistent 
storage (Chandra & Chen, 1998). 
 
Michael & Jones (1996) present an empirical study into the propagation of errors, which 
suggests that, “either all data state errors injected at a given location tend to propagate 
to the output, or else none of them do”. They call this property “homogeneous 
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propagation” and conclude “that one can draw conclusions about the behaviour of 
many data-state errors after examining only a few”. 
2.3   Software Component Reliability 
 
Software component reliability was introduced in Chapter 1. This section reviews 
composition of component reliability, MTTF and F-measure, statistical testing and 
operational profiles. 
2.3.1  Composition of Component Reliability 
 
Hamlet, Mason & Woit (1999) propose a ‘foundational theory’ of software component 
reliability; the composition of components would ideally be supported by component 
‘data sheets’ that would provide sufficient technical quality information about 
components to allow system designers to make reliability predictions for the combined 
system. They contend that random testing using a specified profile based on formal 
specification of component behaviour would provide a suitable statistical measure. 
 
Mason (2002-a): “One of the desirable properties of predictable assembly is reliability. 
Given reliability and transformation functions for components, it is possible to 
accurately compose reliabilities. Currently the transformations are limited in their 
domain of applicability, but we are working to extend their domain.” 
 
Stafford & McGregor (2002) note several issues in predicting the reliability of 
composed components, including the choice of operational profile, unit of time, and 
definition of failure, which may differ for the composed system compared to the 
conditions of reliability estimation for the component. 
2.3.2  MTTF and F-Measure 
 
Reliability measures including MTTF and F-measure were introduced in Chapter 1. 
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) is a statistical measure defined as “the expected time 
that a system will operate before the first failure occurs” (Storey, 1996). An equivalent 
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measure of software reliability is failure rate, denoted by λ and defined as “failures per 
unit time or per number of transactions” (IEEE, 1991). The reliability function R(t) can 
be defined as the probability that there will be no failure before time t and for a constant 
failure rate λ then R(t) = e−λt when it can be shown that the MTTF = 1/λ (Storey, 1996). 
 
Chen, et al. (2004, 2007) define the F-measure as “the number of tests required in a 
sequence to detect the first program failure” and show that (for random testing with 
replacement) if the software under test has a constant failure rate (probability of failure) 
p then the F-measure is distributed according to the geometric distribution. They show 
that probability density function is P(X=n) = q(n-1)p where q=1−p and the MTTF is E(X) 
= 1/p with variance Var(X) = q/p2. If p << 1 then the variance is approximately 1/p2 and 
the standard deviation is approximately 1/p. 
2.3.3  Statistical Testing 
 
Statistical software testing uses an operational profile to reflect the expected actual 
usage of the software. This addresses the perceived shortcomings of random testing and 
equivalence partitioning as black-box techniques, in that they provide a uniform 
coverage of software, unrelated to actual usage (Weber, 2002). 
2.3.4  Operational Profiles 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, measures of software reliability depend on the operational 
profile chosen, that is, on the frequency of occurrence of each possible input value or 
choice of software function, as discussed by Musa (1993) and Koziolek (2005). Mason 
(2002-b) defines an operational profile as “a statistical description of the environment 
in which a system is used”. 
 
Binder (2004) considers the case for testing using an operational profile to be 
‘compelling’. However, the use of operational profiles has some problems: (a) 
operations that are expected to occur infrequently are not well tested, although these 
will eventually occur in service (b) if the operational profile changes in the future (or if 
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the operational profile used in testing was not accurate) then untested functionality is 
suddenly exposed (Whittaker & Voas, 2000). 
 
Hamlet (1994) critiques reliability measures based on an operational profile especially 
in the case of reusable software components for which the operational profile is not 
known. 
 
Whittaker & Thomason (1994) suggest that a single operational profile is insufficient 
for many types of software, because the probability distribution of input values during 
software execution is not constant. 
2.4   Software Component Robustness 
 
Software component robustness was introduced in Chapter 1. Software component 
robustness testing (also known as ‘fuzz’ testing or penetration testing) includes both 
random testing (Mukherjee & Siewiorek, 1997) and deterministic testing techniques 
(Varpiola & Takanen, 2008). 
 
Robustness has been defined as “the degree to which a component or system can 
function correctly in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful environmental 
conditions” (IEEE, 1991) and robustness testing therefore employs negative testing 
(Utting & Legeard, 2007). 
 
Siewiorek, et al. (1993) give an alternative definition of robustness as “the ability to 
identify and handle errors in a consistent and predictable manner”. This definition 
would presumably include handling errors due to valid inputs, as well as those due to 
invalid inputs, and so robustness testing by this definition is not restricted only to 
negative testing. Nevertheless, the authors go on to describe benchmarks of system 
robustness only in terms of invalid inputs, as do Mukherjee & Siewiorek (1997). 
 
Varpiola & Takanen (2008) suggest that much of software testing is positive 
(conformance) testing and that insufficient negative testing is performed; they discuss 
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fuzzing as negative testing, and maintain that systematic grammar based test generation 
is more effective than random testing for robustness testing, because random testing has 
a low probability of finding security-related faults. 
 
This section reviews negative testing, fuzz testing, and measures of robustness. 
2.4.1  Negative Testing 
 
Robustness testing using negative tests is discussed by Utting & Legeard (2007) who 
distinguish between ‘format testing’ that employs invalid input values and ‘context 
testing’ that employs valid input values presented to the SUT in an invalid order (such 
as will happen during stochastic testing). 
 
Siewiorek, et al. (1993) identify four possible combinations of program responses to an 
invalid input; detect the error (or not) and fail (or not), and use these as a basis for 
program failure classification during robustness testing (as described earlier in this 
chapter under ‘Fault Taxonomies’). 
 
Negative test cases can be produced by mutation of positive test cases (data mutation) 
as described by Shan & Zhu (2006, 2007). BS 7925-2 (2001) gives guidance on the 
application of syntax testing with examples of both positive and negative test cases, 
including rules for generating test cases with invalid syntax using mutation, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
2.4.2  Fuzz Testing 
 
Fuzz testing or ‘fuzzing’ has its origins in a series of reports on the stability and 
reliability of UNIX utilities, which crashed or hung when fed random input strings, by 
Miller, Fredriksen & So (1990), Miller, et al. (1995) and Bowers, Lie & Smethells 
(2001). Fuzz testing was later applied to the problem of security vulnerability testing 
(testing for software robustness to malicious invalid inputs) especially for network 
protocol software. The classic type of software robustness failure is buffer overflow 
(Jorgensen, 2002). 
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Examples of automated tools employing fuzzing include PROTOS (Kaksonen, Laakso 
& Takenen, 2000); Ballista (Koopman, et al. 2002); SPIKE (Aitel, 2002) and Sulley 
(Sutton, Greene & Amini, 2007). ‘Fuzzing’ is defined by Sutton, Greene & Amini 
(2007) as “the process of sending intentionally invalid data to a product in the hopes of 
triggering an error condition or fault”. They add, “These error conditions can lead to 
exploitable vulnerabilities”. 
 
More recently, fuzz testing has been applied to robustness testing of DBMS, for 
example Garcia (2009) reports on the use of SQL Fuzz testing at Microsoft Corporation. 
2.4.3  Measures of Robustness 
 
Siewiorek, et al. (1993) and Mukherjee & Siewiorek (1997) have developed robustness 
benchmarks for UNIX systems that provide an indication of robustness for some areas 
of software system functionality. 
 
Varpiola & Takanen (2008) point out that negative testing increases code coverage 
beyond what is possible with positive tests, and this might provide a metric for 
robustness testing; another metric for robustness testing might be input space coverage, 
however finding good metrics for robustness testing remains a challenge. Garcia (2009) 
observes that there is a need for further research into robustness testing metrics, such as 
code coverage; such metrics can help determine “when we can stop fuzzing” (Sutton, 
Greene & Amini, 2007). 
2.5   Stochastic Testing 
 
Stochastic testing was introduced in Chapter 1. This section presents an overview of 
stochastic testing, and considers stochastic testing as an example of a Monte Carlo 
method, and the relationship between run length and test effectiveness; before 
reviewing random search of software states and limitations of undirected random 
testing. 
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2.5.1  Overview of Stochastic Testing 
 
In classical random testing, as described for example in BS 7925-2 (2001), the values 
used in each test case are selected at random, but the test cases are independent of one 
another. In stochastic testing, as described by Kaner (2000) and by Kaner, Bond & 
McGee (2003), a randomly chosen sequence of test cases is executed, where the result 
of each test case depends also on the history (order) of previous test cases. Both 
classical random testing and stochastic testing should be less prone than are 
conventional testing techniques to the so-called ‘pesticide paradox’ described by Beizer 
(1990) in which the rate of detection of faults decreases with repeated execution of the 
same tests; this is because random testing effectively produces a ‘new’ test case on each 
test run (Robinson, 1999). 
 
Whittaker (1997) introduces stochastic testing as a formal approach to software testing 
in which testers create stochastic models (Markov chains) of software behaviour (rather 
than individual test cases) and test cases are automatically generated from the stochastic 
models. Stochastic testing is sometimes known as ‘monkey testing’, however despite 
this pejorative term, Nyman (2000) reports that a ‘dumb monkey’ that can choose 
randomly from a large range of input values and finds very obvious bugs like crashes 
and hangs can nevertheless be highly effective. Kaner & Bach (2004) present an 
overview and analysis of stochastic testing, alongside other random testing techniques. 
2.5.2  Monte Carlo Methods 
 
Stochastic testing can be viewed as an example of a Monte Carlo method; the term 
Monte Carlo is often used to describe any method that employs repeated random 
sampling to estimate a value. Korver (1994) shows how Monte Carlo analysis can be 
applied to the estimation of software reliability; an advantage of this approach is that it 
can be applied without any knowledge of the structure or complexity of the SUT. 
However, as Korver points out, statistically a large number of random samples are 
required for reliable estimation, because the standard error decreases with the square 
root of the sample size and so the sample size must be increased by a factor k2 to reduce 
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the standard error by a factor k. The standard error is defined as the square root of (s2/n) 
where s is the sample standard deviation and n is the sample size. 
2.5.3  Test Run Length and Test Effectiveness 
 
The relationship between test run length and test effectiveness for stochastic testing is 
not well understood. Slutz (1998) observes that: “if the distribution is adequate, 
stochastic testing has the advantage that the quality of the tests improves as the test size 
increases”. Andrews, et al. (2008) conclude based on case studies that “the choice of 
test length dramatically impacts the effectiveness of random testing”. They report that a 
small number of long runs may be more effective than a large number of short runs, 
although long runs produce long test traces that are difficult to debug (see ‘identifying 
failing input requests’). 
2.5.4  Random Search of Software States 
 
Monte Carlo methods generally have a slow rate of convergence as discussed by Korver 
(1994). However, Menzies, Owen & Cukic (2002) and Menzies, Owen & Richardson 
(2007) report a saturation effect in the random search of state models: “random search 
of finite state machines exhibits an early saturation effect [and] quickly yields all that 
can be found, even after a much longer search”. This effect is called ‘clumping’ and 
these authors make the hypothesis that “the effective state space of a program is 
relatively small when compared to all reachable states”. This finding suggests 
stochastic testing may be more efficient than might otherwise be expected, in achieving 
effective software state coverage. 
2.5.5  Limitations of Undirected Random Testing 
 
Undirected random testing (such as stochastic testing) leads to inefficient coverage of 
the test space, because the same state transitions may be executed many times over 
(Robinson, 1999). Furthermore, coverage of the test space is non-uniform, with clusters 
of data points in some areas and relatively light coverage in others, as illustrated by 
Figure 2 in Chapter 1 and discussed by Chen & Merkel (2007) and Chen, et al. (2007). 
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2.6   Alternative Approaches to Stochastic Testing 
 
In order to address the limitations of undirected random testing, several approaches for 
improving coverage of the test space have been proposed. These include deterministic 
approaches such as exhaustive high-volume testing, quasi-random testing, adaptive 
testing, directed random testing, and genetic algorithms. 
2.6.1  Exhaustive High-Volume Testing 
 
Exhaustive high-volume testing may sometimes be possible: Hoffman & Kaner (2003) 
give an example of testing mathematical functions on a massively parallel computer. In 
this case, the integer square root for all integers on a 32-bit machine was tested in about 
six minutes; this found two errors that would probably not have been found without 
exhaustive testing. In this case, exhaustive testing of 232 = 4,294,967,296 integer values 
was possible, and was justified by the expected use of this machine in life-critical 
applications. In each case, the calculated value was compared to the value provided by 
an independent test oracle. The authors contrast this case with a second example of 
testing 64-bit integer square roots. In this case, exhaustive testing was not possible as 
there are 232 × 232 = 264 integer values, which at the same rate as in the previous 
example would have taken approximately 4 × 108 hours (a large random sample of 
values over a wide range of values was tested instead; the authors refer to this technique 
as ‘random function equivalence testing’). 
2.6.2  Quasi-Random Testing 
 
Chen & Merkel (2007) discuss the use of ‘quasi-random’ testing to overcome the 
tendency in random testing for clustering and under-population in the test space; they 
present F-measures for testing using quasi-random sequences and show that this 
approach can be more effective than random testing. 
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2.6.3  Adaptive Testing 
 
Adaptive testing uses feedback from the results of executing previous test cases to guide 
the generation of further tests. Adaptive testing has been discussed by Ince (1987) and 
by Hierons (2009). The ‘delta debugging’ technique of Cleve & Zeller (2005) for 
simplifying test traces is a form of adaptive testing. 
 
Adaptive testing of software systems can perhaps be understood in terms of the input, 
process, output, storage (IPOS) model with feedback as shown in Figure 9. This is a 
general model of an information system with a feedback loop (Stair & Reynolds, 2008) 
where a measurement of the output of a system is fed back to the input of the system. 
 
 Feedback  
↓  ↑ 
Input → Process → Output 
 ↑ ↓  
 Storage  
 
Figure 9: IPOS model with feedback 
 
2.6.4  Directed Random Testing 
 
Directed random testing is an adaptive testing technique based on random testing. Some 
reports suggest directed random testing is both more efficient and more effective than 
either deterministic testing or undirected random testing, for example see Chen, et al. 
(2007), Liu & Zhu (2008), Parizi, et al. (2009). However, Arcuri, Iqbal & Briand (2010) 
compared random testing, adaptive random testing, and search-based testing using 
genetic algorithms and in this study, no one of the three techniques was found to be 
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better in general than the others. There are several different directed random testing 
techniques - two examples are given here: 
 
Godefroid, Klarlund & Sen (2005) present a technique called Directed Automated 
Random Testing (DART) in which feedback is provided through instrumented program 
code. The DART approach also derives the interface specification from analysis of the 
source code. Because DART has access to the interface specification of the SUT it is 
able to avoid generating random values that would simply be rejected by any input 
value ‘filtering’ code. In an experimental evaluation, DART found program faults in a 
few seconds or less, whereas an undirected random search did not find the faults even 
after many hours of searching. 
 
Pacheco, et al. (2007) present a technique called Random tester for Object-Oriented 
Programs (RANDOOP) that uses feedback from the results of execution of program 
methods to build sequences of test cases for unit testing of classes. They report that 
feedback-directed random test generation achieves better code coverage and error 
detection in experimental evaluations than either deterministic test generation or 
undirected random test generation. 
2.6.5  Genetic Algorithms 
 
One promising variation on the theme of directed random testing is the use of genetic 
algorithms. Genetic algorithms are a class of techniques that search for a best or optimal 
solution to a problem in a manner that has been compared to the mechanism of 
biological evolution. A population of candidate solutions to a problem are evaluated 
using a ‘fitness function’ and the properties of the fittest solutions (which may not yet 
be optimal solutions) are propagated into a new generation of candidate solutions by a 
process of mixing (‘crossover’) and random mutation. The procedure is repeated over 
many generations until an optimal solution is eventually reached (Coley, 1999). 
 
Godefroid & Khurshid (2004) describe the use of genetic algorithms for exploring very 
large state spaces in an attempt to avoid the problem of ‘state space explosion’. 
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A genetic algorithm was used to choose the next state transition at each step of the state 
space exploration. In an experimental comparison of this approach to both deterministic 
search and undirected random search of the state space for two example programs, the 
genetic algorithm approach discovered program faults after searching for about one or 
two hours, however the other approaches did not discover the faults even after eight 
hours of search. 
 
Berndt & Watkins (2005) advocate the use of genetic algorithms for high volume 
automated test generation for long sequence testing alongside other approaches such as 
the extended random regression (ERR) approach described by Kaner, Bond & McGee 
(2003). 
 
Bati, et al. (2007) has extended the work of Slutz (1998) on the testing of DBMS, with 
the use of genetic algorithms guided by the results of query execution, for test 
generation. Undirected random generation of SQL results in many database queries that 
do not return results, and so do not test the underlying DBMS very effectively. This 
approach was reported to find ten times more defects than the original undirected 
approach. 
2.7   Experimental Studies of DBMS 
 
Experimental studies of DBMS were introduced in Chapter 1. This section reviews 
DBMS testing, methods of random generation of SQL, SQL mutation, and database 
creation. 
2.7.1  DBMS Testing 
 
Slutz (1998) performed a study of syntax testing of DBMS using grammar-based 
random generation of SQL (described in the next section) and reported that around 14% 
of executed random SQL statements resulted in a failure or incorrect result. 
 
Costa & Madeira (1999) performed a study of software fault injection on the Oracle 
DBMS and reported that 18% of injected faults resulted in an aborted transaction, while 
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5% of injected faults resulted in the DBMS hanging. However, none of the injected 
faults affected the integrity of the database. Costa, Rilho & Madeira (2000) performed a 
similar study and reported that around 50% of injected software faults resulted in 
DBMS failures. 
 
Willmor & Embury (2005) give criteria for adequacy of testing of database systems and 
observe that DBMS faults may involve interactions of program state and persistent 
database state. Haftmann, Kossmann & Kreutz (2005) also make this point. 
2.7.2  Random Generation of SQL 
 
Grammar-based random generation of SQL has been successfully employed at 
Microsoft Corporation for many years in the stochastic testing of DBMS, as reported by 
Slutz (1998), Bati, et al. (2007) and Garcia (2009). 
 
Slutz (1998) described work on a system for random generation of SQL called RAGS. 
The RAGS system combined a random testing approach with grammar–based syntax 
generation to generate very large numbers of long, syntactically valid SQL queries. The 
complexity of the SQL specification means that it is difficult to predict the result of a 
sequence of such long, randomly generated SQL queries; to avoid this problem, Slutz 
compared several different vendors’ DBMS products for the same sequence of SQL 
queries. 
 
Haritsa (2006) has critiqued Slutz (1998), in particular it was not reported what 
proportion of failures revealed by RAGS, would be caught by existing test libraries; and 
RAGS was only tested using a very small database (less than 4k bytes). Nevertheless, 
the work of Slutz has been highly influential and was referenced for example by 
Hamilton (1998), Bruno, Chaudhuri & Thomas (2002), Zeller & Hildebrandt (2002), 
Chays, et al. (2004), Perez (2004), Chen & Merkel (2007), Chen, et al. (2007), Tuya, 
Suárez-Cabal & de la Riva (2007), and Khalek, et al. (2008). 
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Several DBMS-specific testing tools employing random generation of SQL have 
become available in recent years, and DBMS for which such tools are available include 
SQL Server, MySQL, Oracle, and SQLite (2010). Bal, Fan & Lintz (2009) list a number 
of tools for automated database testing, including RAGS. 
 
Stoev (2009), MySQL Forge (2010), and Khalek & Khurshid (2010) describe the 
MySQL Random Query Generator (RQG). Like RAGS, the RQC performs grammar-
based generation of random SQL queries that can be run against several databases 
allowing the results to be compared. Khalek & Khurshid (2010) note that RQC can 
produce invalid queries, and that it is difficult to verify if generated queries are 
syntactically correct. These authors do not describe any specific faults, however several 
MySQL faults that were found using the RQG are reported on the MySQL online bug-
tracking system at http://bugs.mysql.com/. 
 
Finnigan (2009) and Naraine (2009) describe the Sentrigo ‘Fuzzor’, an open-source 
PL/SQL Fuzzer for Oracle available at http://www.sentrigo.com/products/fuzzor/. 
 
SQLite (2010) reports that SQL fuzz testing is performed with approximately 104,000 
SQL statements for the SQLite DBMS. 
2.7.3  SQL Mutation 
 
SQL mutation is a relatively new area of DBMS testing research; Tuya, Suárez-Cabal & 
de la Riva (2006, 2007) state that they know of no earlier work on SQL mutation than 
Chan, Cheung & Tse (2005). More recently, Cabeca, Jino & Leitao-Junior (2009) and 
Derezińska (2009) also discuss SQL mutation. 
 
In all of the studies mentioned above, mutation operators for SQL are defined in some 
detail and the results of case studies using automated tools to generate and execute 
mutated SQL are reported. However, none of these studies appear to have applied SQL 
mutation directly to the problem of DBMS testing; the use of SQL mutation is restricted 
to assessing the adequacy of tests designed to distinguish between correct and incorrect 
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SQL, by comparing the results of executing mutants with the results of executing non-
mutated SQL statements for a predefined database. Although some failing responses 
from the DBMS as a result of executing SQL mutants are mentioned in passing, this 
was not the focus of the reported studies. 
2.7.4  Database Creation 
 
Several predefined databases are widely available for DBMS testing; both MySQL and 
Oracle provide sample databases, such the Menagerie database described in the MySQL 
5.0 Reference Manual (2010) and the Sales History database described in the Oracle® 
Database SQL Reference (2005). 
 
An alternative approach is the creation of a test database by populating a predefined 
schema with randomly generated data; such data must conform to the schema integrity 
constraints. Several tools for creating test databases in this way exist, for example: 
AGENDA described by Chays, et al. (2004), ADUSA described by Khalek, et al. 
(2008), and Xplod described by Banahatti, Iyengar & Lodha (2009). 
2.7.5  Random Databases 
 
There appears to be relatively little published research into random databases, that is to 
say, databases with a randomly generated schema, rather than simply populating a 
predefined schema with random data. 
 
Seleznjev & Thalheim (1998) developed statistical models for the average lengths of 
keys in random databases. 
 
Korovin & Voronkov (2005) studied some statistical properties of random databases, in 
particular the existence of ‘threshold’ properties related to the asymptotic behaviour of 
random graphs; the literature on random graphs is extensive, see for example Janson 
(1995). Korovin & Voronkov (2005) show that as a random database grows in size, the 
probability of a particular query returning ‘true’ rapidly converges to either 0 or 1 as 
given by a threshold function. 
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Bati, et al. (2007) suggested research into randomly generated schemas as future work. 
2.8   Delayed Failure 
 
Delayed failure was introduced in Chapter 1. This section reviews the literature of 
failure delay systems and of delayed software failure. 
2.8.1  Failure Delay Systems 
 
Failure delay systems were introduced in Chapter 1. Limnios (1988) described 
reliability modelling of failure delay systems and formally defined a failure delay 
system in which there is a non-negligible delay between the occurrence of a failure 
condition and the corresponding failure. Examples of such systems include a water 
reservoir and a two-component stand-by system. In a reservoir in which the flow into 
the reservoir is interrupted, the flow out of the reservoir is only interrupted after some 
delay, when the reservoir is emptied. If the flow into the reservoir is restored before the 
reservoir is emptied, then the flow out of the reservoir remains uninterrupted. In the 
case of a stand-by system, failure of the first (active) component causes the second 
(stand-by) component to be activated; if the first component is not repaired, the system 
will continue to function until failure of the second component. In both examples, the 
continuous presence of a failure condition for a given time τ (fixed or random) is a 
condition for failure. Limnios (1988) derived measures of reliability, availability, and 
maintainability for these types of systems. 
 
Faria (2008) has considered degradation of performance over time in failure delay 
systems containing several interconnected components by mathematical modelling of 
failure states in concurrent processes. 
2.8.2  Delayed Software Failure 
 
Delayed software failure was introduced in Chapter 1. Pyle, McLatchie & Grandage 
(1971) described the analysis of a delayed failure in an interactive computer system 
named ‘HUW’ on IBM System 360/65. “Many HUW runs crashed after about one 
 75 
hour, with a diagnostic message from OS/360 reporting an illegal Data Control Block”. 
The cause was overwriting of an area of memory; the overwritten area of memory was 
not used until some time later, when a failure indication was reported. In this case, the 
EDIT command in HUW had a copying operation that was incorrectly copying a block 
of data in response to a zero-length input string. The authors concluded that string-
handling programs should be designed to deal with zero-length strings, but also 
hypothesised that “related bugs are lurking in many other systems”. 
 
The phone system described by Kaner (1997) (state diagram shown in Figure 7) 
provides an example of delayed software failure. In this case, it was reported that a 
software bug caused errors to accumulate on a stack, with stack overflow eventually 
resulting in a system crash. 
 
Thompson (2007) provides an example of delayed failure of a software system in an 
account of an experience with an in-flight entertainment system on an airplane flight 
from Las Vegas to Orlando in mid-2005. This system provided a variety of television 
channels and games through a television monitor and included a phone console with a 
numeric keypad. A parameter of the game could be incremented on the screen up to a 
maximum value of 4; but it was found by trial and error that this could also be set to an 
illegal value of 5 through the phone keypad. The author notes the software was now in 
an ‘unintended state’ and that at this point it was possible to continue to increment up to 
a value of 127. Incrementing again (presumably) resulted in an overview of a variable 
such that 127 + 1 = −128. The system is then reported to have crashed; all users 
consoles were disabled until the system was reset. Although the account is 
uncorroborated and it is not possible to confirm the actual cause of the failure, this 
example is consistent with error propagation leading to delayed failure; the software 
continued to operate correctly in the ‘unintended state’ until the game parameter was 
incremented beyond 127. 
 
Lu, et al. (2005) developed a benchmark suite for evaluating software bug detection 
tools and conducted a study of several tools. In this study the authors defined crash 
latency as the latency from the root cause of a bug to the place where the application 
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finally crashes due to the propagation of the bug. They found crash latency values from 
zero to 29 million instructions. Software error latency has been studied by Chillarege & 
Iyer (1987) and by Madeira & Silva (1994). Yim, Kalbarczyk & Iyer (2009) discuss a 
model of error propagation and latency shown in Figure 3 (‘terminology’ in Chapter 1). 
 
Tan, Chen & Jakubowski (2006) describe an approach to ‘tamper-resistant’ software 
employing a deliberate delayed failure in response to tampering. They observed that 
alternative techniques deliberately cause a program failure at the place where detection 
happens, however this allows an adversary to trace back to the tamper detection code, 
and so they adopted the strategy of introducing a large failure delay. This is achieved by 
corrupting the software state, in the form of global pointer variables. The authors note 
that software bugs can cause delayed failure and cite Pyle, McLatchie & Grandage 
(1971). 
2.9   Summary 
 
This chapter presented a review of the software engineering literature in the areas of 
software component testing techniques, software component reliability, software 
component robustness, stochastic testing, alternative approaches to stochastic testing, 
experimental studies of DBMS, and delayed failure. 
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3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1   Introduction 
 
The conceptual framework provides a foundation for the present research and consists 
of two elements: (a) a ‘stateless’ request-response model of software component 
behaviour, and (b) a state transition model of error propagation and failure. The primary 
research goal (as described in Chapter 5) is to verify by experiment that the state 
transition model correctly describes the delayed failure behaviour of real software 
components. The stateless request-response model partitions component behaviour into 
stateless and state-based elements and defines the domain of the research. 
 
The state-transition model of error propagation and failure defines a two-step 
‘precondition’ and ‘trigger’ process that characterises delayed failure. The conceptual 
framework provides a ‘bridge’ between the more general research problem and the 
specific experimental hypotheses, methodology and experimental procedures. 
 
This chapter presents the simple stateless request-response model and a refinement of 
this model developed during the present research – the partitioned request-response 
model; along with the state transition model of error propagation and failure, the 
Markov chain model, and the process of delayed failure. 
3.2   Stateless Request-Response Model 
 
The stateless request-response model was introduced in Chapter 1. This section 
describes the simple stateless request-response model and a refinement of this model 
developed during the present research – the partitioned request-response model. 
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3.2.1  Simple Request-Response Model 
 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the output response of a software component 
generally depends on both the input request and on the software state, as represented in 
the IPOS model shown in Figure 8 in Chapter 2. Predicting the outcome of a long 
sequence of test cases consequently requires a test oracle based on a state-based model 
of the software component. In Chapter 1 it was explained how the need for such an 
oracle might be avoided by the use of the ‘stateless’ request-response model which is 
shown in Figure 10. 
 
Request → SUT 
→ Accept 
 
→ Reject 
 
Figure 10: Stateless request-response model 
 
The stateless request-response model ignores the internal state of the SUT; the only 
knowledge the oracle has, is that the SUT should accept a valid request and reject an 
invalid request. If the SUT accepts an invalid request, or rejects a valid request, or does 
not respond (in the case of a hang/crash) then this is identified as a failure of the SUT. 
 
In this model it is assumed that it is always possible to determine if a request is valid or 
invalid, by reference to the software component specification. This is consistent with 
BS 7925-2 (2001) where it is stated: “Given any initial state of the component, in a 
defined environment, for any fully-defined sequence of inputs and any observed 
outcome, it shall be possible to establish whether or not the component conforms to the 
specification.” 
 
Software components that do not conform to the stateless request-response model are 
excluded from the present research; an example might be a component that simply 
accepts all requests without validating them, such as the UNIX null device /dev/null. 
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This device discards all data written to it and produces a ‘success’ response to the write 
operation, regardless of the content of the request. 
3.2.2  Partitioned Request-Response Model 
 
The stateless request-response model is a ‘black-box’ model and consequently does not 
allow more detailed analysis of the process of software component failure; however, the 
stateless request-response model has been refined in the present research into the 
‘partitioned’ request-response model shown in Figure 11 in which the software 
component contains both stateless and state-based elements within the component 
boundary. 
 
      
Request  → 
 
Response ← 
 
Stateless 
Element 
→ 
 
← 
State-Based 
Element 
 
      
 
Figure 11: Partitioned request-response model 
 
Note that the use of the partitioned request-response model does not imply or require 
that the actual implementation of the software component should be partitioned in this 
way; however, compare Figure 5: Block diagram of DBMS architecture in Chapter 1. 
 
In the partitioned request-response model, requests are validated by the stateless 
element, and valid requests are passed on to the state-based element; the state-based 
element produces an output value that is passed back in the ‘accept’ response. For the 
case of an invalid request, the stateless element produces a ‘reject’ response without 
communicating with the state-based element. 
 
A valid input value should be accepted by the stateless element regardless of the 
internal state of the state-based element; however, the request may still not succeed if 
 80 
the state-based element is not in a suitable state to process the request. In this case, the 
‘accept’ response will include an error status. If the request succeeds, the ‘accept’ 
response will include a success status as well as any output value passed back from the 
state-based element. As an example, consider the case of a DBMS component receiving 
a request to create a database table; if the requested table does not already exist then the 
request should succeed, however, if the requested table already exists, then an error 
response should be returned. 
 
The partitioned request-response model retains the simplicity of the stateless model, but 
allows an analysis of possible mechanisms of software component failure; for example, 
in the case of a fault, the stateless element may incorrectly reject a valid request, or else 
may incorrectly accept an invalid request, passing this on to the state-based element. In 
the latter case this may lead to error propagation and failure within the state-based 
element. 
 
The following state transition model describes error propagation and failure within a 
software component (that is, within the state-based element of the partitioned request-
response model). 
3.3   State Transition Model 
 
This section describes the state transition model of error propagation and failure, the 
Markov chain model, and the consequent process of delayed failure. 
3.3.1  Description of the State Transition Model 
 
Delayed failure of a software component can be understood in terms of a state transition 
model of error propagation and failure. The model described here is similar to the model 
previously described by Huang, et al. (1995) and by Bernstein & Kintala (2004). 
However, the model described by these authors was introduced in the context of what 
has been called ‘software rejuvenation’ (the practice of re-initialising a software 
component before an error has the opportunity to propagate and cause a failure) and did 
not consider delayed failure. In the present research, delayed failure is described in 
 81 
terms of long-latency error propagation in a state transition model of error propagation 
and failure. 
 
In the following account of the state transition model, a subscripted upper case letter 
such as S0 denotes a ‘macro-state’ of the software component, where a macro-state is 
defined as a collection of software states sharing a common property, as discussed by 
Datta (2007) and Faria (2008). 
 
The state transition model assumes that the executing software component can be 
described at all times by one of the following macro-states; either a ‘robust’ macro-state 
S0, a ‘precondition’ macro-state SP or a ‘failure’ macro-state SF as indicated by circles 
in the state transition diagram shown in Figure 12. A transition between macro-states is 
assumed to occur when the software component processes an input request (possibly 
also producing an output response) and the only possible transitions between macro-
states are assumed to be those indicated by the arrows in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12: State transition model 
 
Self-loop transitions from S0 back to S0 and from SP back to SP are assumed to be 
possible as the component processes input requests, as indicated by the curved block 
arrows in Figure 12. 
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The term ‘robust’ is used for the macro-state S0 because no transition to the ‘failure’ 
macro-state SF is possible from S0 and the term ‘precondition’ is used for the macro-
state SP because any transition to the ‘failure’ macro-state SF requires a transition to SP 
as a precondition to failure. The macro-state SP is called a ‘failure probable state’ by 
Huang, et al. (1995) and by Bernstein & Kintala (2004), however the property of being 
a ‘precondition to failure’ is emphasised in the present research, where latency in the 
macro-state SP terminated by a ‘trigger’ event leading to failure is identified as the 
fundamental mechanism of delayed failure. Software states in the ‘precondition’ macro-
state SP are incorrect software states (errors) that (it is assumed) are not intended by the 
designers of the component. 
 
This model assumes that the component state at initialisation corresponds to the ‘robust’ 
macro-state S0. It is further assumed that the software component processes a sequence 
of input requests resulting in a sequence of transitions between macro-states, and that 
this eventually results in a transition to the ‘precondition’ macro-state SP. 
 
As the software component continues to process input requests, it is assumed that the 
software eventually either ‘self-stabilises’ through a transition from SP back to S0 or else 
fails through a transition from SP to the ‘failure’ macro-state SF. The software might 
remain indefinitely in the macro-state SP however it is assumed here that a transition to 
another macro-state will eventually occur. 
 
This model assumes that failure is a terminal condition, such that the software remains 
in the ‘failure’ macro-state and does not process further input requests until the 
component is restarted, so bringing it back once again to the ‘robust’ macro-state S0 as 
indicated by the dashed arrow in Figure 12. 
 
Note that the state transition model does not distinguished between a persistent software 
state and a non-persistent software state; therefore restarting the component is assumed 
to re-initialise both persistent and non-persistent storage. 
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The state transition model of error propagation inherently possesses latency that can 
result in delayed failure, since at least two (and probably more) transitions must occur 
due to processing input requests before a failure can occur. 
 
Delayed failure is defined for the present research as a failure that occurs some time 
after the condition that causes the failure; the condition leading to failure in this case is 
the processing of an input request resulting in the first transition from S0 to SP (the 
‘precondition’). The period of delay is from this input request until the input request 
resulting in the final transition from SP to SF (the ‘trigger’). 
 
The state transition model provides a description of delayed failure as the result of long-
latency error propagation where a ‘precondition’ input request is followed some time 
later by a ‘trigger’ input request. 
 
Note that the precondition and/or trigger events might alternatively be an internal signal 
within the software component caused, for example, by a timeout or a failure to allocate 
a resource; however this case falls outside the scope of the present research, which is 
limited to communication between components in accordance with the request-response 
model. 
 
Delayed failure is characterized by two latency intervals as shown in Figure 3 in 
Chapter 1: fault activation latency and error propagation latency. Fault activation 
latency includes any self-stabilisation transitions from SP back to S0. Error propagation 
latency includes any ‘dwell time’ in the precondition state due to self-loop transitions 
from SP to SP and the final transition to observable failure. 
 
Either the precondition or the trigger for delayed failure may be either a valid input 
request, or an invalid input request that has been incorrectly accepted due to a fault. 
Invalid input values that are accepted by the SUT might be more likely to result in 
failure than are valid input values, if this case was unanticipated by the designers of the 
software component. 
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3.3.2  Markov Chain Model 
 
The adjacency matrix shown in Table 4 is an equivalent representation of the state 
transition model shown in Figure 12. Here a value of 1 indicates that a transition may 
take place between the associated macro-states while a value of 0 indicates that no 
transition is possible. 
 
 S0 SP SF 
S0 1 1 0 
SP 1 1 1 
SF 0 0 1 
 
Table 4: State transition model adjacency matrix 
 
For the particular case of a random sequence of input values (stochastic testing) the 
state transition model can be interpreted as an absorbing Markov chain by assigning a 
probability to each of the possible transitions between macro-states. By multiplying 
each value in the adjacency matrix by the appropriate transition probability the 
adjacency matrix becomes a transition matrix, as shown in Table 5. Note that each row 
in the transition matrix sums to 1. In the theory of Markov chains SF is absorbing 
because no transition from SF to another macro-state is possible. 
 
 S0 SP SF 
S0 P1 P2 0 
SP P3 P4 P5 
SF 0 0 1 
 
Table 5: Markov chain transition matrix 
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Markov chain models of software failure were reviewed in Chapter 2 ‘Models of Error 
Propagation and Failure’ (Whittaker & Thomason, 1994; Thomason & Whittaker, 1999) 
however these models do not explicitly model error propagation. The Markov chain 
model represented by the transition matrix shown in Table 5 provides a model of error 
propagation through transitions to the ‘precondition’ macro-state SP. 
 
Given the Markov chain transition matrix, the behaviour of the absorbing Markov chain 
model can be analysed using the theory of absorbing Markov chains, as found for 
example in Grinstead & Snell (1998) (Chapter 11: Markov Chains). 
 
The matrix Q determines the behaviour of the absorbing Markov chain model: 
 
 P1 P2  
Q = 
 P3 P4 
 
 
 
The matrix N = (I − Q)−1 is called the fundamental matrix, where I denotes the identity 
matrix. By Theorem 11.5 of Grinstead & Snell (1998) it can be shown that the expected 
number of steps before the chain is ‘absorbed’ for each starting state is given by the sum 
of the entries in the corresponding row of the fundamental matrix. 
 
The sum of the entries in the first row of the matrix N gives the expected value for F-
measure (starting in the macro-state S0) during stochastic testing and the sum of the 
entries in the second row of the matrix N (starting in the macro-state SP) gives the 
expected value for failure delay. Expected values for F-measure and failure delay under 
the assumption of particular values of transition probability are calculated in Chapter 4. 
 
The Markov chain model represented by the transition matrix shown in Table 5 assumes 
a single value for the transition probability between macro-states, that is to say a 
unimodal probability distribution is assumed for transitions between macro-states. 
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3.3.3  The Process of Delayed Failure 
 
The simple model of error propagation and failure with latency discussed by Yim, 
Kalbarczyk & Iyer (2009) implies a two-step process of failure: fault → error → failure 
however this model does not provide a mechanism that allows analysis of error 
propagation latency. The state transition model described by Huang, et al. (1995) does 
provide a mechanism that would allow analysis of error propagation latency, although 
these authors do not explicitly recognise latency in their model. The state transition 
model shown in Figure 12 emphasises a ‘precondition to failure’ where latency in the 
macro-state SP terminated by a ‘trigger’ event leading to failure provides the mechanism 
for delayed failure. 
 
Latency in the macro-state SP occurs either as a result of a direct self-loop transition 
from SP back to SP or as a result of an indirect path consisting of a ‘stabilising’ 
transition from SP to S0 and a further ‘precondition’ transition from S0 back to SP 
(possibly with one or more intervening self-loop transitions from S0 back to S0). This 
process may continue indefinitely until a failure transition from SP to SF occurs; the 
theory of absorbing Markov chains provides a mathematical analysis of this process in 
terms of transition probabilities. It should be noted that ‘fail-stop’ approaches to 
software fault tolerance such as rejuvenation and self-stabilisation have the potential to 
prevent delayed failure, provided these mechanisms have sufficiently small error 
detection latency. However Chandra & Chen (1998) conducted a study of error 
propagation in the Postgres database system using fault injection and concluded that the 
fail-stop model was violated in 7% of cases. 
3.4   Summary 
 
This chapter presented the simple stateless request-response model and a refinement of 
this model developed during the present research – the partitioned request-response 
model, along with the state transition model of error propagation and failure, the 
Markov chain model, and the process of delayed failure. 
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4 RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES 
4.1   Introduction 
 
The conceptual framework described in Chapter 3 consists of two elements, the stateless 
request-response model, and the state transition model. The stateless request-response 
model was shown to apply for the case of DBMS in Chapter 1, and this was a factor in 
the choice of DBMS as a subject of study. 
 
The question of the validity of the state transition model will now be considered. This 
question leads to two hypotheses; the first hypothesis H1 applies in the case of an 
invalid ‘precondition’ input request, and the second hypothesis H2 applies in the case of 
a valid ‘precondition’ input request. The corresponding null hypotheses can be tested by 
experiment. Rejection of the null hypotheses provides an experimental validation of the 
state transition model. 
 
The order of presentation of the hypotheses, first the ‘invalid’ case and second the 
‘valid’ case, reflects the order in which these concepts originated in the motivation for 
the present research, as described in Chapter 1, and this is the order in which the 
experiments are performed, as described in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
This chapter presents a statement of the research question, the research hypotheses H1 
and H2 together with the associated null hypotheses, calculations of expected values of 
F-measure and failure delay using the Markov chain model, and why answering this 
question is worthwhile. 
4.2   Statement of the Research Question 
 
The research question can be stated simply as: Is the state transition model valid? 
 
If the state transition model is valid, it should correctly predict the behaviour of real 
software components. In Chapter 3, the state transition model was shown to entail a 
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process of delayed failure. The research question can be restated in the following form: 
Do real software components exhibit delayed failure, consistent with long-latency error 
propagation? If the state transition model is valid, delayed failure should be observed in 
the case of both valid and invalid ‘precondition’ input requests; the hypotheses H1 and 
H2 correspond to these two cases, respectively. The expected failure behaviour in the 
case of each hypothesis can be calculated from the Markov chain model as discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
4.3   Hypothesis H1 
 
This section presents the first hypothesis H1 the corresponding null hypothesis H01 and a 
calculation of the expected F-measure and failure delay using the Markov chain model. 
4.3.1  Hypothesis 
 
Hypothesis H1: Delayed failure of a software component may occur due to long-
latency error propagation following acceptance of an invalid input request by the SUT. 
 
The hypothesis H1 follows from the state transition model; it is expected that an invalid 
‘precondition’ input request being accepted by the SUT (due to a fault) will not lead 
directly to failure of the software component, but that failure may occur following a 
subsequent ‘trigger’ input request some time later. 
 
It is not expected that delayed failure will occur in every stochastic testing experiment. 
Possible alternatives to delayed failure include the following: 
 
a) The experimental profile might not contain an invalid input request that is accepted 
by the SUT. 
 
b) The SUT might not have a fault that will cause an invalid input request to be 
accepted. 
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c) Invalid input requests that are accepted by the SUT might not cause the SUT to 
enter a ‘precondition’ state. 
 
d) The SUT might ‘self-stabilise’ from the ‘precondition’ state back to a ‘robust’ state 
before a failure can occur. 
 
e) Invalid input requests that are accepted by the SUT might not cause the SUT to fail 
from the ‘precondition’ state. 
 
Rather than looking for evidence to support the hypothesis H1 the experimental method 
looks for evidence to reject the following null hypothesis H01. 
4.3.2  Null Hypothesis 
 
Null hypothesis H01: Delayed failure of a software component due to long-latency 
error propagation will not occur following acceptance of an invalid input request by the 
SUT. 
4.3.3  Expected Values of F-measure and Failure Delay 
 
The expected values of F-measure and failure delay for invalid input requests Finvalid and 
Dinvalid can be calculated using the Markov chain model as described in Chapter 3. 
 
From the Markov chain transition matrix we have: 
 
P1 + P2 = 1 
P3 + P4 + P5 = 1 
Where: 
P1 is the probability of a transition from S0 to S0 
P2 is the probability of a transition from S0 to SP 
P3 is the probability of a transition from SP to S0 
P4 is the probability of a transition from SP to SP 
P5 is the probability of a transition from SP to SF 
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Assuming (for example) the following values for state transition probabilities: 
 
P1 =       9/10 
P2 =       1/10 
P3 =       1/10,000 
P4 = 9998/10,000 
P5 =       1/10,000 
 
Here it is assumed that P3 = P5 = 1/10,000 (anticipating order of magnitude of 
experimental results) and that transitions to SP due to invalid input values are much 
more likely say P2 = 1000 × P5 = 1/10. 
 
Substituting the values for state transition probability into the matrix Q: 
 
 9/10 1/10  
Qinvalid =  1/10,000 9998/10,000 
 
 
 
A computer program written by the author was used to calculate the corresponding 
fundamental matrix: 
 20 10,000  
Ninvalid =  10 10,000 
 
 
 
The sum of the entries in the first row of the matrix Ninvalid gives the expected value for 
F-measure Finvalid = 10,020. 
 
The sum of the entries in the second row of the matrix Ninvalid gives the expected value 
for failure delay Dinvalid = 10,010. 
 
This analysis assumes that, due to a fault, the SUT will incorrectly accept an invalid 
input request; however, it is not expected that every invalid input request will be 
accepted by the SUT. If the probability that an invalid input request is accepted by the 
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SUT is P0 then the expected values for F-measure and failure delay derived from the 
Markov chain model must be divided by P0 so that (for example) assuming a value of 
1/100 for P0 gives modified values for F-measure Finvalid = 1,002,000 and for failure 
delay Dinvalid = 1,001,000. 
4.4   Hypothesis H2 
 
This section presents the second hypothesis H2 the corresponding null hypothesis H02 
and a calculation of the expected F-measure and failure delay using the Markov chain 
model. 
4.4.1  Hypothesis 
 
Hypothesis H2: Delayed failure of a software component due to long-latency 
error propagation may occur following acceptance of a valid input request by the SUT. 
 
The hypothesis H2 follows from the state transition model; it is expected that a valid 
‘precondition’ input request being accepted by the SUT will not lead directly to failure 
of the software component, but that failure may occur following a subsequent ‘trigger’ 
input request some time later. 
 
As for the invalid case, it is not expected that delayed failure will occur in every 
stochastic testing experiment. Possible alternatives to delayed failure include the 
following: 
 
a) Valid input requests that are accepted by the SUT might not cause the SUT to 
enter a ‘precondition’ state. 
 
b) The SUT might ‘self-stabilise’ from the ‘precondition’ state back to a ‘robust’ 
state before a failure can occur. 
 
c) Valid input requests that are accepted by the SUT might not cause the SUT to 
fail from the ‘precondition’ state. 
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Rather than looking for evidence to support the hypothesis H2 the experimental method 
looks for evidence to reject the following null hypothesis H02. 
4.4.2  Null Hypothesis 
 
Null hypothesis H02: Delayed failure of a software component due to long-latency 
error propagation will not occur following acceptance of a valid input request by the 
SUT. 
4.4.3  Expected Values of F-measure and Failure Delay 
 
The expected values of F-measure and failure delay for valid input requests Fvalid and 
Dvalid can be calculated using the Markov chain model as described in Chapter 3. 
 
Assuming (for example) the following values for state transition probabilities: 
 
P1 = 9999/10,000 
P2 =       1/10,000 
P3 =       1/10,000 
P4 = 9998/10,000 
P5 =       1/10,000 
 
Here it is assumed that P2 = P3 = P5 = 1/10,000 anticipating order of magnitude of 
experimental results and assuming that transitions to SP due to valid input values are 
much less likely than for the case of invalid values. 
 
Substituting the values for state transition probability into the matrix Q: 
 
 9999/10,000 1/10,000  
Qvalid =  1/10,000 9998/10,000 
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The corresponding fundamental matrix was calculated to be: 
 
 20,000 10,000  
Nvalid =  10,000 10,000 
 
 
 
The sum of the entries in the first row of the matrix Nvalid gives the expected value for 
F-measure Fvalid = 30,000. 
 
The sum of the entries in the second row of the matrix Nvalid gives the expected value 
for failure delay Dvalid = 20,000. 
4.5   Why Answering this Question is Worthwhile 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is a perceived gap between academic research into 
software testing and industrial software testing practice (Reid, et al., 1999). A software 
testing practitioner considering employing stochastic testing might take a ‘pragmatic’ 
view, that the technique has been shown to reveal faults that alternative software testing 
techniques did not reveal; for example, see Nyman (2000). However, this argument 
does not explain the reported success of the technique. Demonstration that stochastic 
testing can reveal delayed failure due to long-latency error propagation, supported by a 
model of error propagation and failure which has been validated by experiment, 
provides a deeper insight into the technique, which has explanatory power and may lead 
to further research questions. The point here is to fill a ‘gap in knowledge’ not merely to 
provide a practical justification of a testing technique. 
4.6   Summary 
 
This chapter presented a statement of the research question, the research hypotheses H1 
and H2 together with the associated null hypotheses, calculations of expected values of 
F-measure and failure delay using the Markov chain model, and why answering this 
question is worthwhile. 
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5 METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
5.1   Introduction 
 
The research problem introduced in Chapter 1 was investigated through the methods of 
experimental software engineering: the development of a research question and 
hypotheses, and an experimental methodology for testing the hypotheses. The 
experimental methodology is designed firstly to test the hypotheses that were derived 
from the research question, and in this way to test the validity of the state transition 
model, and secondly to determine baseline metrics for the components under test. 
 
Before presenting the experimental procedure, this chapter first presents the research 
goals, a generic procedure for testing the hypotheses, the experimental design, 
experimental configurations, methods for random generation of SQL and SQL 
mutation, DBMS initialisation, database creation, and the method for identifying 
minimal test sequences. 
 
This chapter then presents the procedures to be followed in the 1st experiment - MySQL 
(invalid and valid SQL) and the 2nd experiment - Oracle XE (valid SQL), and discusses 
methodological challenges, and experimental questions. 
5.2   Research Goals 
 
This section presents the primary and secondary goals of the research. 
5.2.1  Primary Research Goal 
 
The primary goal of the present research is to validate the state transition model 
described in Chapter 3, verifying by experiment if the model correctly describes the 
delayed failure behaviour of real software components. Stochastic testing with both 
‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ experimental profiles tests the research hypotheses H1 and H2 by 
rejecting the null hypotheses H01 and H02 if possible. 
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5.2.2  Secondary Research Goal 
 
The secondary goal of the present research is to determine baseline metrics for the 
components under test, including failure delay, reliability, robustness, testing 
effectiveness and efficiency, and time constant. These metrics should provide the basis 
for a comparison of different software components and for a comparison of different 
testing techniques, in corroboration of related work and in future research. 
5.3   Generic Procedure for Testing the Hypotheses 
 
Before describing specific experimental procedures, a generic procedure is described. 
This generic procedure for testing the research hypotheses applies to both hypothesis H1 
and hypothesis H2 and forms the basis of the experimental procedures for both the 1st 
and 2nd experiments. The macro-state labelling convention S0 SP and SF are used in the 
state transition model described in Chapter 3, however the internal state of the SUT is 
not directly observable and must be inferred from observations of the external 
behaviour of the SUT. 
5.3.1  Generic Procedure Part I 
 
The first part of the procedure finds a ‘candidate’ software failure: 
 
1.  The SUT is initialised into the ‘robust’ macro-state S0. 
2. The SUT cycles in the ‘robust’ macro-state S0 processing requests. 
3. A ‘precondition’ request is accepted by the SUT. 
4. The SUT enters the ‘precondition’ macro-state SP. 
5. The SUT cycles in the ‘precondition’ macro-state SP processing requests. 
6. A ‘trigger’ request is accepted by the SUT. 
7. The SUT fails (enters the failure macro-state SF). 
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5.3.2  Generic Procedure Part II 
 
The second part of the procedure shows that the ‘trigger’ alone does not result in failure: 
 
1. The SUT is re-initialised into the ‘robust’ macro-state S0. 
2. The SUT cycles in the ‘robust’ macro-state S0 processing requests. 
3. The ‘precondition’ request in Part I is omitted; instead, the same ‘trigger’ 
request as in Part I is accepted by the SUT. 
4. The SUT does not fail but continues to cycle in the ‘robust’ macro-state S0 
processing requests. 
5.3.3  Generic Procedure Part III 
 
The third part of the procedure shows that the ‘precondition’ alone does not result in 
failure: 
 
1. The SUT is re-initialised into the ‘robust’ macro-state S0. 
2. The SUT cycles in the ‘robust’ macro-state S0 processing requests. 
3. The same ‘precondition’ request as in Part I is accepted by the SUT. 
4. The SUT enters the ‘precondition’ macro-state SP. 
5. The SUT cycles in the ‘precondition’ macro-state SP processing requests. 
6. The ‘trigger’ request in Part I is omitted; the SUT does not fail but continues to 
cycle in the ‘precondition’ macro-state SP processing requests. 
5.3.4  Generic Procedure Part IV 
 
The final part of the procedure shows that the SUT does not fail when both the ‘trigger’ 
and the ‘precondition’ requests are omitted: 
 
1. The SUT is re-initialised into the ‘robust’ macro-state S0. 
2. The SUT cycles in the ‘robust’ macro-state S0 processing requests. 
3. Both the ‘trigger’ and the ‘precondition’ requests are omitted. 
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4. The SUT does not fail but continues to cycle in the ‘robust’ macro-state S0 
processing requests. 
 
The condition for delayed failure as verified by the four parts of the generic procedure is 
shown in Table 6. 
 
Precondition Trigger Failure 
Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes No 
Yes No No 
No No No 
 
Table 6: Condition for delayed failure 
 
5.4   Experimental Design 
 
This section first presents the abstract form of the experimental design and then presents 
the instantiation of the experimental design in the specific form used in the experiments. 
5.4.1  Abstract Design 
 
The experiment will compare two different techniques for generating input values for 
two different software components, therefore a 2 × 2 factorial design having two 
different SUT S1 and S2 and two different experimental profiles P1 and P2 is 
appropriate, as shown in Figure 13. In a factorial design, the effects of more than one 
independent variable (or factor) are observed simultaneously; this is more efficient than 
repeating several single factor experiments, and any interactions between factors can be 
detected (Easton & McColl, 2005). 
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 S1 S2 
P1 1st  
P2 1st 2nd 
 
Figure 13: Experimental design 
 
5.4.2  Instantiation of the Design 
 
Each quadrant of the experimental design corresponds to a possible experiment. The 
software under test S1 is the MySQL DBMS and S2 is the Oracle XE DBMS. The 
profile P1 contains invalid values as described for the 1st experiment, and corresponds to 
the hypothesis H1, while the profile P2 has only valid values as described for the 1st and 
2nd experiments, and corresponds to the hypothesis H2. The correspondence between the 
1st and 2nd experiments and the abstract design is indicated in Figure 13. Each 
experiment is performed using the same method for applying the experimental profiles 
to the SUT. 
 
The following metrics are recorded in each of the two experiments: F-measure, failure 
delay, and time constant. MTTF can be calculated as the average of a number of F-
measures for the same software component using stochastic testing with the same 
experimental profile. 
5.5   Experimental Configurations 
 
The experiments using MySQL and Oracle XE were performed using separate personal 
computers with MySQL running on a Windows machine and Oracle XE running on a 
Linux machine. The corresponding hardware and software configurations for the test 
machines are shown in APPENDIX B. 
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This section describes the program and data file configurations for the MySQL and 
Oracle XE experiments. 
5.5.1  MySQL Data Files 
 
/mysql/data/acc.txt Accepted statements log 
/mysql/data/bnf09.txt BNF specification 2009 version 
/mysql/data/bnf10.txt BNF specification 2010 version 
/mysql/data/err.txt Failed statements log 
/mysql/data/invalid.txt Invalid SQL from syntax parser 
/mysql/data/log.txt Test trace log 
/mysql/data/reset.txt SQL commands to reset database 
/mysql/data/suc.txt Succeeded statements log 
/mysql/data/summary.txt Summary statistics of run 
/mysql/data/valid.txt Valid SQL from syntax parser 
/mysql/data/x.txt SQL statements to be executed 
 
5.5.2  MySQL Program Files 
 
/mysql/programs/bmut.pl BNF mutation 
/mysql/programs/hgen.pl Generate SQL from BNF 
/mysql/programs/hparse.pl Parse syntax against BNF 
/mysql/programs/init.pl Initialise log files 
/mysql/programs/krun.bat Batch file for response profile 
/mysql/programs/reset.bat Reset database 
/mysql/programs/smut.pl Syntax mutation 
/mysql/programs/xx.pl Execute SQL statements 
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5.5.3  Oracle XE Data Files 
 
/oracle/data/acc.txt Accepted statements log 
/oracle/data/cleanup.txt SQL statements to clean up database 
/oracle/data/err.txt Failed statements log 
/oracle/data/log.txt Test trace log 
/oracle/data/oracle_bnf_2.txt BNF specification 
/oracle/data/suc.txt Succeeded statements log 
/oracle/data/summary.txt Summary statistics of run 
/oracle/data/tmp.txt Temporary work file 
/oracle/data/x.txt SQL statements to be executed 
 
5.5.4  Oracle XE Program Files 
 
/opt/ActivePerl-5.8/bin/perl Perl 
/oracle/programs/cleanup.sh Clean up database 
/oracle/programs/debug.txt Debug log 
/oracle/programs/oracle_gen.pl Generate SQL from BNF 
/oracle/programs/ox.pl Execute SQL statements 
/oracle/programs/reset Initialise log files 
/oracle/programs/run1.sh Script for F-measure 
/oracle/programs/run2.sh Script for failure delay 
/oracle/programs/run3.sh Script for time constant 
 
5.6   Random Generation of SQL 
 
This section describes the method of automatic generation of SQL, and the ‘valid’ 
experimental profiles P2a and P2b used in the 1st experiment with MySQL and P2 used in 
the 2nd experiment with Oracle XE. 
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5.6.1  Automatic Generation of SQL 
 
Automatic generation of random SQL statements is achieved with a grammar-based 
technique similar to that used by Slutz (1998) as reviewed in Chapter 2 (Random 
Generation of SQL). The automatic generation of SQL begins with a definition of valid 
SQL syntax in a machine-readable form. 
 
The syntax of SQL, even for statements with similar functionality, differs between 
MySQL and Oracle XE. For example, the syntax of the DROP TABLE command is 
shown in Table 7 for both MySQL and Oracle XE. The notation used in Table 7 is a 
variant of BNF as used in Chapter 12 of the MySQL 5.0 Reference Manual (2010). 
 
DBMS Syntax of DROP TABLE 
MySQL DROP [TEMPORARY] TABLE [IF EXISTS] table [, table] ... 
[RESTRICT | CASCADE] ; 
Oracle XE DROP TABLE table [CASCADE CONSTRAINTS] [PURGE] ; 
 
Table 7: Syntax of DROP TABLE SQL statement 
 
While the syntax of SQL statements for MySQL is documented using a human-readable 
notation based on BNF, the syntax of SQL statements for Oracle XE is documented 
using Graphic Syntax Diagrams (Oracle® Database SQL Reference, 2005). 
 
Machine-readable BNF specifications were created by hand for a subset of the MySQL 
SQL syntax and for a subset of the Oracle XE SQL syntax, using a minimalist variant of 
BNF developed for the purpose as part of the present research which is especially 
simple to process, illustrated in Figure 14 taking MySQL DROP TABLE as an 
example. This syntax is readable by the syntax generator, a Perl program used to 
automatically generate random SQL statements from BNF. 
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sequence DROP [s_temporary] \s TABLE [s_if_exists] \s {table_list} 
[s_restrict_cascade] ; 
[s_temporary] s_temporary \0 
s_temporary \s TEMPORARY 
[s_if_exists] s_if_exists \0 
s_if_exists \s IF \s EXISTS 
[s_restrict_cascade] s_restrict s_cascade \0 
s_restrict \s RESTRICT 
s_cascade \s CASCADE 
{table_list} table table_list 
table_list {table} [comma_table_list] 
[comma_table_list] comma_table_list \0 
comma_table_list , {table_list} 
{table} table 
table MYTABLE {digit} 
{digit} 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Figure 14: Specification of MySQL DROP TABLE 
 
The syntax generator considers the BNF specification to consist of a series of 
‘sequences’ and ‘choices’, each line in the file being a list of tokens that is interpreted 
either as a sequence or as a choice. A sequence is a token followed by a list of choice 
tokens or literals, and a choice is a token followed by a list of sequence tokens or literals 
(the first line in the specification is assumed to be a sequence). By default, a literal is a 
token that does not occur as the first token on any line in the specification. 
 
Each token or literal in a sequence is processed in turn; when a choice is processed, one 
of the sequence tokens or literals is chosen at random. Each token encountered is looked 
for as the first token on a line and recursively processed until a literal is encountered, 
and this literal is then copied to the output. Special literals are defined for white space \s 
and null \0. 
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Examples of possible outputs produced by the syntax generator when processing the 
BNF specification of MySQL DROP TABLE in Figure 14 are shown below: 
 
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS MYTABLE0; 
DROP TABLE MYTABLE1; 
DROP TEMPORARY TABLE IF EXISTS MYTABLE2; 
DROP TEMPORARY TABLE MYTABLE3; 
 
5.6.2  ‘Valid’ experimental profiles for MySQL 
 
The ‘valid’ experimental profile P2a used for determining the response profile and time 
constant in the 1st experiment consists of randomly generated, syntactically valid SQL 
statements containing approximately equal numbers of each of CREATE, INSERT and 
REPLACE SQL statements. The first experimental profile P2a allowed tables to increase 
arbitrarily in size such that continuing runs to 300,000 executed statements resulted in 
the message ‘table is full’ for many tables, and the MySQL DBMS log file reported 
‘disk is full’. To avoid this, the DELETE statement was added to the profile to produce 
a second experimental profile P2b and this profile was used for the F-measure 
experiments. The ‘valid’ experimental profile P2b for MySQL is shown in Table 8. 
 
SQL Statement Number % of Total 
CREATE INDEX 138 13.8 
CREATE TABLE 48 4.8 
CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE 64 6.4 
DELETE 256 25.6 
INSERT 254 25.4 
REPLACE 240 24.0 
Total 1000 100 
 
Table 8: ‘Valid’ experimental profile for MySQL 
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Note that the SELECT statement is implicitly present in the experimental profile in the 
syntax of CREATE TABLE, as given in the MySQL 5.0 Reference Manual (2010). 
 
CREATE [TEMPORARY] TABLE [IF NOT EXISTS] tbl_name 
[(create_definition,...)] [table_options] select_statement ; 
 
The ‘valid’ experimental profile for MySQL can be generated by running the Perl 
program /mysql/programs/hgen.pl optionally supplying as parameters the number of 
expansions to be performed and a random number seed value. The ‘valid’ experimental 
profile is generated automatically when the batch file /mysql/programs/krun.bat is run. 
5.6.3  ‘Valid’ Experimental Profile for Oracle XE 
 
The ‘valid’ experimental profile P2 used for determining the response profile and time 
constant in the 2nd experiment consists of randomly generated, syntactically valid SQL 
statements containing CREATE, DELETE and INSERT SQL statements as shown in 
Table 9. 
 
SQL Statement Number % of Total 
CREATE TABLE 38 2.52 
CREATE GLOBAL TEMPORARY TABLE 32 2.12 
DELETE 725 48.05 
INSERT 714 47.32 
Total 1509 100 
 
Table 9: ‘Valid’ experimental profile for Oracle XE 
 
Note that the SELECT statement is implicitly present in the experimental profile in the 
syntax of CREATE TABLE (refer to the Oracle® Database SQL Reference, 2005). 
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The Oracle XE experimental profile has a higher proportion of INSERT statements to 
counterbalance the REPLACE statements that appear in the MySQL experimental 
profile. 
 
According to Murray (2008) “The REPLACE statement in MySQL is a dual-purpose 
statement; it works like the INSERT statement when there is no record in the table that 
has the same value as the new record for a primary key or a unique index, and 
otherwise it works like the UPDATE statement. Oracle does not have any built-in SQL 
statement equivalent to the MySQL REPLACE statement. To convert this statement to 
Oracle, an emulated function using both the INSERT and UPDATE statements would 
have to be created: an attempt would first be made to insert data into the table using the 
INSERT statement and if this failed, the data in the table would then be updated using 
the UPDATE statement”. 
 
The ‘valid’ experimental profile for Oracle XE can be generated by running the Perl 
program /oracle/programs/oracle_gen.pl optionally supplying as parameters the number 
of expansions to be performed and a random number seed value. The BNF specification 
for Oracle XE was written in such a way that expansion need not terminate after a finite 
number of expansions, leaving BNF tokens in some output lines; these lines can be 
filtered out using the UNIX grep command before executing the SQL as follows: 
 
grep -v { ../data/x.txt >../data/tmp.txt 
 
For the example shown in Table 9, 3000 generated lines of output were filtered to 
produce 1509 remaining valid SQL statements. The ‘valid’ experimental profile is 
generated automatically when the shell scripts /oracle/programs/run*.sh are run. 
5.7   SQL Mutation 
 
SQL mutation was used to generate the ‘invalid’ experimental profile P1 used in the 1st 
experiment. This section describes the approaches to SQL mutation taken in the present 
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research and the ‘invalid’ experimental profile used in the 1st experiment, and the syntax 
parser program used to separate valid SQL from invalid SQL following mutation. 
5.7.1  Approaches to SQL Mutation 
 
Two different approaches to SQL mutation were investigated in the course of the 
present research: (a) mutation of the BNF specification before generation of SQL and 
(b) mutation of the resulting SQL statements after generation of valid SQL. With either 
approach, the syntax parser program is used to separate valid SQL from invalid SQL 
following mutation. 
 
In approach (a) the Perl program /mysql/programs/bmut.pl first separates each BNF 
statement into tokens and then randomly applies one of the following mutation rules to 
produce a new BNF statement: 
 
B1. Substitute a fixed value for a token. 
B2. Substitute the null string for a token. 
B3. Insert an extra fixed value token before a token. 
 
The resulting (invalid) BNF is then used to generate SQL statements, which may 
happen to be either valid or invalid, but are expected to be more likely to be invalid. In 
approach (b) the Perl program /mysql/programs/smut.pl first separates each SQL 
statement into elements and then randomly applies one of the following mutation rules 
to produce a new SQL statement, which may happen to be either valid or invalid, but is 
expected to be more likely to be invalid: 
 
M1. Substitute an invalid value for an element. 
M2. Substitute an element with another defined element. 
M3. Miss out an element. 
M4. Add an extra element. 
M6. Swap two adjacent elements 
M9. Duplicate (repeat) an element 
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Rules M1 to M4 are syntax mutation rules given in BS 7925-2 (2001), and rules M6 and 
M9 are additional mutation rules, as discussed in Chapter 8 (Syntax Mutation 
Extension) ‘Example mutation operators’. 
5.7.2  ‘Invalid’ Experimental Profile for MySQL 
 
The ‘invalid’ experimental profile P1 for MySQL is shown in Table 10 for (a) BNF 
mutation and (b) syntax mutation. The results of executing both invalid profiles are 
shown in Table 13: Results for ‘invalid’ experimental profile, in Chapter 6. 
 
SQL Statement 
(a) 
Number 
(a) 
% of Total 
(b) 
Number 
(b) 
% of Total 
CREATE 16,164 17.1 12,267 14.0 
DELETE 12,037 12.7 19,960 22.7 
INSERT 16,616 17.6 19,194 21.8 
REPLACE 16,605 17.6 25,156 28.6 
Other 33,093 35.0 11,372 12.9 
Total 94,515 100 87,949 100 
 
Table 10: ‘Invalid’ experimental profile for MySQL 
 
5.7.3  Syntax Parser 
 
The syntax generator program /mysql/programs/hgen.pl for random generation of SQL, 
described earlier in this chapter, was adapted as a syntax parser to be used for separating 
valid SQL statements from invalid SQL statements after mutation. The Perl program 
/mysql/programs/hparse.pl compares each field in the SQL statement in turn (separated 
by white space) to literals produced by expanding the BNF specification, until either a 
match is found or the BNF specification is exhausted. If all fields in the SQL statement 
are matched, the statement is valid, or if not, the statement is invalid. Valid and invalid 
statements are copied to separate output files. 
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5.8   DBMS Initialisation 
 
This section describes the DBMS initialisation procedures to be followed in the 1st and 
2nd experiments (for MySQL and Oracle XE). These procedures are intended to ensure 
that the DBMS is always returned to a known initial state prior to each test run. The 
initialisation procedures clear the contents of log files and empty the database by 
dropping any existing tables. 
5.8.1  MySQL 
 
1. Following a MySQL crash restart MySQL by entering ‘net start mysql5’ at the
 command prompt (this step is not necessary if the PC has been restarted). 
 
2. Verify MySQL is running. 
 
3. Initialise log files by running the Perl program /mysql/programs/init.pl 
 This clears the contents of the following files: 
 /mysql/data/acc.txt 
 /mysql/data/err.txt 
 /mysql/data/log.txt 
 /mysql/data/suc.txt 
 /mysql/data/summary.txt 
 
4. Reset the ‘TEST’ database by executing the following SQL commands as found
 in /mysql/data/reset.txt 
 DROP DATABASE TEST; 
 CREATE DATABASE TEST; 
 USE TEST; 
5. Check the contents of /mysql/data/log.txt to be sure step 4 was successful. 
 
Steps (3) and (4) are also performed by the batch files /mysql/programs/reset.bat and 
/mysql/programs/krun.bat. 
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5.8.2  Oracle XE 
 
1. The PC must be restarted following a crash or hang of Oracle XE. 
 
2. Start Oracle XE by running the following commands: 
 . /usr/lib/oracle/xe/app/oracle/product/10.2.0/server/bin/oracle_env.sh 
 /etc/init.d/oracle-xe start 
 
3. Verify Oracle XE is running. 
 
4. Initialise log files by running /oracle/programs/reset 
 This clears the contents of the following files: 
 /oracle/data/acc.txt 
 /oracle/data/err.txt 
 /oracle/data/log.txt 
 /oracle/data/suc.txt 
 /oracle/data/summary.txt 
 
5. Reset the ‘HR’ data base by running /oracle/programs/cleanup.sh 
 This executes a DROP TABLE command for each test table (do not drop the
 database as test tables are created in the ‘HR’ sample database schema). 
 
6. Check the contents of /mysql/data/log.txt to be sure step 5 was successful. 
 
Steps (4) and (5) are also performed by the shell scripts /oracle/programs/run*.sh 
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5.9   Database Creation 
 
This section describes the database creation approach used in the experiments and the 
exponential saturation model of database growth, and presents a justification of the 
chosen approach. 
5.9.1  Database Creation Approach 
 
Following DBMS initialisation, a random database is created; there is no predefined 
database. Starting from an empty database, database tables are created and populated at 
random by executing randomly generated SQL statements. This approach to database 
creation is in contrast to other approaches to DBMS testing that have executed 
randomly generated SQL queries against a predefined database, for example Slutz 
(1998), or else have populated a predefined database schema with random data, for 
example Chays, et al. (2004). 
5.9.2  Exponential Saturation Model 
 
The randomly generated database is expected to grow in accordance with an 
exponential saturation model. Because the probability of success of a random SQL 
statement should be proportional to the number of database tables, the rate of growth of 
the database should also be proportional to the number of database tables, up to a 
maximum number of tables set by the experimental profile. 
 
The exponential saturation model of random database growth is described by equation 
(1) where y is the number of success responses from the DBMS and x is the number of 
SQL statements executed. The constants k, A and C are determined by the experimental 
profile. 
y(x) = A(1−e-kx) + C = A + C − A(e-kx)   (1) 
 
The factor k = 1/T for time constant T and the intercept on the y-axis is given by y = C. 
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The function y(x) is shown plotted with arbitrary values of constants and without scale 
in Figure 15. The diagram was generated using a computer program written by the 
author. 
 
        y(x) 
x 
 
Figure 15: Plot of exponential saturation model 
 
5.9.3  Justification of the Approach 
 
The chosen approach for database creation can be justified, firstly on the basis of 
avoiding the ‘pesticide paradox’ described by Beizer (1990) since each test run uses a 
different database; secondly, testing with a predefined database, presumably intended to 
reflect the expected actual usage of the DBMS, suffers from the same weaknesses as 
testing from an operational profile. Database operations that are not expected to occur 
are unlikely to be tested using a predefined database, and if the DBMS usage profile 
changes in the future, or if the usage profile chosen for testing is not correct, then 
untested DBMS functionality may be exposed, leading to activation of dormant faults. 
The approach may also be justified from a practical viewpoint, on the basis of the 
simplicity, low cost and convenience, of avoiding the effort of creating a test database. 
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5.10   Method for Identifying Minimal Test Sequences 
 
This section describes the ‘reduction’ procedure for identifying minimal test sequences 
from long test traces (see ‘identifying failing input requests’ in Chapter 2). 
5.10.1 Method for MySQL 
 
For MySQL, the Perl program used to execute SQL statements /mysql/programs/xx.pl 
copies SQL statements that report ‘succeeded’ to the file /oracle/data/suc.txt, therefore it 
is only necessary to copy this file to /oracle/data/x.txt to produce a minimal set of SQL 
statements to be executed. If executing this file reproduces the failure, the process can 
be repeated until a minimal test sequence has been found. 
5.10.2 Method for Oracle XE 
 
An identical procedure is followed for Oracle XE with the Perl program 
/oracle/programs/ox.pl and data files /oracle/data/suc.txt and /oracle/data/x.txt. 
5.11   1st Experiment - MySQL (Invalid and Valid SQL) 
 
The 1st experiment is performed with MySQL using both invalid and valid SQL. The 
experimental procedure for part I and part II is performed using invalid SQL while the 
experimental procedures for F-measure, response profile, and time constant, are 
performed using valid SQL. 
 
This section first introduces the general procedure used in the 1st experiment and the 
procedure for generating the ‘invalid’ experimental profile, and then describes the 
experimental procedure part I, the experimental procedure part II, possible outcomes of 
the experiment, and the procedures for F-measure, failure delay, response profile, and 
time constant. 
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5.11.1 General Procedure 
 
The experimental procedure for the 1st experiment with invalid SQL consists of two 
parts. In the first part of the procedure, as shown in Figure 16, the SUT is initialised and 
a sequence (or ‘block’) of randomly generated invalid SQL statements is executed, 
followed by a further blocks of randomly generated valid SQL statements, until the 
SUT fails. It is assumed that the SUT does fail during the first part of the procedure; 
otherwise the procedure must be repeated with a different initial seed value until failure 
occurs. 
 
In the second part of the procedure, as shown in Figure 17, the SUT is re-initialised and 
only the blocks of valid SQL statements are executed. If a failure of the SUT occurs 
while executing valid SQL statements in part I of the procedure, but no failure of the 
SUT occurs while executing valid SQL statements in part II of the procedure, then a 
delayed failure has been demonstrated. The delayed failure is caused by the SUT 
accepting a ‘precondition’ invalid SQL statement followed later by a ‘trigger’ valid 
SQL statement. 
 
 
Block 
1 
Block 
2 
… … 
Block 
B 
↑ 
Initialise 
↑ 
Invalid 
↑ 
Valid 
  ↓ 
Fail 
 
Figure 16: Procedure for 1st experiment part I 
 
 
Block 
2 
… … 
Block 
B 
↑ 
Initialise 
↑ 
Valid 
  ↓ 
No Fail 
 
Figure 17: Procedure for 1st experiment part II 
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The failure delay is then (B−1) blocks or the equivalent number of executed SQL 
statements. The experiment must be repeated several times to allow for random 
variation. The median value of failure delay is obtained for several runs of the 
experiment using different initial seed values for generating random blocks of invalid 
and valid values, and a 95% confidence interval is calculated. 
5.11.2 Procedure for ‘Invalid’ Experimental Profile 
 
The ‘invalid’ experimental profile P1 for MySQL can be generated using either of the 
following procedures, corresponding to the two different approaches to SQL mutation. 
 
Procedure (a) for BNF Mutation 
 
Run the following Perl programs: 
 
1. /mysql/programs/bmut.pl BNF mutation 
2. /mysql/programs/hgen.pl Generate SQL from BNF 
3. /mysql/programs/hparse.pl Parse syntax against BNF 
 
Procedure (b) for Syntax Mutation 
 
Run the following Perl programs: 
 
1. /mysql/programs/hgen.pl Generate SQL from BNF 
2. /mysql/programs/smut.pl Syntax mutation 
3. /mysql/programs/hparse.pl Parse syntax against BNF 
 
5.11.3 1st Experiment Part I 
 
In the following experimental procedure, a subscripted lower case letter such as s0 
denotes a specific state of the software component, and a subscripted bold upper case 
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letter such as S1 denotes a specific sequence of SQL statements. The first part of the 
experiment consists of four steps, as follows: 
 
Step (1) Clear log files. Initialise the SUT to the start-up state s0. This step 
  ensures that the experimental procedure is repeatable, as the SUT is 
  always started from the same state. It is assumed that the SUT 
  does not fail immediately on start-up otherwise the experiment is 
  inconclusive. For a DBMS such as MySQL the start-up state s0 
  corresponds to an empty database. 
 
Step (2) Execute a randomly generated sequence of valid SQL statements S1. It is 
  assumed that this causes a sequence of state transitions, leaving the 
  software in an initial state s1. It is assumed that the software does not fail 
  while executing the sequence of valid SQL statements S1 otherwise the 
  experiment is inconclusive. 
 
Step (3) Execute a randomly generated sequence of invalid SQL statements S2 
  such that at least one of these invalid SQL statements is accepted by the 
  SUT. It is assumed that this causes one or more state transitions leaving 
  the software in a state s2. It is assumed that the software does not fail 
  while executing the sequence of invalid SQL statements S2 otherwise the 
  experiment is inconclusive. 
 
Step (4) Execute a randomly generated sequence of valid SQL statements S3. It is 
  assumed that this causes a sequence of state transitions leaving the 
  software in a state s3. It is assumed that the software fails during this step 
  and so the state s3 is a failed state, otherwise the experiment is 
  inconclusive. A state diagram for the first part of the procedure is shown 
  in Figure 18. 
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s0 s1 s2 s3
S1 S2 S3
 
 
Figure 18: State diagram for 1st experiment part I 
 
5.11.4 1st Experiment Part II 
 
The second part of the experiment consists of three steps, as follows: 
 
Step (5) Re-initialise the SUT to the start-up state s0. 
 
Step (6) Execute the same sequence of valid SQL statements S1 as in step (2). 
  This is randomly generated using the same seed value. If the software is 
  deterministic then the SUT will be in the same initial state s1 as in step 
  (2). 
 
Step (7) Execute the same sequence of valid SQL statements S3 as in step (2). 
  This is randomly generated using the same seed value. It is assumed that 
  this causes a sequence of state transitions leaving the software in a state 
  s4. It is assumed that the software does not fail at this step otherwise the 
  experiment is inconclusive. A state diagram for the second part of the 
  procedure is shown in Figure 19. 
 
s0 s1
S1
s4
S3
 
 
Figure 19: State diagram for 1st experiment part II 
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5.11.5 Possible Outcomes of the Experiment 
 
The variables in the experiment are the start-up state s0 (control variable), the sequences 
S1, S2 and S3 (independent variables) and the states s1, s2, s3 and s4 (dependent 
variables). 
 
The state diagram for the complete experimental procedure is shown in Figure 20. 
 
s0 s1 s2 s3
S1
s4
S2 S3
S3
 
 
Figure 20: Complete state diagram for 1st experiment 
 
In the first part of the experiment the state s3 is a failed state. There are two possible 
outcomes of the second part of the experiment; either the state s4 is a failed state, or the 
state s4 is not a failed state. 
 
If the state s4 is not a failed state then the failure of the SUT in the first part of the 
experiment is a consequence of executing the sequence of invalid SQL statements S2. 
The state s2 cannot be the same state as s1 (assuming the SUT is deterministic) and 
therefore a transition has occurred between the state s1 and the state s2 due to the SUT 
accepting one or more invalid SQL statements in S2. 
 
If the state s4 is a failed state then the failure in the first part of the experiment is a 
consequence of executing the sequence of valid SQL statements S3. In this case, no 
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inference can be drawn regarding the effect of executing the sequence of invalid SQL 
statements S2 and the experiment is inconclusive. 
 
All the possible outcomes of the experiment are summarised in Table 11. ‘Pass’ in a 
step column indicates that the SUT does not fail. Each of the possible cases leads to an 
inconclusive outcome except for case (f) and in this case a ‘positive outcome’ tends to 
indicate rejection of the null hypothesis for hypothesis H1. 
 
 Step (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Conclusion 
Case (a) Fail       Inconclusive 
 (b) Pass Fail      Inconclusive 
 (c) Pass Pass Fail     Inconclusive 
 (d) Pass Pass Pass Pass    Inconclusive 
 (e) Pass Pass Pass Fail Pass Pass Fail Inconclusive 
 (f) Pass Pass Pass Fail Pass Pass Pass Positive outcome 
 
Table 11: Possible outcomes of the 1st experiment 
 
5.11.6 Procedure for F-Measure 
 
The procedure for F-measure is as follows: 
 
Step (1) Clear log files. Initialise the SUT to the start-up state s0. 
 
Step (2) Execute blocks of randomly generated valid SQL statements on the SUT
  continuing until the SUT fails at some block B. Each block is generated 
  using the valid experimental profile P2b with initial seed values 
  incremented by 1 starting from 1. 
 
Step (3) Initialise the SUT to the start-up state s0. 
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Step (4) Execute block B alone. If this does not result in failure of the SUT then
  the F-measure is calculated as B blocks or the equivalent number of
  executed SQL statements. If the SUT does fail at this step then the 
  outcome of the experimental run is inconclusive. 
 
The experiment must be repeated several times to allow for random variation. The 
median value of F-measure is obtained for several runs of the experiment using different 
initial seed values for generating random blocks of valid values, and a 95% confidence 
interval is calculated. 
5.11.7 Procedure for Response Profile and Time Constant 
 
Measurement of the time constant T for the MySQL DBMS response profile is achieved 
by applying the procedure described below. Procedure steps (1) and (2) are automated 
using the batch file /mysql/programs/krun.bat as shown in Figure 21. The procedure 
consists of running up to 100 blocks of SQL statements, where each block contains a 
configurable number of SQL statements (by default 1000). 
 
Step (1) Clear log files. Initialise the SUT to the start-up state s0. 
 
Step (2) Execute blocks of randomly generated valid SQL statements on the SUT; 
  until a maximum block number is reached. Each block is generated using 
  the valid experimental profile P2b with initial seed values incremented by 
  1 starting from 1. 
 
Step (3) Record the number of success responses from the SUT for each block
  and plot this number against the number of blocks executed. 
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rem created 28/11/2009 
rem updated 08/04/2010 
 
rem seed offset parameter %1 
set seed=%1 
if not defined seed set seed=0 
rem statements parameter %2 
set n=%2 
if not defined n set n=1000 
 
perl init.pl 
echo %0 >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo ## Resetting database ## >> ..\data\summary.txt 
copy ..\data\reset.txt ..\data\x.txt /Y 
perl xx.pl 
set /a s=%seed%+1 
perl hgen.pl %n% %s% | echo seed = %s% >> ..\data\log.txt 
perl xx.pl 
 
set /a s=%seed%+2 
perl hgen.pl %n% %s% | echo seed = %s% >> ..\data\log.txt 
perl xx.pl 
 
[Intermediate lines not shown…] 
 
set /a s=%seed%+100 
perl hgen.pl %n% %s% | echo seed = %s% >> ..\data\log.txt 
perl xx.pl 
 
Figure 21: Listing of batch file krun.bat 
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5.12   2nd Experiment - Oracle XE (Valid SQL) 
 
The 2nd experiment is performed with Oracle XE using valid SQL. 
 
This section introduces the procedures used in the 2nd experiment and describes the 
procedure for F-measure, the procedure for F-measure and failure delay, the procedure 
for response profile and time constant, and the calculation of time constant according to 
the exponential saturation model of random database growth. 
5.12.1 Introduction to the Procedures 
 
The experimental procedure for the 2nd experiment consists of three elements: a 
procedure for F-measure, a procedure for failure delay, and a procedure for response 
profile and time constant. Each element of the experimental procedure involves 
executing a series of blocks of randomly generated valid SQL statements on the SUT. 
Each block is generated using the experimental profile P2 with each block using a 
different randomising seed value to ensure that the sequence of statements in each block 
is different; each block contains approximately the same number of statements. In each 
case, the SUT is initialised before execution of the first block so that the database is 
empty. Variations on this basic method allow measurement of F-measure, failure delay, 
and time constant for the SUT. The procedures for failure delay and for time constant 
are both derived from the basic procedure for F-measure, accordingly the procedure for 
F-measure is described first. 
5.12.2 Procedure for F-Measure 
 
The procedure for F-measure is documented separately here for completeness; however 
a combined procedure that determines both F-measure and failure delay is given in the 
next section. Measurement of the F-measure for the SUT may be achieved by applying 
the method shown in Figure 22. Procedure steps (1) and (2) are automated using the 
script /oracle/programs/run1.sh shown in Figure 23. 
 
 122 
Step (1) Clear log files. Initialise the SUT to the start-up state s0. 
 
Step (2) Execute blocks of randomly generated valid SQL statements on the SUT
  continuing until the SUT fails at some block B. Each block is generated 
  using the valid experimental profile P2 with initial seed values 
  incremented by 1 starting from 1. 
 
Step (3) Initialise the SUT to the start-up state s0. 
 
Step (4) Execute block B alone. If this does not result in failure of the SUT then
  the F-measure is calculated as B blocks or the equivalent number of
  executed SQL statements. If the SUT does fail at this step then the 
  outcome of the experimental run is inconclusive. 
 
 
Block 
1 
… … … 
Block 
B 
↑ 
Initialise 
↑ 
Execute 
   ↓ 
Fail 
 
Figure 22: Method for measurement of F-measure 
 
The experiment must be repeated several times to allow for random variation. The 
median value of F-measure is obtained for several runs of the experiment using different 
initial seed values for generating random blocks of valid values, and a 95% confidence 
interval is calculated. 
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# script for F-measure 
cd /oracle/programs 
. ./reset 
cp ../data/cleanup.txt ../data/x.txt 
/opt/ActivePerl-5.8/bin/perl ox.pl 
 
s=1618 
 
for ((i = 1; i <= 800; i++)) 
do 
/opt/ActivePerl-5.8/bin/perl oracle_gen.pl 2000 $((s+i)) 
grep -v { ../data/x.txt >../data/tmp.txt 
cp ../data/tmp.txt ../data/x.txt 
/opt/ActivePerl-5.8/bin/perl ox.pl 
done 
 
Figure 23: Listing of script run1.sh 
 
5.12.3 Procedure for F-Measure and Failure Delay 
 
Measurement of both F-measure and failure delay for the SUT is achieved by following 
the method shown in Figure 24. The experimental procedure for failure delay consists 
of two parts. 
 
Part I. In the first part of the procedure, the SUT is initialised and a randomly generated 
sequence of blocks of valid SQL statements is executed; it is assumed that the SUT will 
fail, otherwise the procedure must be repeated using a different initial seed value. 
 
Part II. In the second part of the procedure, only the ‘precondition’ and ‘trigger’ blocks 
from the sequence of blocks of valid SQL statements are executed. 
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If a failure of the SUT occurs in Part I of the procedure, and a failure of the SUT occurs 
in Part II of the procedure, then a delayed failure has been demonstrated. The delayed 
failure is caused by the SUT accepting a ‘precondition’ SQL statement followed later by 
a ‘trigger’ SQL statement. 
 
Procedure Part I 
 
Procedure steps (1) and (2) below are the same as procedure steps (1) and (2) as given 
for the determination of F-measure, and are automated using the script 
/oracle/programs/run1.sh shown in Figure 23. 
 
Step (1) Clear log files. Initialise the SUT to the start-up state s0. 
 
Step (2) Execute blocks of randomly generated valid SQL statements on the SUT
  continuing until the SUT fails at some block B. Each block is generated 
  using the valid experimental profile P2 with initial seed values 
  incremented by 1 starting from 1. 
 
Procedure Part II 
 
Procedure step (3) is automated using the script /oracle/programs/run2.sh shown in 
Figure 25. 
 
Step (3) The SUT is re-initialised as in step (1) and block 1 is executed 
  followed by block B only as shown in Figure 24 (b). If there is no failure 
  then the procedure is repeated, this time executing block 2 followed by
  block B only as shown in Figure 24 (c) (and so on). 
 
Step (4) When a failure in block B eventually occurs, say following execution of
  block C as shown in Figure 24 (d) then the failure delay is given by (B − 
  C + 1) blocks or the equivalent number of executed SQL statements. 
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Step (5) Initialise the SUT to the start-up state s0. 
 
Step (6) Execute block B alone. If this does not result in failure of the SUT then
  the F-measure is calculated as B blocks or the equivalent number of
  executed SQL statements. If the SUT does fail at this step then the 
  outcome of the experimental run is inconclusive. 
 
The experiment must be repeated several times to allow for random variation. The 
median values of F-measure and failure delay are obtained for several runs of the 
experiment using different initial seed values for generating random blocks of valid 
values, and 95% confidence intervals are calculated. 
 
The experiment is repeated for different numbers of database tables 10, 100, 500, 1000 
to account for dependence of F-measure and failure delay on the number of tables. 
 
(a) 
Block 
1 
… … … 
Block 
B 
↑ 
Initialise 
↑ 
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   ↓ 
Fail 
 
(b) 
Block 
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Block 
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↑ 
Initialise 
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   ↓ 
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(c)  
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  ↓ 
No Fail 
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(d)   
Block 
C 
 
Block 
B 
↑ 
Initialise 
  ↑ 
Execute 
 ↓ 
Fail 
 
Figure 24: Method for F-measure and failure delay 
 
#script for failure delay 
cd /oracle/programs 
r=1717 
s=1722 
t=s-r-1 
 
for ((i = 1; i <= t; i++)) 
do 
. ./reset 
cp ../data/cleanup.txt ../data/x.txt 
/opt/ActivePerl-5.8/bin/perl ox.pl 
 
/opt/ActivePerl-5.8/bin/perl oracle_gen.pl 2000 $((r+i)) 
grep -v { ../data/x.txt >../data/tmp.txt 
cp ../data/tmp.txt ../data/x.txt 
/opt/ActivePerl-5.8/bin/perl ox.pl 
 
/opt/ActivePerl-5.8/bin/perl oracle_gen.pl 2000 $((s)) 
grep -v { ../data/x.txt >../data/tmp.txt 
cp ../data/tmp.txt ../data/x.txt 
/opt/ActivePerl-5.8/bin/perl ox.pl 
done 
 
Figure 25: Listing of script run2.sh 
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5.12.4 Procedure for Response Profile and Time Constant 
 
Measurement of the time constant T for the Oracle XE DBMS response profile is 
achieved by applying the method as shown in Figure 26. Procedure steps (1) and (2) are 
automated using the script /oracle/programs/run3.sh shown in Figure 27. This is almost 
identical to /oracle/programs/run1.sh but with the addition of a case statement. 
 
Step (1) Clear log files. Initialise the SUT to the start-up state s0. 
 
Step (2) Execute blocks of randomly generated valid SQL statements on the SUT 
  until the SUT fails or a maximum block number is reached. Each block
  is generated using the valid experimental profile P2 with initial seed
  values incremented by 1 starting from 1. 
 
Step (3) Record the number of success responses from the SUT for each block
  and plot this number against the number of blocks executed. 
 
It is desired to achieve a run of N failure-free blocks; if a failure (crash or hang) of the 
SUT occurs during execution of any block in the run, say block number B as shown in 
Figure 26 (a) then the SUT is re-initialised and the run is repeated, but this time 
omitting execution of the failing block. This is achieved by editing the case statement in 
script /oracle/programs/run3.sh. After several repetitions of this procedure, execution of 
a run of N blocks without failure is achieved as shown in Figure 26 (b). The number of 
blocks N is chosen to be about 5T. This corresponds to approximately 99% of the 
maximum number of success responses, assuming an exponential saturation model of 
random database growth as described previously in this chapter by equation (1). 
 
The experiment is repeated for different numbers of database tables 10, 100, 500, 1000 
to account for dependence of time constant on the number of tables. 
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(a) 
Block 
1 
… 
Block 
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↑ 
Execute 
 ↓ 
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(b) … 
Block 
B - 1 
Block 
B + 1 
… 
Block 
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↑ 
Initialise 
↑ 
Execute 
   ↓ 
No fail 
 
Figure 26: Method for measurement of time constant 
 
# script for time constant 
cd /oracle/programs 
. ./reset 
cp ../data/cleanup.txt ../data/x.txt 
/opt/ActivePerl-5.8/bin/perl ox.pl 
 
s=1618 
 
for ((i = 1; i <= 800; i++)) 
do 
case "$((s+i))" in 226|488|543) continue ;; 
esac 
/opt/ActivePerl-5.8/bin/perl oracle_gen.pl 2000 $((s+i)) 
grep -v { ../data/x.txt >../data/tmp.txt 
cp ../data/tmp.txt ../data/x.txt 
/opt/ActivePerl-5.8/bin/perl ox.pl 
done 
 
Figure 27: Listing of script run3.sh 
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5.12.5 Calculation of Time Constant 
 
The time constant T for both the MySQL and Oracle XE DBMS response profiles is 
calculated in the same way. The exponential saturation model of random database 
growth was described earlier in this chapter by y(x) in equation (1) where y is the 
number of success responses from the SUT and x is the number of blocks of SQL 
statements executed. 
 
The constants A and C in equation (1) determine the maximum number of success 
responses, which is equal to A + C. The value of A + C is estimated in the experiments 
as the median of the number of success responses for approximately the last ten blocks. 
Because the response profile is obtained up to approximately x = 5T at which point the 
number of success responses y(x) achieves approximately 99% of the maximum value, a 
margin of 1% is added when estimating the value of A + C. Plotting the natural 
logarithm log(A + C − y) against x should produce a straight line with slope −k where k 
= 1/T and intercept log(A). As discussed in section 7.4 linear regression analysis of the 
logarithm of (A + C − y) against x is expected to be accurate provided random variation 
in the number of success responses y(x) is sufficiently small. 
5.13   Methodological Challenges 
 
This section presents methodological challenges associated with BNF specification, 
separation of valid and invalid values, and reproducibility of failures. 
5.13.1 BNF Specification 
 
There are differences in BNF syntax between MySQL and Oracle, and the SQL syntax 
specifications are not easily machine-readable; therefore machine-readable BNF 
specifications are created by hand, introducing the possibility of errors in transcribing 
the specifications. To guard against this possibility, automatically generated SQL is 
executed against the DBMS and the results are verified against the documented SQL 
specifications. 
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Discrepancies may be due to errors in the BNF specifications, that must be corrected, or 
possibly these may reveal faults in the SUT, or faults in the SQL generator program. 
5.13.2 Separation of Valid and Invalid Values 
 
Mutated SQL statements may happen to be either valid or invalid, so mutation produces 
a mix of valid and invalid SQL statements; these are separated after mutation using the 
syntax parser program. The syntax parser uses the same BNF specification as the SQL 
generator program, and so correctness of parsing is subject to possible errors in the BNF 
specification (as well as possibly faults in the syntax parser program). To guard against 
this possibility, SQL statements are executed against the DBMS after separation by the 
parser program, with the expectation that the DBMS should accept valid SQL 
statements and reject invalid statements; the results are verified against the documented 
SQL specifications. Again, discrepancies may be due to errors in the BNF specification, 
or these may reveal faults in the SUT, or in the syntax parser program. 
5.13.3 Reproducibility of Failures 
 
Following a crash of MySQL, the PC may be restarted to ‘cold start’ MySQL. 
Alternatively, a ‘warm start’ may be performed using the command ‘net start mysql5’ 
and this avoids the delay of restarting the PC. However, during pilot experiments it was 
found that failures of MySQL following a ‘cold start’ may not be reproducible 
following a ‘warm start’ which suggests that the start-up state of MySQL may be 
different in these two cases. A consistent restart procedure must be followed and in the 
present research a ‘warm start’ of MySQL was always performed following a crash, 
except at the start of an experimental run when a ‘cold start’ was performed. In the case 
of Oracle XE, it has been found that this usually hangs the machine on failure, and so 
the PC is always rebooted, after which a ‘cold start’ of Oracle XE is performed. 
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5.14   Experimental Questions 
 
A number of experimental questions arise once the details of the experimental 
methodology have been decided. This section describes experimental questions related 
to measures of F-measure, failure delay, and time constant. 
5.14.1 F-Measure 
 
The following experimental questions are of interest related to F-measure: 
 
a) What is the F-measure for each SUT for each experimental profile? 
b) How does the F-measure vary with the number of database tables? 
c) How does the F-measure for each SUT change with different profiles? 
d) Does the F-measure differ between SUT for the same experimental profile? 
5.14.2 Failure Delay 
 
The following experimental questions are of interest related to failure delay: 
 
a) What is the failure delay for each SUT for each experimental profile? 
b) How does the magnitude of the failure delay compare with the F-measure? 
c) How does the failure delay vary with the number of database tables? 
d) How does the failure delay for each SUT change with different profiles? 
e) Does failure delay differ between SUT for the same experimental profile? 
5.14.3 Time Constant 
 
The following experimental questions are of interest related to time constant: 
 
a) What is the time constant for each SUT for each experimental profile? 
b) How does the time constant vary with the number of database tables? 
c) How does the time constant for each SUT change with different profiles? 
d) How does the time constant compare to failure delay and F-measure? 
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e) Does time constant differ between SUT for the same experimental profile? 
f) Does the response profile conform to the exponential saturation model? 
 
5.15   Data Analysis 
 
This section describes the data analysis to be performed for the experimental results; 
confidence intervals for the mean, robust statistical estimators, and handling of outliers. 
5.15.1 Confidence Intervals for the Mean 
 
Confidence intervals for the experimental results are used, in preference to significance 
testing, as recommended for example by StatSoft, Inc. (2011). For normally distributed 
data of sample size n with sample mean µs and sample standard deviation σs it is usual 
to calculate a confidence interval for the mean given by µs ± tcσs/√n where tc is the 
critical point of the t-distribution for n−1 degrees of freedom, and t0.05 is often chosen 
giving a 95% confidence level. However, the mean and standard deviation are very 
sensitive to the presence of ‘outliers’ in the data, which ‘contaminate’ the distribution. 
5.15.2 Robust Statistical Estimators 
 
Abu-Shawiesh, Al-Athari & Kittani (2009) have studied the confidence interval for the 
mean in the presence of outliers. ‘Robust’ statistical estimators that are relatively 
unaffected by the presence of outliers include the sample median M and the median 
absolute deviation about the median (MAD). MAD is defined as the median of |Xi−M| 
for data values Xi where the index i runs from 1 to n for sample size n. A robust 
confidence interval for the mean is given by Μ ± 1.253tcbn × 1.4826 × MAD/√n where 
bn is a correction factor for small sample size, approximately equal to n/(n−1). A robust 
estimator for the sample standard deviation σs is given by bn × 1.4826 × MAD. These 
estimators are normalised to give correct values for the case of normally distributed 
data. 
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5.15.3 Handling of Outliers 
 
Data values Xi for which |Xi−M| / MAD > 4.5 are treated as suspected outliers. This 
approach is independent of the underlying distribution, however for normally 
distributed data, this is equivalent to the well-known ‘3 sigma rule’ with the probability 
of Xi falling beyond this range approximately equal to 1/370 = 0.0027 (Maronna, Martin 
& Yohai, 2006). The median M is recalculated with the outliers removed from the data 
set for comparison. 
5.16   Summary 
 
This chapter first presented the research goals, a generic procedure for testing the 
hypotheses, the experimental design, experimental configurations, methods for random 
generation of SQL and SQL mutation, DBMS initialisation, database creation, and the 
method for identifying minimal test sequences. This chapter then presented the 
procedures to be followed in the 1st experiment - MySQL (invalid and valid SQL) and 
the 2nd experiment - Oracle XE (valid SQL) and finally discussed methodological 
challenges, experimental questions, and data analysis. 
 
 134 
6 RESULTS 
6.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter presents results for the 1st experiment using MySQL with invalid and valid 
SQL, MySQL bugs found during the experiment, and results for the 2nd experiment 
using Oracle XE with valid SQL. 
6.2   1st Experiment - MySQL (Invalid and Valid SQL) 
 
This section first presents a summary of the data sets and results for the 1st experiment 
and then presents results for executing the ‘invalid’ experimental profiles produced by 
BNF mutation and syntax mutation, followed by results using the ‘valid’ experimental 
profile for F-measure, response profile and time constant, and finally results for MySQL 
database creation. 
6.2.1  Summary of Results for the 1st Experiment 
 
The data sets and experimental results for the 1st experiment using SQL mutation are 
fully described in APPENDIX C together with details of the program and data files used 
to automate the experimental procedure. 
 
The following data sets were used in the 1st experiment: 
1. Data set A (non-mutated) 
2. Data set B (mutated) 
3. Data set C (mutated) 
 
Input values used in the experimental runs were drawn randomly from these data sets. 
 
Data set A consisted of non-mutated (valid) SQL statements and contained nearly equal 
proportions of CREATE (33%) INSERT (34%) and REPLACE (33%) statements. 
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Data set B consisted of mutated (invalid) SQL statements and contained proportions of 
CREATE (28%) INSERT (26%) and REPLACE (46%) statements. Data set B was 
generated by Dr. Jacob Mulenga, using several machines at Cranfield Defence and 
Security with the same Perl programs as were used to generate the other data sets. 
 
Data set C consisted of mutated (invalid) SQL statements and contained only CREATE 
statements. 
 
For the 1st experiment there were two experimental runs. The first experimental run 
used non-mutated (valid) input values from data set A and mutated (invalid) input 
values from data set B. This run produced 12 inconclusive outcomes and two positive 
outcomes. 
 
The second experimental run used non-mutated (valid) input values from data set A and 
mutated (invalid) input values from data set C. This run produced five inconclusive 
outcomes and two positive outcomes. Overall, four out of 21 experimental outcomes 
were positive (19%). A summary of results for the 1st experiment is shown in Table 12. 
 
1st experiment Delay F-measure 
First run 4195 24,195 
 5338 25,338 
Second run 9265 29,265 
 5431 25,431 
Median M1 5384.5 25,385 
MAD 618 618 
σs 1248.8 1248.8 
Lower 95% 2894 22894.5 
Upper 95% 7875 27875.5 
 
Table 12: Failure delay results for the 1st experiment 
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The median value M1 for failure delay and F-measure for the positive outcomes and the 
corresponding 95% confidence intervals are shown. The sample standard deviation σs is 
estimated as bn × 1.4826 × MAD and a robust 95% confidence interval for the mean is 
estimated as Μ1 ± 1.253t0.05σs/√n where number of samples n = 4 b4 = 1.363 and t0.05 = 
3.182 that is Μ1 ± 4.03 × MAD. 
 
The ‘3 sigma’ outlier test of M1 ± 4.5 × MAD suggests the values of 9265 for failure 
delay and 29,265 for F-measure in the second run are outliers. After removing the 
outliers from the data set, the recalculated medians are M2 = 5338 for failure delay and 
M2 = 25,338 for F-measure with revised 95% confidence intervals of 2847.5 to 7828.5 
and 22,847.5 to 27,828.5 respectively. 
 
A positive outcome in the 1st experiment tends to indicate rejection of the null 
hypothesis H01 as described in Table 11 (‘possible outcomes of the experiment’) in 
Chapter 5. 
6.2.2  ‘Invalid’ Experimental Profiles 
 
Two alternative approaches were used to generate the ‘invalid’ experimental profile 
used in the 1st experiment, as shown in Table 10: ‘Invalid’ experimental profile for 
MySQL, in Chapter 5. The ‘invalid’ experimental profile was generated from the 2010 
version of the BNF specification /mysql/data/bnf10.txt which specifies 260 database 
table names. 
 
BNF Mutation 
 
For 100,000 generated SQL statements, procedure (a) BNF mutation produced 5485 
valid SQL statements (442 CREATE and 5043 DELETE) and 94,515 invalid SQL 
statements after mutation. The results of executing both the valid and invalid profiles 
with MySQL are shown in Table 13. Note that it is possible for random BNF mutation 
to generate a profile containing no valid CREATE statements; however, such a profile 
cannot be used in the experiments, as no database tables are created. 
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Syntax Mutation 
 
For 100,000 generated SQL statements, procedure (b) syntax mutation produced 12,051 
valid and 87,949 invalid SQL statements after mutation. The results of executing both 
the valid and invalid profiles with MySQL are shown in Table 13. 
 
Before each run of the profiles (a) and (b) shown in Table 13, 1000 SQL statements 
were generated using the ‘valid’ experimental profile with a seed value of 0 and 
executed with an empty database (as discussed later under the heading of ‘MySQL 
Database Creation’). 
 
Profile Executed Failed Accepted Succeeded Time (sec) 
(a) Valid 5485 0 5270 215 16 
(b) Valid 12,051 5 11,588 458 54 
(a) Invalid 94,515 66,105 28,391 19 291 
(b) Invalid 87,949 84,593 3339 17 165 
 
Table 13: Results for ‘invalid’ experimental profile 
 
6.2.3  F-Measure 
 
The F-measure Fvalid was measured for MySQL with a ‘valid’ experimental profile. 
Twenty runs were performed using experimental profile P2b with the database initially 
empty before each run. Each run was performed with a different random number seed 
and so each used a different random set of SQL statements. The ‘valid’ experimental 
profile P2b was generated from the 2009 version of the BNF specification 
/mysql/data/bnf09.txt which specifies 260 database table names. 
 
The MySQL DBMS crashed in eight runs out of twenty (40%) with the results shown in 
Table 14. Experimental runs that did not crash are not shown in the table. Note the 
number of SQL statements executed = failed + accepted + succeeded. 
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Seed Executed Failed Accepted Succeeded Time (sec) 
3 12,884 1 10,939 1944 78 
6 22,612 9 19,167 3436 421 
10 21,625 6 18,420 3199 403 
11 29,057 7 25,841 3209 238 
12 45,498 13 39,578 5906 350 
16 13,425 2 12,383 1220 237 
17 17,352 3 15,914 1435 298 
19 30,147 8 26,733 3407 320 
M 22,119 7 18,794 3204 309 
MAD 7,484 3 6729 746 71.5 
Lower 95% 8992 1 6991 1896 184 
Upper 95% 35,245 12 30,596 4512 434 
 
Table 14: F-measure results for MySQL DBMS 
 
The sample median M and median absolute deviation MAD are calculated for each of 
the response variables in Table 14. For sample size n = 8 √n = 2.828 t0.05 = 2.365 and b8 
= 1.129 so (1.253tcbn × 1.4826)/√n = 1.754 giving a 95% confidence interval for the 
mean of Μ ± 1.754 × MAD. 
 
The ‘3 sigma’ outlier test of M1 ± 4.5 × MAD suggests that none of the data values in 
Table 14 are outliers. 
6.2.4  Response Profile and Time Constant 
 
The response profile obtained for the MySQL DBMS with ‘valid’ experimental profile 
P2a is shown in Figure 28. This is a plot of the number of success responses from the 
SUT against the number of blocks of SQL statements executed for a database with 260 
tables. There were 1482 SQL statements in each block; this was chosen to match the 
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mean number of SQL statements in each block in the Oracle XE response profile 
experiment to allow comparison of the results. This plot shows random variation in the 
number of success responses from the SUT. The experimental results are tabulated in 
APPENDIX A. 
 
Number of success responses 
 
Number of blocks 
 
Figure 28: Response profile for MySQL DBMS 
 
Plotting the natural logarithm log(A + C − y) against x should produce a straight line 
with slope −k and intercept log(A) where k = 1/T for time constant T. Linear regression 
coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for time constant T were calculated using 
Microsoft Excel data analysis as shown in Table 15. The value of (A + C) was estimated 
from the last 10 data points + 1% margin as approximately 234. 
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Time constant Coefficients Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 2.63 2.44 2.824 
Slope -0.081 -0.097 -0.064 
A 13.89 11.49 16.79 
C 220.11 222.51 217.21 
T 12.31 10.22 15.47 
 
Table 15: Linear regression for time constant 
 
6.2.5  MySQL Database Creation 
 
Using the ‘valid’ experimental profile P2b 1000 SQL statements were generated with a 
seed value of 0 and then executed with an empty database. Of these 1000 statements 
994 were accepted and 6 succeeded as shown below, creating the six (empty) database 
tables described in Table 16. 
 
CREATE TABLE m2 (u8 YEAR ) MAX_ROWS=36 TYPE=MRG_MYISAM ; 
CREATE TABLE y0 (z7 REAL UNSIGNED ) ; 
CREATE TABLE g6 (j6 SMALLINT (54) ZEROFILL NOT NULL REFERENCES 
m5 (g8) ON UPDATE NO ACTION ON DELETE SET NULL ) CHARACTER SET 
HEBREW CONNECTION 'k' ; 
CREATE TABLE c6 (k6 REAL ,u5 VARCHAR (9) CHARACTER SET SWE7 KEY 
REFERENCES c4 (d1,t1) ON UPDATE RESTRICT ) ; 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS l8 (b1 LONGTEXT ) ; 
CREATE TABLE w0 (z0 SET ('jxf','i') CHARACTER SET CP1250 ) MIN_ROWS 17; 
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Table Field Type Null Key Default 
c6 k6 Double YES  NULL 
 u5 varchar(9) NO PRI NULL 
g6 j6 smallint(54) unsigned zerofill NO  NULL 
l8 b1 longtext YES  NULL 
m2 u8 year(4) YES  NULL 
w0 z0 set('jxf','i') YES  NULL 
y0 z7 double unsigned YES  NULL 
 
Table 16: MySQL database tables 
 
The MySQL response for successful statements is ‘0000 SUCCESS’ and the response 
for failing statements is ‘1064 You have an error in your SQL syntax’ (although no 
statements in this run failed). Examples of MySQL responses for ‘accepted’ statements 
from this run are shown below: 
 
1031 Table storage engine for 'c6' doesn't have this option 
1051 Unknown table 'a0' 
1054 Unknown column 'c3' in 'order clause' 
1054 Unknown column 'd4' in 'field list' 
1054 Unknown column 'n3' in 'where clause' 
1063 Incorrect column specifier for column 's0' 
1067 Invalid default value for 'g3' 
1072 Key column 'a6' doesn't exist in table 
1089 Incorrect sub part key; the used key part isn't a string, the used length is longer 
 than the key part, or the storage engine doesn't support unique sub keys 
1136 Column count doesn't match value count at row 1 
1146 Table 'test.a0' doesn't exist 
1214 The used table type doesn't support FULLTEXT indexes 
1253 COLLATION 'latin1_danish_ci' is not valid for CHARACTER SET 'ujis' 
1253 COLLATION 'latin1_german2_ci' is not valid for CHARACTER SET 'cp932' 
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1253 COLLATION 'latin1_german2_ci' is not valid for CHARACTER SET 'latin5' 
1391 Key part 'm6' length cannot be 0 
1425 Too big scale 319 specified for column 'q4'. Maximum is 30 
1427 For float(M,D), double(M,D) or decimal(M,D), M must be >= D (column 'k6') 
 
6.3   MySQL Bugs Reported 
 
This section presents a summary of MySQL bugs found during pilot runs, script 
debugging, and experimental runs. These were reported using the MySQL online bug-
tracking system at http://bugs.mysql.com/ 
 
6.3.1  MySQL Bug Report #4046 
 
“Using column type DECIMAL (0,11) will crash mysql”. This was found to be an 
existing MySQL bug, so a new bug report was not needed. When creating a table 
column of type DECIMAL (M, D) the maximum number of digits (precision) is M and 
the number of digits to the right of the decimal point (range) is D. In this case a 
precision of zero was syntactically valid (although in practice this will not allow any 
value to be stored) however when the table was later accessed MySQL crashed; this is a 
delayed failure because the table access may occur an arbitrary time after the CREATE 
TABLE. 
6.3.2  MySQL Bug Report #38696 
 
“CREATE TABLE ... CHECK ... allows illegal syntax”. The MySQL parser accepts 
invalid CREATE TABLE syntax and furthermore the database operation is successful. 
The following is valid syntax according to the MySQL specification: 
CREATE TABLE a1 (col_1 INT CHECK (whatever)); 
However the following invalid syntax succeeds: 
CREATE TABLE a1 (col_1 INT CHECK something (whatever)); 
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6.3.3  MySQL Bug Report #39144 
 
“CREATE TABLE - undocumented behaviour of reference_definition options”. Again, 
the MySQL parser accepts invalid CREATE TABLE syntax, which succeeds. The 
parameter reference_definition is defined in the MySQL specification as: 
REFERENCES ... [MATCH option] [ON DELETE option] [ON UPDATE option] 
This has three optional parameters in a given order. However, the actual MySQL 
behaviour corresponds to: 
REFERENCES ... [choice] [choice] [choice] … 
Here choice is any of MATCH option | ON DELETE option | ON UPDATE option and 
so allows any number of parameters in any order, including repetition of parameters. 
6.3.4  MySQL Bug Report #45639 
 
“INSERT on MERGE table results in a crash”. The following SQL statements cause 
MySQL to crash: 
CREATE TABLE u3 (e9 INT) TYPE MRG_MYISAM INSERT_METHOD LAST; 
INSERT u3 SET e9=42; 
Here the optional UNION clause is (perfectly legally) omitted from CREATE for a 
table of type MERGE and so the reference to the MERGE table is a ‘null pointer’ and 
should be read-only. However, a subsequent INSERT request on the table is accepted 
and this results in a crash because no underlying tables exist for the MERGE reference. 
This is a delayed failure, because the INSERT may occur an arbitrary time after the 
CREATE TABLE. The expected response to the INSERT was “ERROR 1036 Table 'u3' 
is read only”. 
6.4   2nd Experiment - Oracle XE (Valid SQL) 
 
This section presents a summary and detail of results for F-measure and failure delay, 
and for response profile and time constant, obtained for Oracle XE with valid SQL. 
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The ‘valid’ experimental profile was generated from the /oracle/data/oracle_bnf_2.txt 
BNF specification. 
6.4.1  Summary of Results for the 2nd Experiment 
 
A summary of the results obtained with Oracle XE for F-measure, failure delay, and 
time constant for different numbers of database tables is shown in Table 17, in each 
case as a number of blocks; there was an average of 1482 SQL statements per block. 
The summary of results is shown plotted on a graph in Figure 29. The graph was 
generated using Microsoft Excel. Detailed results for F-measure, failure delay, and time 
constant appear in the following sections. 
 
Number of tables F-measure Fvalid Delay Dvalid Time constant T 
10 38 38 3.2 
100 60 33 15.6 
500 138 79 97 
1000 214.5 110.5 187.9 
 
Table 17: Summary of results for Oracle XE 
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Number of blocks 
 
Number of database tables 
 
Figure 29: Summary of results for Oracle XE 
 
Linear regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for F-measure, failure 
delay, and time constant T were calculated using Microsoft Excel data analysis as 
shown in Table 18, Table 19, and Table 20. 
 
F-measure Coefficients Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 41.24 18.52 63.95 
Slope 0.17 0.13 0.21 
 
Table 18: Linear regression coefficients for F-measure 
 
 
 
 146 
Delay Coefficients Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 33.02 8.73 57.30 
Slope 0.08 0.04 0.12 
 
Table 19: Linear regression coefficients for failure delay 
 
T Coefficients Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 0 N/A N/A 
Slope 0.19 0.18 0.20 
 
Table 20: Linear regression coefficients for time constant 
 
Here it is assumed that the intercept coefficient for time constant is zero. The variation 
in Delay values for Oracle XE shown in Figure 29 does not appear to be due to the 
presence of outliers and is probably a straight line after allowing for the large standard 
deviation of the experimental results. 
6.4.2  F-Measure and Failure Delay 
 
Oracle XE results for F-measure and failure delay with 10, 100, 500 and 1000 database 
tables are shown in Table 21, Table 22, Table 23, and Table 24. Random seed values for 
block execution in this experiment began at Offset +1. 
 
In these tables of results S1 is the precondition block number and S2 is the trigger block 
number. The F-measure Fvalid was calculated as S2−Offset and failure delay Dvalid was 
calculated as S2−S1+1. 
 
The sample standard deviation σs was estimated as 1.5 × median absolute deviation 
(MAD) calculated from the sample median M1 and a revised value for the median M2 
was recalculated after removal of outliers. 
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Suspected outliers were identified as lying more than 4.5 × MAD from the median M1 
and suspected outliers are indicated in the tables as bold underline. 
 
Robust 95% confidence intervals for the mean are calculated as Μ1 ± 1.253t0.05σs/√n 
where bn is taken to be n/(n−1). The experimental differences in median values of F-
measure and failure delay for different numbers of tables were not found to be 
significant at the 95% level. 
 
The following notes appear in the tables of results in the S1 column for inconclusive 
runs: (a) no failure occurred during the run, and (b) the SUT failed on a single re-
execution of block number S2. Case (a) occurred in 6 out of 52 runs or 12%. Case (b) 
occurred in 15 out of 52 runs or 29% and indicates a short latency failure or possibly an 
immediate failure. 
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Offset S2 S1 Fvalid = S2−Offset Dvalid = S2−S1+1 
1 205 (a) 204 - 
206 623 (b) - - 
623 647 625 24 23 
647 743 648 96 96 
743 781 744 38 38 
781 933 (b) - - 
933 960 934 27 27 
960 1022 963 62 60 
1022 1119 1024 97 96 
1119 1144 1120 25 25 
1144 1374 1145 230 230 
1374 1400 1377 26 24 
1400 1418 1401 18 18 
1418 1497 1423 79 75 
1497 1605 1498 108 108 
1605 1676 1616 71 61 
1676 1717 (b) - - 
1717 1722 1718 5 5 
1722 1780 (b) - - 
1780 1984 (b) - - 
  M1 62 49 
  MAD 36 26 
  σs 54 39 
  M2 38 38 
  n 15 14 
21.8 18.6 Lower 95% 
Upper 95% 102.2 79.4 
 
Table 21: Oracle XE results for 10 database tables 
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Offset S2 S1 Fvalid = S2−Offset Dvalid = S2−S1+1 
0 38 (b) - - 
38 98 (a) 60 - 
98 146 (b) - - 
146 219 (b) - - 
219 693 (a) 474 - 
693 919 (b) - - 
919 951 920 32 32 
951 1022 989 71 34 
1022 1116 (b) - - 
1116 1148 1142 32 7 
1148 1527 (b) - - 
1527 1618 1530 91 89 
1618 1729 (b) - - 
  M1 65.5 33 
  MAD 29.5 13.5 
  σs 44.25 20.25 
  M2 60 33 
  n 6 4 
 Lower 95% -4.3 -20.8 
 Upper 95% 135.3 86.8 
 
Table 22: Oracle XE results for 100 database tables 
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Offset S2 S1 Fvalid = S2−Offset Dvalid = S2−S1+1 
0 226 172 226 55 
226 378 279 152 100 
378 488 487 110 2 
488 543 (b) - - 
543 902 (a) 359 - 
902 1001 917 99 85 
1001 1455 (a) 454 - 
1455 1534 1456 79 79 
1534 1672 1620 138 53 
1672 1837 1734 165 104 
  M1 152 79 
  MAD 53 24 
  σs 79.5 36 
  M2 138 79 
  n 9 7 
 Lower 95% 65.9 30.3 
 Upper 95% 238.1 127.7 
 
Table 23: Oracle XE results for 500 database tables 
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Offset S2 S1 Fvalid = S2−Offset Dvalid = S2−S1+1 
0 226 172 226 55 
226 488 309 262 180 
488 543 (b) - - 
543 (a) - - - 
1343 1534 (b) - - 
1534 1672 1620 138 53 
1672 1837 1734 165 104 
1837 2047 1885 210 163 
2047 2487 2064 440 424 
2487 2706 2590 219 117 
  M1 219 117 
  MAD 43 62 
  σs 64.5 93 
  M2 214.5 110.5 
  n 7 7 
 Lower 95% 131.8 -8.7 
 Upper 95% 306.2 242.7 
 
Table 24: Oracle XE results for 1000 database tables 
 
6.4.3  Response Profile 
 
The response profile obtained for the Oracle XE DBMS is shown in Figure 30. This is a 
plot of the number of success responses from the SUT against the number of blocks of 
SQL statements executed, for a database with 100 tables. There was an average of 1482 
SQL statements in each block. This plot shows random variation in the number of 
success responses from the SUT. The experimental results are tabulated in APPENDIX 
A. 
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Number of success responses 
 
Number of blocks 
 
Figure 30: Response profile for Oracle XE DBMS 
 
For the Oracle XE experiments executed = accepted + succeeded, as the test harness 
program does not detect failed responses. The results for seed value 38 are excluded as 
this caused the DBMS to hang/freeze; an initial pool of 2900 SQL statements was 
generated for each run producing a mean of 1482 final statements per run. 
 
Taking a moving average of the data set can smooth out the random variation in the 
number of success responses, as shown in Figure 31. Here a window of size 3 was 
chosen for the moving average; this was calculated and plotted using Microsoft Excel. 
This plot is for the same data set as shown in Figure 30. 
 
The plot in Figure 31 suggests the response profile is of the form given by the 
exponential saturation model of random database growth as described by equation (1). 
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Averaged number of success responses 
 
Number of blocks 
 
Figure 31: Moving average of Oracle XE response profile 
 
6.4.4  Time Constant 
 
Plotting the natural logarithm log(A + C − y) against x as shown in Figure 32 should 
produce a straight line with slope −k and intercept log(A) where k = 1/T for time 
constant T. An initial estimate for (A + C) is found by taking the median of the last 10 
data points plus a margin of 1% calculated in this case to be 200.5 as can be confirmed 
by inspection of Figure 31. 
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log(A + C − y) 
 
Number of blocks 
 
Figure 32: Log plot of response profile for Oracle XE 
 
Linear regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the values of A, C and T 
for a database with 100 tables were calculated using Microsoft Excel data analysis as 
shown in Table 25. 
 
100 Tables Coefficients Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 5.21 5.10 5.31 
Slope −0.064 −0.070 −0.059 
A 182.4 164.5 202.1 
C 18.1 36 1.6 
T 15.6 14.3 17.1 
 
Table 25: Linear regression for time constant (100 tables) 
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Linear regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the values of A, C and T 
for databases with 10, 500 and 1000 tables were calculated using Microsoft Excel data 
analysis as shown in Table 26, Table 27, and Table 28. 
 
10 Tables Coefficients Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 4.80 4.09 5.52 
Slope −0.31 −0.40 −0.22 
A 122.1 59.8 249.1 
C 17.0 79.2 −110.1 
T 3.2 2.5 4.5 
 
Table 26: Linear regression for time constant (10 tables) 
 
500 Tables Coefficients Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 4.93 4.88 4.99 
Slope −0.010 −0.011 −0.099 
A 138.9 131.8 146.5 
C −0.5 6.1 −8.6 
T 97.0 93.1 101.3 
 
Table 27: Linear regression for time constant (500 tables) 
 
1000 Tables Coefficients Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 4.89 4.86 4.93 
Slope −0.0053 −0.0055 −0.0052 
A 133.6 129.2 138.1 
C 0.7 5.1 −3.8 
T 187.9 182.5 193.6 
 
Table 28: Linear regression for time constant (1000 tables) 
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The experimental difference in the values for time constant for 10, 100, 500, and 1000 
tables is significant at the 95% level. 
6.5   Summary 
 
This chapter presented results for the 1st experiment using MySQL with invalid and 
valid SQL, MySQL bugs found during the experiment, and results for the 2nd 
experiment using Oracle XE with valid SQL. 
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7 ANALYSIS 
7.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the experimental results. The 1st experiment used 
MySQL with both invalid and valid SQL while the 2nd experiment used Oracle XE with 
valid SQL only. Experiments with invalid SQL provided measurements of failure delay 
only while experiments with valid SQL provided measurements of F-measure, failure 
delay, and time constant. The experimental design is discussed in Chapter 5 and shown 
in Figure 13. This analysis looks for differences between experimental profiles P1 and 
P2 with the same SUT and for differences between SUT S1 and S2 with the same 
experimental profile, as well as considering the accuracy of the response profile 
regression analysis and the statistical distribution of the results. 
7.2   Analysis of Results for P1 and P2 
 
This section compares the results for F-measure with ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ experimental 
profiles P1 and P2 using MySQL that is SUT S1. 
7.2.1  F-Measure 
 
The median values and 95% confidence intervals for F-measure in the 1st experiment 
using experimental profile P1 (after removal of outliers) and experimental profile P2 are 
shown in Table 29. The experimental difference in the median values for F-measure for 
P1 and P2 using MySQL S1 is not significant at the 95% level. 
 
Experimental profile F-measure  Lower 95% Upper 95% 
P1 25,338 22,847.5 27,828.5 
P2 22,119 8992 35,245 
 
Table 29: F-measure for P1 and P2 
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7.3   Analysis of Results for S1 and S2 
 
This section compares the results for MySQL and Oracle XE that is SUT S1 and S2 
using the ‘valid’ experimental profile P2 for F-measure, failure delay, and time constant. 
7.3.1  F-Measure 
 
The median values and 95% confidence intervals for F-measure for S1 and S2 are shown 
in Table 30. F-measure figures given for Oracle XE are the number of blocks. For 
MySQL the number of SQL statements is given with the equivalent in blocks. The 
experimental difference in the median values for F-measure for S1 and S2 is significant 
at the 95% level, using interpolated values for Oracle XE with 300 tables (shown in 
bold), although the 95% confidence intervals for F-measure for Oracle XE with 
different numbers of tables are overlapping. 
 
Oracle XE 1482 SQL statements per block (average) 
Number of tables F-measure Fvalid Lower 95% Upper 95% 
10 38 21.8 102.2 
100 60 -4.3 135.3 
300 99 30.8 186.7 
500 138 65.9 238.1 
1000 214.5 131.8 306.2 
MySQL    
260 22,119 =  
14.9 blocks 
8992 =  
6.1 blocks 
35,245 =  
23.8 blocks 
 
Table 30: F-measure for S1 and S2 
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7.3.2  Failure Delay 
 
The median values and 95% confidence intervals for failure delay for S1 and S2 are 
shown in Table 31. Failure delay figures given for Oracle XE are the number of blocks. 
For MySQL the number of SQL statements is given with the equivalent in blocks; the 
failure delay figure given for MySQL is the delay in the 1st experiment with profile P1. 
The experimental difference in the median values for failure delay for S1 and S2 is 
significant at the 95% level, using interpolated values for Oracle XE with 300 tables 
(shown in bold), although the 95% confidence intervals for failure delay for Oracle XE 
with different numbers of tables are overlapping. 
 
Oracle XE 1482 SQL statements per block (average) 
Number of tables Delay Dvalid Lower 95% Upper 95% 
10 38 18.6 79.4 
100 33 -20.8 86.8 
300 56 4.75 107.25 
500 79 30.3 127.7 
1000 110.5 -8.7 242.7 
MySQL    
260 5338 =  
3.6 blocks 
2847.5 =  
1.9 blocks 
7828.5 =  
5.3 blocks 
 
Table 31: Failure delay for S1 and S2 
 
7.3.3  Time Constant 
 
The median values and 95% confidence intervals for time constant for S1 and S2 are 
shown in Table 32. The time constant figures given for both Oracle XE and MySQL are 
the number of blocks. The experimental difference in the values for time constant for S1 
and S2 is significant at the 95% level, interpolating values for Oracle XE with 300 tables 
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(shown in bold). The experimental differences in the values for time constant for Oracle 
XE with different numbers of tables are significant at the 95% level. 
 
Oracle XE 1482 SQL statements per block 
Number of tables Time constant T Lower 95% Upper 95% 
10 3.2 2.5 4.5 
100 15.6 14.3 17.1 
300 56.3 53.7 59.2 
500 97 93.1 101.3 
1000 187.9 182.5 193.6 
MySQL    
260 12.31 10.22 15.47 
 
Table 32: Time constant for S1 and S2 
 
7.4   Accuracy of Response Profile Regression Analysis 
 
As discussed in section 5.12.5 (calculation of time constant) plotting the natural 
logarithm of f(x) = (A + C − y) = Ae-kx against x should produce a straight line. In 
practice, random variation in the number of success responses y(x) is observed as shown 
in the response profiles of Figure 28 and Figure 30 and this gives rise to variation in the 
logarithm plot which is a cause of inaccuracy in linear regression analysis. 
 
The logarithm of f(x) is logA – kx, however due to the influence of random variation we 
actually obtain the logarithm of R(x)f(x), that is log A – kx + log R where R(x) is a factor 
due to random variation. If the magnitude of the random variation is small compared to 
f(x) then R(x) is close to 1 and log R is close to zero so the variation is negligible. As 
shown in Figure 28 and Figure 30 the observed magnitude of variation is approximately 
0.1A and this is approximately equal to f(x) at x = 2T for time constant T where k = 1/T. 
In this case, regression analysis of log plots should be accurate for x < 2T as shown in 
Figure 32: Log plot of response profile for Oracle XE. 
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7.5   Statistical Distribution of Results 
 
Chen, Kuo & Merkel (2004) report that the F-measure for random testing is distributed 
according to the (discrete) geometric distribution with a mean of approximately M/log 2 
where M is the sample median and 1/log 2 = 1.44 to 2 significant figures. Maronna, 
Martin & Yohai (2006) show that a robust estimate for the mean of the analogous 
(continuous) exponential distribution is M/log 2. However, the results of the present 
research show a ratio of mean/median ranging from 0.95 to 1.37 for F-measure and 
from 0.86 to 1.33 for delay, and this suggests the results are not geometrically 
distributed. This may be a result of the dependence between test cases for stochastic 
testing of a DBMS, where the result of each test case depends on the DBMS state from 
the previous test case. 
 
Measures of Kurtosis and Skewness (from Excel data analysis descriptive statistics) 
suggest the results are very approximately normally distributed: F-measure has a range 
of Kurtosis from -1.70 to 1.29 and a range of Skewness from 0.23 to 1.10 while delay 
has a range of Kurtosis from -1.74 to 2.34 and a range of Skewness from -1.13 to 1.22. 
However the hypothesis of normality cannot be rejected on the basis of these measures 
because of the small size of the data sets (between 4 and 13 samples). Normal 
probability plots of F-measure results also suggest these results are approximately 
normally distributed as shown in APPENDIX F. An assumption of normal distribution 
when calculating 95% confidence intervals as discussed in section 5.15 is therefore 
justified. 
7.6   Summary 
 
This chapter presented an analysis of the experimental results. This analysis looked for 
differences between experimental profiles P1 and P2 with the same SUT and for 
differences between SUT S1 and S2 with the same experimental profile, and considered 
the accuracy of the response profile regression analysis and the statistical distribution of 
the results. 
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8 DISCUSSION 
8.1   Introduction 
 
The present research has investigated the delayed failure of software components and 
has addressed the problem that the conventional approach to software testing is unlikely 
to reveal this type of failure. Delayed failure of software components is a consequence 
of long-latency error propagation. 
 
The focus of this research is on software components described by a request-response 
model. Within this conceptual framework, a Markov chain model of error propagation 
and failure has been developed that allows calculation of the delayed failure behaviour 
of software components based on estimation of state transition probabilities. 
 
Experimental studies of DBMS using MySQL and Oracle XE have been conducted 
using stochastic testing with random generation of SQL and the results are consistent 
with expected behaviour based on the Markov chain model. SQL mutation was used to 
generate negative as well as positive test profiles. 
 
Stochastic testing has been shown to be an effective method for revealing delayed 
failure, as well as being a suitable technique for reliability and robustness testing of 
software components. Metrics for failure delay and reliability for these software 
components have been shown to depend on the characteristics of the chosen 
experimental profile. 
 
This chapter presents a discussion of the present research within the context of 
stochastic testing, SQL mutation, experimental studies of DBMS, fault detection 
effectiveness and efficiency, the conceptual framework, delayed failure, the research 
problem, and threats to validity. 
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8.2   Stochastic Testing 
 
This section discusses the present research within the context of stochastic testing. 
Stochastic testing was introduced in Chapter 1. 
 
Stochastic testing was chosen for the present research because it appeared to be a good 
candidate as a testing technique for delayed failure and was a suitable technique for a 
stateless approach. In addition, stochastic testing allows comparative measurement of 
reliability and robustness of software components with the use of ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ 
profiles and has a strong link to related work, such as that of Slutz (1998) and Kaner & 
Bach (2004). 
 
Whittaker (1997) and Nyman (2000) are among the earliest advocates for the 
effectiveness and efficiency of stochastic testing; yet stochastic testing continues to be 
an active area of current research in its modern form of ‘fuzzing’, as described for 
example by Garcia (2009) and by Khalek & Khurshid (2010). 
 
The BCS Standard for Software Component Testing BS 7925-2 (2001) recognises 
random testing as a technique, but does not distinguish stochastic testing. Reid (2000) 
recalls that random testing was only added to the Standard at a late stage, after research 
comparing random testing to other software testing techniques demonstrated its 
effectiveness (Reid, 1997); a case could now be made for including stochastic testing in 
the Standard. 
 
The robustness and reliability of MySQL as an Open Source product was expected to be 
at least comparable to that of a proprietary product such as Oracle XE. Reasoning, Inc. 
(2003) give details of faults found in automated source code inspection of MySQL 
version 4.0.16. This study reported 21 defects resulting in a defect density of 0.09 
defects per KLOC, whereas the overall defect density of proprietary database code was 
reported as 0.58 defects per KLOC (Kilo Lines Of Code). The faults examined included 
memory leaks, null pointer dereferences, and un-initialised variables. However, for the 
present research the MTTF (median F-measure) number of SQL statements found in the 
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experimental study was 24,767 for MySQL and 146,718 for Oracle XE. This apparent 
difference may be due to differences in the experimental profiles used for MySQL and 
Oracle XE, that is to say the experimental profile used for MySQL may simply be more 
effective at revealing failures than the experimental profile used for Oracle XE. 
 
The experimental profiles for the two SUT were created separately because of 
differences in SQL syntax, and it was expected that a profile based on only the common 
core SQL syntax would be less effective in revealing faults, compared to profiles 
incorporating proprietary SQL extensions. It would be interesting to repeat the 
experiments using a common profile based on the core SQL ISO/IEC 9075 2003 
standard. 
 
The order of magnitude of these values also was unexpected, since at a processing rate 
of 150 statements per second (as found in the response profile experiments for both 
SUT) 150,000 SQL statements would take 1000 sec to execute, or a little less than 17 
minutes. Clearly, commercial DBMS typically operate for very much longer periods 
than this without failure! According to Hamlet & Voas (1993) desired software 
reliability is typically of the order of 106 to 108 executions without failure. 
 
The main reason for the lower than expected MTTF for these DBMS in the experiments 
is probably that randomly generated SQL statements are more likely to reveal failures 
than those found in a typical operational profile. Reliability for a typical operational 
profile might be expected to be high for a ‘stable’ production software release, firstly 
because faults that caused failures in typical use have already been reported by users 
and fixed, and secondly that release testing is probably based on an operational profile, 
as discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Randomly generated SQL statements are likely to be very different from typical SQL 
statements encountered in normal operation; a complex SQL statement such as 
CREATE TABLE has a large number of optional parameters and so there are a very 
large number of possible combinations of parameters. Relatively few of the many 
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possible SQL statements present in a randomly generated profile are likely to be found 
in a typical operational profile. 
 
Further support to this argument is provided by the provision of a query cache in 
MySQL. The query cache stores SQL queries, along with their results; the result of a 
query is available immediately if the query is repeated. Many typical DBMS 
environments have large numbers of identical queries, and table contents do not change 
often. The query cache is described in MySQL Administrator’s Guide (2004) and in the 
MySQL 5.0 Reference Manual (2010). 
 
In addition to the unusual syntax of randomly generated SQL statements, stochastic 
testing also has the feature that valid statements are very likely to be presented to the 
SUT in an invalid order, a form of negative testing called ‘context testing’ by Utting & 
Legeard (2007). Examples include the attempted CREATE of an existing table and 
attempted INSERT and DELETE operations on non-existing tables, rows, or columns. 
This accounts for the high proportion of ‘accepted’ to ‘succeeded’ SQL statements in 
the experimental results, and is not expected in a typical operational profile. 
 
For these reasons, stochastic testing cannot be considered a ‘pure’ reliability testing 
technique, since it has strong aspects of robustness testing, and should be more correctly 
regarded as a dependability testing technique. Reliability, robustness, and dependability 
are discussed in Chapter 1. 
8.3   SQL Mutation 
 
This section discusses the present research within the context of SQL mutation; as 
discussed in Chapter 2, there appear to be few published works on the use of SQL 
mutation in DBMS testing prior to the present research. 
 
As described in Chapters 5 and 6, two alternative approaches to SQL mutation were 
used to generate the ‘invalid’ experimental profile used in the 1st experiment; (a) BNF 
mutation using the program /mysql/programs/bmut.pl and (b) syntax mutation using the 
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program /mysql/programs/smut.pl. Refer to Table 10: ‘Invalid’ experimental profile for 
MySQL and Table 13: Results for ‘invalid’ experimental profile. 
 
It is not evident from the results presented if one approach or the other can be regarded 
as more effective; this was not the focus of the present research, but might be an 
interesting topic for further research, as it is believed there has been little related work 
in this area. 
 
The BCS Standard for Software Component Testing BS 7925-2 (2001) provides the 
following list of syntax mutation operators, as discussed in Chapter 5: 
 
M1. Introduce an invalid value for an element. 
M2. Substitute an element with another defined element. 
M3. Miss out a defined element. 
M4. Add an extra element. 
 
These operators can be reduced to the repeated application of just two basic operators, 
‘cut’ and ‘paste’ as described below. Furthermore, this approach produces several new 
syntax mutation operators. 
 
The ‘paste’ operator (+) inserts an additional element into the string to the right of the 
current element, while the ‘cut’ operator (−) deletes the current element from the string: 
the deleted element is re-used in subsequent paste operations. If there has been no 
previous cut operation on the string then the paste operator inserts a default element. 
 
As an example, taking the point of operation as the first element of the original string, 
the string ‘ABCD’ after applying the ‘paste’ operation (+) becomes ‘AXBCD’ then 
applying the ‘cut’ operation (−) this becomes ‘XBCD’ which is the same as operation 
M1 as given in BS 7925-2 (2001) ‘introduce an invalid value for an element’. 
 
Further examples of operators produced by this method including M1 to M4 discussed 
above plus new mutations M5 to M9 are shown in Table 33. 
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Operator sequence Resulting string Equivalent operator 
 ABCD Original string unchanged 
+− XBCD M1. Introduce an invalid value for an element 
−−+−++−+ CBCD M2. Substitute with another defined element 
− BCD M3. Miss out a defined element 
+ AXBCD M4. Add an extra (invalid) element 
−− CD M5. Miss out two adjacent elements 
−+ BACD M6. Swap two adjacent elements 
++ AXXBCD M7. Add two extra (invalid) elements 
−−+ CBD M3 (miss out) followed by M6 (swap) 
+−+ XABCD M8. Add extra element at the left of the string 
+−++− AABCD M9. Duplicate (repeat) an element 
 
Table 33: Extended set of mutation operators 
 
Mutation operators M1 to M4 as given in BS 7925-2 (2001) are not sufficient to test the 
cases of swapped element order (M6) and repeated elements (M9). Testing using the 
extended set of mutation operators found the MySQL Bug #39144 “CREATE TABLE - 
undocumented behaviour of reference_definition options” as described in Chapter 6. 
This bug would not have been found by testing using only the mutation operators M1 to 
M4. The set of mutation operators given in BS 7925-2 (2001) should therefore be 
extended. 
8.4   Experimental Studies of DBMS 
 
This section discusses the present research within the context of experimental studies of 
DBMS including random database creation. Experimental studies of DBMS were 
introduced in Chapter 1. 
 
With increasing volumes of data, databases have begun to be used in embedded 
applications; a survey of DBMS for embedded real-time systems can be found in 
Tešanovic, et al. (2002). 
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This ubiquity of DBMS should mean that techniques for testing them, as investigated in 
the present research, are of increasing importance in the future. Tools and techniques for 
SQL ‘fuzzing’ are now beginning to be employed, as reported by Garcia (2009), 
Naraine (2009) and Stoev (2009). 
8.4.1  Database Creation 
 
The test databases generated in the experiments have randomly generated schemas, 
populated with randomly generated data. This contrasts with the usual approach to 
DBMS testing as discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5; production tests of the MySQL 
and Oracle XE DBMS are likely to have been performed with predefined databases, 
such as one of the example databases, or a copy of a production database. 
 
Testing with a random database is likely to include unusual combinations of data types 
and values not covered in production testing performed with predefined databases, and 
so potentially expose dormant faults. This approach to DBMS testing can be viewed as 
a form of robustness testing of the DBMS, by means of the database interface rather 
than the SQL interface; refer to Figure 5: ‘Block diagram of DBMS architecture’ in 
Chapter 1. This approach to DBMS testing might be an interesting topic for further 
research, as it is believed there has been little related work in this area. 
 
The databases generated using the experimental procedures described in Chapter 5 
should have a random schema that is related to the choice of experimental profile. 
However, the DBMS imposes integrity constraints on SQL data definition and data 
manipulation statements, and inserts default values for parameters, and in the case of 
MySQL, substitutes default values for data types (this feature is optional, see 
Schumacher, 2005) and this will affect the resulting database schema. Database 
integrity constraints are discussed in Date (2004), Greenwald, Stackowiak & Stern 
(2004), the MySQL 5.0 Reference Manual (2010), and the Oracle® Database SQL 
Reference (2005). 
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8.5   Fault Detection Effectiveness and Efficiency 
 
This section discusses the present research within the context of fault detection 
effectiveness and efficiency. Fault detection effectiveness and efficiency were discussed 
in Chapter 2, in particular with reference to Reid, et al. (1999) and BS 7925-2 (2001). 
8.5.1  Fault Detection Effectiveness 
 
It is expected that an effective testing technique should be able to reveal already known 
faults in the SUT, as well as to reveal new faults previously unknown; the MySQL bugs 
found during the experiment as discussed in Chapter 6 provide evidence that this is true 
of the stochastic testing technique investigated in the present research: 
Bug Report #4046 was an existing bug. 
Bug Report #38696 was similar to existing Bug#35578. 
Bug Report #39144 was similar to existing Bug#34455. 
Bug Report #45639 was new and repeatable on version 5.0.21 (although not on more 
  recent versions). 
 
This observation is important, because any new testing technique should be at least as 
effective as alternative techniques if it is to make a useful contribution to software 
testing practice. 
 
It is interesting to consider if the technique will continue to be effective when faults are 
removed and testing is repeated; fault detection effectiveness is expected to be less, due 
to the pesticide paradox of Beizer (1990). However, new versions of software will 
probably contain new features and hence new defects, provided software development 
techniques do not improve. Furthermore, random generation of the test profile 
effectively generates new tests ad infinitum (Robinson, 1999) as discussed in Chapter 2, 
perhaps compensating for the pesticide paradox. 
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8.5.2  Fault Detection Efficiency 
 
Testing software components with invalid input requests is expected to be less efficient 
than testing with valid input requests, because there is a low probability of acceptance 
P0 as discussed in Chapter 4. Combining the results for both approaches to SQL 
mutation as shown in Table 13: Results for ‘invalid’ experimental profile, in chapter 6, 
gives 160,249 statements failed out of 171,471 executed, that is 93.5% giving a value 
for P0 of 0.065. 
 
Automatic generation and execution of test cases, as with other HVAT techniques, 
greatly increases the efficiency of the technique used in the present research compared 
to manual or semi-automated testing techniques. The creation of Perl programs to 
accomplish this was not found to be particularly difficult or time consuming, and once 
created these offer the promise of re-use with little modification for other varieties of 
DBMS, or altogether different software components, provided a specification and 
software interface is available. 
 
Against these advantages must be set the effort required to debug long test traces, 
although the method for identifying minimal test sequences described in Chapter 5 is 
helpful. Manual preparation and debugging of SQL specification files in the present 
research did, however, occupy several weeks of effort on a part-time basis. 
 
The automatic generation of a (random) test database, as opposed to the manual creation 
of a predefined test database, is another possible efficiency gain, although some time is 
required in every test run for the database tables to be created. 
 
From the exponential saturation model described in Chapter 5, a period of 3T would be 
expected to be required in each test run for 95% of the database tables to be created, 
where T is the time constant. However, from the experimental results summarised in 
Table 34 the median of the ratio of F-measure to time constant F/T is only 1.4 
suggesting that failure occurs somewhere between 1T and 2T that is when between 63% 
and 87% of database tables have been created (in cases where failure occurs at all). 
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The data in Table 34 is a summary of data found in Chapter 6 in Table 12, Table 14, 
Table 15, and Table 17; figures are in multiples of blocks. These results were obtained 
using the ‘valid’ experimental profile P2. No measurement of time constant was 
obtained for MySQL in run (a) and so the value obtained in run (b) been substituted (*). 
 
DBMS Tables Median F-measure F Median time constant T F/T 
MySQL (a) 260 17.13 12.31 (*) 1.39 
MySQL (b) 260 14.93 12.31 1.21 
Oracle XE 10 38 3.2 11.88 
Oracle XE 100 60 15.6 3.85 
Oracle XE 500 138 97 1.42 
Oracle XE 1000 214.5 187.9 1.14 
 Median 49.0 14.0 1.4 
 
Table 34: Ratio of F-measure to time constant 
 
The small ratio F/T provides support for the hypothesis of a saturation effect, as 
reported by Menzies, Owen & Cukic (2002) and by Menzies, Owen & Richardson 
(2007). This effect, possibly due to ‘clumping’ of software states, would make 
stochastic testing more efficient than might otherwise be expected, as the smaller 
effective state space of the SUT can be rapidly covered, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
From the point of view of software development testing using this testing technique, 
new failures might be expected to be found within a period of perhaps 3T, or not at all; 
and after fixing a defect, regression testing might only need be continued to perhaps 3T. 
This observation might begin to determine “when we can stop fuzzing” (Sutton, Greene 
& Amini, 2007). 
8.6   The Conceptual Framework 
 
This section discusses the present research within the context of the conceptual 
framework. The conceptual framework defines the scope and context of the present 
 172 
research as described in Chapter 3, and consists of a request-response model of software 
components and a state transition model of error propagation and failure. 
8.6.1  Partitioned Request-Response Model 
 
The expected stateless behaviour of a software component is that (a) the component 
should accept valid requests, and (b) the component should reject invalid requests, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. The analysis of the partitioned request-response model in 
Chapter 3 (refer to Figure 11) focussed on two examples of possible failure behaviour: 
 
1. The stateless element might reject a valid request, without passing the request on to 
the state-based element. 
 
2. The stateless element might accept an invalid request and pass this on to the state-
based element. 
 
A more detailed analysis reveals six possible failure behaviours for the stateless 
element, as shown in Table 35. 
 
Case Valid request Request accepted Request passed on Failure  
1. Yes Yes Yes No 
2. Yes Yes No Yes 
3. Yes No Yes Yes 
4. Yes No No Yes 
5. No Yes Yes Yes 
6. No Yes No Yes 
7. No No Yes Yes 
8. No No No No 
 
Table 35: Possible stateless element behaviours 
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Only the failure behaviour cases (3), (4), (5), and (6) can be detected from outside the 
component boundary, and in these cases it is not possible to distinguish whether or not 
the request was passed on to the state-based element. Failure cases (2) and (7) cannot be 
distinguished from correct component behaviour. 
 
Another possible failure behaviour of the stateless element is to incorrectly alter 
(corrupt) a valid request before passing it on to the state-based element; this might apply 
in cases (1) and (3) in Table 35. 
 
Another possible behaviour of the stateless element might of course be to correct an 
invalid request before passing it on to the state-based element; if an invalid request is 
corrected by the stateless element, or if an invalid request is not passed on to the state-
based element, then an incorrect software state should not occur as a result. 
 
In addition, it is possible that the state-based element might enter an incorrect state, 
even if the request is valid; or else might not enter an incorrect state, even when the 
request is invalid. 
 
This analysis shows that accepting valid requests and rejecting invalid requests does not 
guarantee the software component state is correct, and that accepting an invalid request 
does not necessarily mean the software component state is incorrect. 
 
Other possible failure behaviours of the state-based element include accepting a request 
that conflicts with the current software state, and rejecting a request that is not in 
conflict with the software state. A stateless test oracle cannot detect these failures. 
8.6.2  State Transition Model 
 
The state transition model in Chapter 3 describes the delayed failure behaviour of 
software components as the result of long-latency error propagation, where a 
‘precondition’ input request causes a transition to an incorrect software state, followed 
some time later by a ‘trigger’ input request that causes a transition to a failure state. 
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When probabilities are assigned to the transitions between software states, the state 
transition model becomes an absorbing Markov chain model. Expected values of F-
measure and failure delay for valid and invalid input requests are calculated in Chapter 
4 using the theory of absorbing Markov chain models, based on rough order of 
magnitude estimates of transition probabilities. 
 
The expected values of F-measure and failure delay for invalid input requests calculated 
for hypothesis H1 were F-measure Finvalid = 10,020 statements = 6.76 blocks and failure 
delay Dinvalid = 10,010 statements = 6.75 blocks. 
 
The expected values for F-measure and failure delay derived from the Markov chain 
model must be divided by P0 and using the value found for P0 of 0.065 gives modified 
values for F-measure Finvalid = 154,153.8 statements = 104.02 blocks and for failure 
delay Dinvalid = 154,000 statements = 103.91 blocks. 
 
No measurements of F-measure and failure delay for purely invalid input requests were 
obtained in the experiments; the ‘invalid’ profiles executed as shown in Chapter 6, 
Table 13: Results for ‘invalid’ experimental profile, were less than 60 blocks in length. 
 
The expected values of F-measure and failure delay for valid input requests calculated 
for hypothesis H2 were F-measure Fvalid = 30,000 statements = 20.24 blocks and failure 
delay Dvalid = 20,000 statements = 13.5 blocks. 
 
Median values for F-measure and failure delay for MySQL as shown in Chapter 6, 
Table 12: Failure delay results for the 1st experiment, are 17.13 and 3.63 blocks 
respectively. Median values for F-measure Fvalid and failure delay Dvalid shown in Table 
17: Summary of results for Oracle XE, are 99 blocks and 60 blocks respectively. 
 
The differences in F-measure and failure delay results for MySQL and Oracle XE may 
be due to differences in the experimental profiles, as already discussed; however there 
may also be a possibility that the difference is at least partly due to differences in 
transition probabilities between macro states P1 through P5 as defined in Chapter 3. 
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8.7   Delayed Failure 
 
This section discusses the present research within the context of failure delay systems 
and delayed software failure. Delayed failure was introduced in Chapter 1. 
8.7.1  Failure Delay Systems 
 
Although there has been work on reliability modelling of failure delay systems by 
Limnios (1988) and Faria (2008) and failure delay in software has been observed, such 
as for example crash latency reported by Lu, et al. (2005) these ideas do not appear to 
have been combined in a theory of reliability modelling of failure delay in software. The 
Markov chain model described in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 could provide a reliability 
model for software components by relating transition probabilities to an operational 
profile, although there are difficulties in identifying operational profiles for software 
components, as noted in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. 
 
The Markov chain model might further provide a basis for a reliability model of 
software systems, by extending the concept of macro-states to encompass system states; 
however this lies outside the scope of the present research. 
8.7.2  Delayed Software Failure 
 
Although there appears to have been little related work on the delayed failure of 
software, it seems likely that this type of failure should occur in a wide variety of 
software components. First, the few examples of reports of delayed software failure, 
such as Pyle, McLatchie & Grandage (1971), Kaner (1997) and Thompson (2007) are 
spread across a wide range of software systems; an interactive computer system, a 
telephone system and an in-flight entertainment system. Second, the underlying 
mechanism of delayed failure as revealed in studies of software error latency, such as 
Madeira & Silva (1994) and in the state transition model investigated in the present 
research, seems to be generally applicable to any state-based software component. 
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Third, experiments conducted during the present research have revealed delayed failure 
of both the MySQL and Oracle XE DBMS. 
 
It appears that delayed failure of software has not often been recognised, as discussed in 
Chapter 1; one important reason may be that, if the failure delay is less than the F-
measure for an immediate failure, the delayed failure us likely to be ‘masked’ by the 
earlier occurrence of an immediate failure. 
8.7.3  Immediate Failure 
 
In contrast to delayed failure, defined as a failure that occurs some time after the 
condition that causes the failure due to long-latency error propagation, there are two 
other possible failure behaviours of a software component; ‘short latency’ failure and 
‘immediate’ failure. A short latency failure occurs a very short time after the condition 
that causes the failure, due to short-latency error propagation, and differs from delayed 
failure only in the shortness of the delay; the two-step ‘precondition’ and ‘trigger’ 
process of failure as described in Chapter 3 is still present. An immediate failure, on the 
other hand, occurs immediately after the condition that causes the failure, in a single 
step that would be a transition directly from S0 to SF in the state transition model 
(Figure 12). 
 
Immediate failure is not represented in the state transition model as described in Chapter 
3, and falls outside the scope of the present research; the research problem focuses on 
the delayed failure of software components, and the conventional approach to software 
testing is believed to be effective in revealing both immediate failures and short latency 
failures. 
 
A short latency failure from the point of view of the experiments conducted in the 
present research is a failure with a delay less than a single block of SQL statements. 
Failures having a delay less than a single block cannot be distinguished from an 
immediate failure with the experimental methodology used, and in such cases the 
experiment is inconclusive. 
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The Oracle XE results for F-measure and failure delay with 10, 100, 500 and 1000 
database tables shown in Table 21, Table 22, Table 23, and Table 24 have a note (b) in 
the S1 column for inconclusive runs where the SUT failed on a single re-execution of 
block number S2. This indicates a short latency failure or possibly an immediate failure, 
and occurred in 15 out of 52 runs or 29%. 
 
The probability of a transition directly from S0 to SF would have to be included in a 
complete reliability model for software components, as F-measure results will include 
delayed failures, short latency failures, and immediate failures, unless delayed failures 
are separated using a procedure for identifying ‘precondition’ requests, as in the 
experiments performed during the present research. Note that in Chapter 6, Table 14: F-
measure results for MySQL DBMS do not distinguish between delayed failures and 
immediate failures. 
 
Because of random variation introduced by the stochastic testing process, any single 
experiment might reveal delayed failure, immediate failure, or no failure. The Oracle 
XE results for F-measure and failure delay with 10, 100, 500 and 1000 database tables 
shown in Table 21, Table 22, Table 23, and Table 24 have a note (a) in the S1 column 
for inconclusive runs where no failure occurred during the run; this occurred in 6 out of 
52 runs or 12%. 
8.8   Research Problem 
 
This section discusses the present research within the context of the research problem. 
A statement of the research problem appears in Chapter 1, along with a discussion of 
why investigation of this problem is worthwhile. 
 
The research problem arises when considering software component testing in the 
context of delayed failure; faults that cause delayed failures are likely to avoid detection 
by the conventional approach to software testing and remain in released software. 
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The present research has shown that stochastic testing is an effective testing technique 
for revealing delayed failure of software components. The approach taken to the 
research problem has used the methods of experimental software engineering: the 
development of a research question and hypotheses, and an experimental methodology 
for testing the hypotheses. 
8.8.1  Research Question and Hypotheses 
 
A statement of the research question appears in Chapter 4, along with the research 
hypotheses H1 and H2 together with the associated null hypotheses, and a discussion of 
why answering this question is worthwhile. 
 
Delayed failure, consistent with long-latency error propagation, was observed as shown 
in Table 31: Failure delay for S1 and S2 in Chapter 6, for MySQL (invalid precondition) 
with 95% confidence; and for Oracle XE (valid precondition) with 95% confidence in 
the case of results for 10 tables and 500 tables, only. 
 
The null hypotheses H01 and H02 can therefore both be rejected, suggesting that the state 
transition model is valid and so answering the research question, “Is the state transition 
model valid?” 
 
Experimental demonstration of delayed failure, consistent with long-latency error 
propagation as described by the state transition model, suggests that the research 
problem can be solved for the SUT considered in the study, by using stochastic testing 
with sequences of test cases at least equal to the failure delay. 
8.9   Threats to Validity 
 
This section discusses internal, external, and construct threats to the validity of the 
experimental results. 
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8.9.1  Threats to Internal Validity 
 
Internal validity pertains to the certainty of the cause and effect relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variables in the experiment, when the control 
variables remain unchanged during the experiment. The control variables, dependent 
variables, and independent variables involved in the experiments are listed in Table 36. 
 
Variable type Variable 
1. Control Hardware configuration – see APPENDIX B 
2. Control Software configuration – see APPENDIX B 
3. Control Software under test (Subject) 
4. Control Experimental profile (BNF specification) (Treatment) 
5. Control Initial state of the database 
6. Control Person conducting the experiment (Researcher) 
7. Control Physical environment (location of PC) 
8. Control Settings of DBMS configuration variables 
9. Control Time and date of experiment 
10. Control Versions of Perl programs, batch files and shell scripts 
11. Dependent Execution time (sec) 
12. Dependent Number of statements accepted 
13. Dependent Number of statements failed 
14. Dependent Number of statements rejected 
15. Dependent Number of statements succeeded 
16. Independent Sequence of SQL statements executed 
17. Independent Seed value (initialise random number generation) 
 
Table 36: Variables involved in the experiments 
 
Threats to internal validity arise where the control variables have changed between 
experimental runs, or where a control variable in the experiment has not been taken into 
account. 
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The hardware and software configuration, physical environment, and researcher have 
not changed over the course of the present research. The reported experiments have 
been carried out over a period of six years between 2005 and 2011 and some changes to 
the experimental profiles (BNF specifications) and Perl programs, batch files and shell 
scripts have occurred over this time. However, these would not have changed during a 
single repetition of an experiment. Changes to experimental variables were recorded in 
the author’s research logbook, along with the experimental results, for future reference 
and program files contain version history in comments. 
 
Note that the researcher conducting the experiment, while a control variable, is also a 
source of (possibly unconscious) bias. Such bias might include the choice of literature 
sources, the choice of experimental subjects, choice of methodology, choice of metrics, 
choice of analysis technique, and interpretation of results. 
 
The best defence against these threats to internal validity is probably to replicate the 
experiments; however this was not possible within the resources and timescales of the 
present research. 
 
A further internal threat to validity is the power of the experiments, that is, the level of 
statistical confidence that can be assigned to the results. In the present research, 95% 
confidence intervals for the mean were estimated for the experimental results and in 
some instances this showed that the experiment lacked sufficient power to provide 
confidence at this level. The power of the experiments might be improved by increasing 
the number of experimental runs, however as noted by Korver (1994) and discussed in 
Chapter 2, the sample size must be increased by a factor k2 to reduce the standard error 
by a factor k. 
8.9.2  Threats to External Validity 
 
External validity pertains to the generality of the results; ideally, the results of the 
present research should generalise to a wide variety of different software components, 
potentially containing a wide variety of different faults, possibly resulting in a wide 
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variety of different failure behaviours, in a wide variety of different testing and 
operating environments. 
 
Threats to external validity arise where the choice of subjects, treatments, or variables 
involved in the experiments limit the generality of the results. 
 
The focus of the present research is on software components described by a request-
response model; however, this is a common model of communication between software 
components, as described by Martin-Flatin (2005) and should generalise to a fairly wide 
variety of different software components. 
 
F-measure and delayed failure metrics are based on simple crash/hang failure, because a 
stateless test oracle was desired, as discussed in Chapter 1. This is a limitation, as 
correctness of responses is not considered; however a crash, for example due to 
incorrect exception handling, is a common type of failure, see Mao & Lu (2005). 
 
The behaviour of DBMS may not be representative of software components in general, 
and the behaviour of MySQL and Oracle XE may not be representative of some other 
DBMS. However, MySQL and Oracle are both Relational DBMS, probably the most 
common type of DBMS, and as they are both at least partly written in the C/C++ 
programming language they are likely to share many of the vulnerabilities and errors 
common to C/C++ with other software components written in that language. 
 
The SUT studied in the present research run on both the Linux and Microsoft Windows 
operating systems, which are common system software environments. 
 
The experimental profiles used in the present research are unlikely to be similar to any 
real operational profiles; as already discussed in this chapter, the experimental profiles 
may be more likely to reveal software failures than real operational profiles. It may be 
possible to relate apparent reliability during stochastic testing to actual component 
reliability, however this is an area for future research. Testing beyond the limits of real 
operational profiles is an established practice in other engineering disciplines; for 
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example, Forsberg, Mooz & Cotterman (2005) define ‘Qualification’ as demonstration 
that “the design will perform in the intended environment, with margin”. 
 
The best defence against threats to external validity is probably to replicate the 
experiments with a different choice of subjects and treatments; this would be an 
interesting topic for future research. 
8.9.3  Threats to Construct Validity 
 
Construct validity pertains to the use of surrogate measures for properties of interest in 
the research problem or question. 
 
Threats to construct validity arise where the surrogate measure is not truly correlated 
with the property of interest. Properties of interest in the present research are software 
component reliability and robustness, failure delay, and fault detection effectiveness; 
the surrogate measure for these properties in the experiments is the F-measure as 
discussed by Chen, Kuo & Merkel (2004). Further research into the correlation of the F-
measure with these properties is desirable; other measures of fault detection 
effectiveness have been proposed, including the E- and P-measures defined in Table 3 
in Chapter 2, as discussed by Liu & Zhu (2008). 
8.10   Summary 
 
This chapter presented a discussion of the present research within the context of 
stochastic testing, SQL mutation, experimental studies of DBMS, fault detection 
effectiveness and efficiency, the conceptual framework, delayed failure, the research 
problem, and threats to validity. 
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9   CONCLUSION 
9.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a summary of the conclusions of the present research, a summary 
of the contributions to knowledge, and areas for future research. 
9.2   Conclusions 
 
This section presents the conclusions of the present research under the following 
headings: software component testing, software component reliability and robustness, 
stochastic testing, experimental studies of DBMS, delayed failure, the conceptual 
framework, and the research problem. 
9.2.1  Software Component Testing 
 
a) The conventional approach to software testing is unlikely to detect delayed 
failures of software components, and alternative approaches should be employed 
to detect this type of failure. Delayed failures appear to have avoided detection 
in release testing for both MySQL and Oracle XE, so that faults leading to 
delayed failure have remained in the production release of software; the testing 
technique investigated in the present research was able to reveal these failures, 
and also revealed some known faults in the MySQL DBMS. 
 
b) High-volume stochastic testing using random generation of valid SQL is an 
effective DBMS testing technique, able to quickly crash or hang the DBMS 
server, and does not necessarily require the additional effort of generating 
invalid SQL statements; this was not expected at the outset of the present 
research. 
 
c) The MySQL DBMS accepts invalid SQL statements, and SQL mutation is an 
effective test technique for revealing this type of failure, although acceptance of 
 184 
invalid SQL statements does not appear to have a significantly higher 
probability of failure (resulting in a crash) than valid statements. The assertion 
P2invalid > P2valid that is, the assertion that in the state transition model, the 
probability P2 of a transition from S0 to SP is greater for an invalid input than for 
a valid input, does not appear to be supported by the experimental results. 
 
d) The mutation operators M1 to M4 as given in BS 7925-2 (2001) are not 
sufficient to test the cases of swapped element order and repeated elements. The 
set of mutation operators given in BS 7925-2 (2001) should be extended. 
9.2.2  Software Component Reliability and Robustness 
 
a) The present research provides a practical methodology for benchmarking 
software component dependability (reliability and robustness) and benchmark 
measures for the MySQL and Oracle XE DBMS have been determined. Metrics 
for failure delay and reliability for the software components investigated in the 
study depend on the characteristics of the chosen experimental profile. 
 
b) The MTTF (median F-measure) found in the experimental study was 
significantly different for MySQL and Oracle XE and this result was 
unexpected. F-measure values found in the experimental study for both MySQL 
and Oracle XE were an order of magnitude less than expected. 
9.2.3  Stochastic Testing 
 
a) Stochastic testing is an effective method for revealing delayed failure, and is a 
suitable technique for comparative characterisation of the reliability and 
robustness of software components; although it is not suited for directly 
measuring component reliability. 
 
b) The present research provides support for the hypothesis of a saturation effect, 
as reported by Menzies, Owen & Cukic (2002) and by Menzies, Owen & 
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Richardson (2007). This effect would make stochastic testing more efficient 
than might otherwise be expected. 
9.2.4  Experimental Studies of DBMS 
 
a) The present research provides experimental results that broadly corroborate 
related work into testing of DBMS using random generation of SQL, for 
example as reported by Slutz (1998). 
 
b) Random database creation, in combination with stochastic testing, appears to be 
a powerful DBMS testing technique. The median of the ratio of F-measure to 
time constant F/T in cases where failures occurred suggests that failure occurs 
somewhere between 1T and 2T that is, when between 63% and 87% of database 
tables have been created. 
9.2.5  Delayed Failure 
 
a) Delayed failure is an important failure mode of software components and has 
been demonstrated at least for the components studied in the present research. 
There appear to be few systematic studies of delayed failure in the software 
engineering literature. 
 
b) Experimental demonstration of delayed failure for both ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ 
experimental profiles at a 95% confidence level means that the null hypotheses 
can be rejected, answering the research question in the affirmative by suggesting 
that the state transition model is valid. 
 
c) Median values for F-measure and failure delay for MySQL were 17.13 and 3.63 
blocks respectively. Median values for F-measure and failure delay for Oracle 
XE were 99 blocks and 60 blocks respectively. 
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9.2.6  The Conceptual Framework 
 
a) The stateless request-response model provides a useful conceptual framework 
for black-box testing of software components. Within this conceptual 
framework, a Markov chain model of error propagation and failure allows 
calculation of the delayed failure behaviour of software components based on 
estimation of state transition probabilities. 
 
b) Results of experimental studies of software components (MySQL and Oracle 
XE DBMS) using stochastic testing are consistent with expected behaviour 
based on the Markov chain model. 
9.2.7  The Research Problem 
 
Experimental demonstration of delayed failure, consistent with long-latency error 
propagation as described by the state transition model, suggests that the research 
problem can be solved at least for the DBMS components considered in the study, by 
using stochastic testing with sequences of test cases at least equal to the measured value 
of failure delay. 
9.3   Summary of Contributions 
 
This section presents the contributions to knowledge of the present research in the 
following areas: Software component testing, software component reliability and 
robustness, stochastic testing, experimental studies of DBMS, delayed failure, the 
conceptual framework, and the research problem. 
9.3.1  Software Component Testing 
 
Contributions to knowledge of the present research in the area of software component 
testing are: (a) The proposition, with supporting evidence, that the conventional 
approach to software testing is unlikely to detect delayed failures of software 
components which occur due to long-latency error propagation. (b) Experimental results 
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demonstrating delayed failure in two examples of production software that have already 
passed a quality control and release testing process. (c) The identification of a delayed 
failure mechanism in examples of reported software bugs. 
9.3.2  Software Component Reliability and Robustness 
 
Contributions to knowledge of the present research in the area of software component 
reliability and robustness are: (a) A methodology for benchmarking software 
component dependability (reliability and robustness). (b) Benchmark dependability 
metrics for the MySQL and Oracle XE DBMS using the technique. 
9.3.3  Stochastic Testing 
 
Contributions to knowledge of the present research in the area of stochastic testing are: 
(a) The application of stochastic testing to the delayed failure of software components, 
and evidence that this is an effective technique for revealing delayed failure. (b) 
Evidence that stochastic testing is a suitable technique for comparative characterisation 
of the reliability and robustness of software components. (c) Support for the hypothesis 
of a saturation effect, as reported by Menzies, Owen & Cukic (2002) and by Menzies, 
Owen & Richardson (2007). 
9.3.4  Experimental Studies of DBMS 
 
Contributions to knowledge of the present research in the area of experimental studies 
of DBMS are: (a) Corroboration of related work in DBMS testing using random 
generation of SQL. (b) A testing technique for DBMS that appears to be both efficient 
and effective, using random generation of SQL to create a random database. 
9.3.5  Delayed Failure 
 
Contributions to knowledge of the present research in the area of delayed failure are:  
(a) Evidence that delayed failure is an important failure mode of software components. 
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(b) A methodology for the measurement of failure delay in software components using 
both ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ experimental profiles. 
9.3.6  The Conceptual Framework 
 
Contributions to knowledge of the present research in the area of the conceptual 
framework are: (a) An analysis of software component failure behaviour based on the 
partitioned request-response model. (b) A state transition model of delayed failure in 
software components and a method for calculation of the delayed failure behaviour of 
software components using a Markov chain model of error propagation and failure. (c) 
Experimental validation of the state transition model of delayed software failure with 
both ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ experimental profiles. 
9.3.7  The Research Problem 
 
Contributions to knowledge of the present research in the area of the research problem 
are: Evidence that the research problem can be solved, at least for the DBMS 
components considered in the study, by using stochastic testing with sequences of test 
cases at least equal to the failure delay. 
9.4   Future Research 
 
The present research has identified a number of areas where future research could make 
an additional contribution to knowledge. This section describes potential future research 
topics in the areas of software component testing, software component reliability and 
robustness, stochastic testing, experimental studies of DBMS, delayed failure, the 
conceptual framework, and the research problem. 
9.4.1  Software Component Testing 
 
(a) Compare alternative approaches with stochastic testing from the point of view 
of their efficiency and effectiveness in revealing delayed failure, as discussed in 
the TAIC PART 2006 conference paper (APPENDIX D). Such approaches 
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might include adaptive testing, deterministic HVAT, directed random testing, 
and genetic algorithms. 
 
(b) Replicate the experiments with a different choice of subjects and treatments and 
compare the results obtained for different software components and for different 
testing techniques or different experimental profiles. 
9.4.2  Software Component Reliability and Robustness 
 
(a) Perform further benchmarking of software components for reliability and 
robustness (dependability) and failure delay using the methodology of the 
present research, as discussed in the UKSMA 2009 conference paper 
(APPENDIX E). 
 
(b) Determine appropriate surrogate measures for reliability, robustness and failure 
delay in software component testing, in comparison with the F-measure. 
 
(c) Investigate the relationship between measures of reliability and robustness of 
software components during stochastic testing and actual component reliability 
and robustness in operational use. 
9.4.3  Stochastic Testing 
 
(a) Investigate the relationship between test run length and test effectiveness for 
stochastic testing. See Andrews, et al. (2008). 
 
(b) Determine criteria for selecting appropriate experimental profiles for reliability 
and robustness benchmarking of software components such as DBMS using 
stochastic testing. 
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9.4.4  Experimental Studies of DBMS 
 
(a) Perform further comparative experimental study of delayed failure in DBMS 
using a single profile based on the core SQL ISO/IEC 9075 2003 standard. 
 
(b) Perform further research into the use of random databases and randomly 
generated schemas in DBMS testing, as proposed by Bati, et al. (2007). 
9.4.5  Delayed Failure 
 
Relate the failure and fault taxonomies in the literature, as discussed in Chapter 2, to 
faults found in delayed failure testing, and determine what class of faults are associated 
with delayed failure, and how frequently these lead to failure in an operational setting. 
See for example IEEE (1993) in Table 2. 
9.4.6  The Conceptual Framework 
 
Develop a reliability model for software components that accounts for both delayed 
failure and immediate failure, and relates transition probabilities in the Markov chain 
model to an operational profile. 
9.4.7  The Research Problem 
 
Investigate alternative solutions to the research problem such as extended random 
regression (ERR) as described by Kaner, Bond & McGee (2003) and compare the 
effectiveness of these approaches in revealing delayed failures to that of stochastic 
testing. 
9.5   Summary 
 
This chapter presented a summary of the conclusions of the research, a summary of the 
contributions to knowledge, and areas for future research. 
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APPENDIX A. DBMS RESPONSE PROFILE RESULTS 
 
The full experimental results for MySQL and Oracle XE DBMS response profiles are 
shown in Table 37 and Table 38 respectively. For Oracle XE the results for Seed = 38 
are excluded because this caused the DBMS to hang/freeze. 
 
Note the number of SQL statements executed = failed + accepted + succeeded for 
MySQL experiments and the number of SQL statements executed = accepted + 
succeeded for Oracle XE experiments. 
 
Run Executed Failed Accepted Succeeded Time (sec) 
1  1482 0 1470 12 6 
2  1482 0 1461 21 5 
3  1482 1 1459 22 6 
4  1482 0 1447 35 7 
5  1482 1 1444 37 6 
6  1482 0 1399 83 7 
7  1482 0 1408 74 8 
8  1482 0 1381 101 9 
9  1482 1 1365 116 9 
10  1482 0 1335 147 9 
11  1482 0 1326 156 10 
12  1482 0 1320 162 10 
13  1482 0 1277 205 12 
14  1482 0 1276 206 11 
15  1482 0 1255 227 11 
16  1482 0 1269 213 11 
17  1482 1 1265 216 9 
18  1482 1 1270 211 9 
19  1482 0 1258 224 10 
 216 
20  1482 0 1247 235 11 
21  1482 2 1241 239 9 
22  1482 0 1261 221 8 
23  1482 0 1250 232 11 
24  1482 0 1246 236 9 
25  1482 1 1256 225 9 
26  1482 1 1240 241 10 
27  1482 0 1231 251 9 
28  1482 0 1230 252 11 
29  1482 0 1255 227 11 
30  1482 0 1233 249 11 
31  1482 0 1210 272 11 
32  1482 0 1238 244 10 
33  1482 0 1227 255 11 
34  1482 1 1256 225 10 
35  1482 0 1244 238 9 
36  1482 0 1233 249 10 
37  1482 1 1235 246 10 
38  1482 1 1240 241 11 
39  1482 0 1221 261 12 
40  1482 1 1241 240 12 
41  1482 1 1257 224 10 
42  1482 1 1250 231 9 
43  1482 0 1244 238 11 
44  1482 0 1241 241 9 
45  1482 1 1223 258 10 
46  1482 1 1251 230 11 
47  1482 1 1249 232 11 
48  1482 1 1232 249 11 
49  1482 0 1226 256 10 
50  1482 0 1215 267 10 
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51  1482 0 1233 249 10 
52  1482 0 1256 226 12 
53  1482 0 1257 225 12 
54  1482 1 1242 239 10 
55  1482 1 1249 232 10 
56  1482 1 1223 258 8 
57  1482 0 1251 231 9 
58  1482 2 1235 245 9 
59  1482 0 1233 249 10 
60  1482 0 1239 243 10 
61  1482 0 1239 243 10 
62  1482 0 1240 242 9 
63  1482 2 1243 237 10 
64  1482 0 1220 262 10 
65  1482 0 1253 229 10 
66  1482 0 1236 246 9 
67  1482 1 1229 252 9 
68  1482 0 1234 248 10 
69  1482 0 1235 247 10 
70  1482 0 1243 239 9 
71  1482 1 1237 244 10 
72  1482 1 1250 231 9 
73  1482 0 1223 259 10 
74  1482 0 1238 244 10 
75  1482 0 1238 244 10 
76  1482 1 1235 246 9 
77  1482 0 1235 247 9 
78  1482 0 1219 263 10 
79  1482 0 1264 218 10 
80  1482 0 1237 245 11 
81  1482 0 1232 250 10 
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82  1482 0 1241 241 10 
83  1482 0 1249 233 9 
84  1482 0 1252 230 8 
85  1482 1 1244 237 8 
86  1482 0 1221 261 10 
87  1482 0 1239 243 9 
88  1482 0 1235 247 10 
89  1482 0 1230 252 10 
90  1482 0 1242 240 9 
91  1482 0 1216 266 11 
92  1482 0 1244 238 10 
93  1482 0 1252 230 9 
94  1482 0 1230 252 9 
95  1482 0 1258 224 8 
96  1482 0 1254 228 10 
97  1482 1 1254 227 9 
98  1482 1 1230 251 9 
99  1482 0 1249 233 10 
100  1482 2 1253 227 9 
Total 148,200 35 126,099 22,066 963 
 
Table 37: Results for MySQL response profile 
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Seed Executed Accepted Succeeded Time (sec) 
1 1468 1447 21 9 
2 1510 1481 29 7 
3 1516 1472 44 15 
4 1494 1451 43 7 
5 1499 1428 71 6 
6 1436 1370 66 10 
7 1488 1392 96 8 
8 1500 1411 89 11 
9 1473 1377 96 10 
10 1439 1324 115 7 
11 1488 1373 115 7 
12 1510 1400 110 13 
13 1465 1330 135 9 
14 1512 1367 145 6 
15 1525 1364 161 12 
16 1464 1347 117 11 
17 1497 1352 145 8 
18 1495 1348 147 9 
19 1501 1357 144 7 
20 1502 1364 138 10 
21 1489 1351 138 21 
22 1493 1342 151 12 
23 1477 1310 167 12 
24 1519 1346 173 7 
25 1479 1333 146 6 
26 1454 1287 167 8 
27 1462 1306 156 16 
28 1463 1302 161 8 
29 1514 1325 189 6 
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30 1438 1279 159 8 
31 1512 1332 180 10 
32 1506 1295 211 17 
33 1441 1262 179 7 
34 1457 1278 179 6 
35 1457 1271 186 12 
36 1510 1338 172 22 
37 1428 1263 165 6 
39 1466 1302 164 15 
40 1506 1313 193 15 
41 1454 1288 166 7 
42 1479 1303 176 8 
43 1494 1311 183 7 
44 1467 1306 161 12 
45 1510 1293 217 14 
46 1415 1244 171 9 
47 1504 1306 198 6 
48 1540 1362 178 12 
49 1470 1284 186 10 
50 1498 1309 189 7 
51 1520 1317 203 7 
52 1474 1294 180 19 
53 1453 1274 179 7 
54 1441 1250 191 7 
55 1470 1292 178 8 
56 1450 1259 191 14 
57 1470 1246 224 6 
58 1501 1293 208 11 
59 1498 1308 190 12 
60 1476 1273 203 6 
61 1479 1293 186 9 
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62 1460 1253 207 13 
63 1508 1300 208 7 
64 1472 1275 197 15 
65 1496 1295 201 8 
66 1523 1354 169 8 
67 1458 1270 188 6 
68 1505 1328 177 16 
69 1507 1280 227 6 
70 1500 1293 207 9 
71 1478 1285 193 7 
72 1487 1310 177 7 
73 1472 1260 212 7 
74 1489 1308 181 7 
75 1470 1278 192 8 
76 1542 1317 225 15 
77 1493 1283 210 7 
78 1477 1294 183 7 
79 1445 1251 194 8 
80 1467 1266 201 7 
81 1459 1269 190 6 
82 1449 1261 188 10 
83 1501 1284 217 7 
84 1486 1271 215 6 
85 1463 1277 186 29 
86 1431 1239 192 6 
87 1480 1302 178 6 
88 1452 1237 215 13 
89 1497 1319 178 7 
90 1495 1296 199 9 
91 1495 1312 183 6 
92 1467 1268 199 8 
 222 
93 1497 1299 198 9 
94 1469 1265 204 15 
95 1458 1272 186 10 
96 1490 1309 181 8 
97 1507 1283 224 10 
98 1492 1302 190 7 
99 1447 1246 201 6 
100 1492 1292 200 6 
Total 146,692 129,798 16,894 946 
Mean 1481.7 - - - 
 
Table 38: Results for Oracle XE response profile 
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APPENDIX B. TEST MACHINE CONFIGURATIONS 
The hardware and software configurations for the MySQL and Oracle XE test machines 
are shown in Table 39 and Table 40 respectively. 
 
Machine Details 
Evesham Vale Computer 
Asset Number RA001128 
S/N WO00711296 
Software Configuration 
MySQL Ver 14.12 Distrib 5.0.22, for Win32 (ia32) 
This is perl, v5.8.2 built for MSWin32-x86-multi-thread 
(with 25 registered patches, see perl -V for more detail) 
Copyright 1987-2003, Larry Wall 
Binary build 808 provided by ActiveState Corp. http://www.ActiveState.com 
ActiveState is a division of Sophos. 
Built Dec 9 2003 10:19:40 
System Information 
OS Name Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional 
Version 5.0.2195 Build 2195 
OS Manufacturer Microsoft Corporation 
System Name MRM-EVESHAM 
System Manufacturer VIA Technologies, Inc. 
System Model VT82C692BX 
System Type X86-based PC 
Processor x86 Family 6 Model 8 Stepping 1 
 GenuineIntel ~600 Mhz 
BIOS Version Award Modular BIOS v4.51PG 
Windows Directory C:\WINNT 
System Directory C:\WINNT\System32 
Boot Device  \Device\Harddisk0\Partition1 
Locale  United States 
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User Name MRM-EVESHAM\Michael Moulding 
Time Zone GMT Standard Time 
Total Physical Memory 130,544 KB 
Available Physical Memory 34,016 KB 
Total Virtual Memory 635,456 KB 
Available Virtual Memory 445,668 KB 
Page File Space 504,912 KB 
Page File C:\pagefile.sys 
 
Table 39: MySQL test machine configuration 
 
Machine Details 
Acer Aspire One Notebook Computer 
Model Number ZG5 
S/N LUS030A096829238062500 
Software Configuration 
Oracle Database 10g Express Edition Release 10.2.0.1.0 – Production 
This is perl, v5.8.9 built for i686-linux-thread-multi 
Binary build 825 [288577] provided by ActiveState http://www.ActiveState.com 
Built Dec 15 2008 03:04:17 
System Information 
Model name: Aspire one 
Operating system: Linpus Linux Lite vl.0.6.E 
CPU: Intel(R) Atom(TM) CPU N270 @ 1.60GH 
System memory: 512 MB 
Hard drive: 8 GB 
Battery: Li-ion 2200 mAh 
BIOS version: v0.3109 
 
Table 40: Oracle XE test machine configuration 
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APPENDIX C. RESULTS FOR 1ST EXPERIMENT 
 
This appendix describes the data sets and experimental results for the 1st experiment and 
gives details of the program and data files used to automate the experimental procedure. 
 
C.1  Data Set A (Non-Mutated) 
 
This section describes experimental data set A. Before starting the experimental runs, a 
data set of 50,000 non-mutated (valid) SQL statements was randomly generated by 
executing batch file build1.bat with a random seed value of 0 as shown below. The valid 
input values used in both the first and second experimental runs were drawn randomly 
from this set (data set A, file valid.txt). All statements in this set were unique. 
 > build1 50000 0 
 Sun Jul 15 2007 
 215 non-duplicate lines 
 Random generator seed value = 0 
 50000 statements generated 
 871 seconds elapsed 
 
The profile of input values in the non-mutated (valid) data set A is shown in Table 41. 
 
SQL Statement Number % of Total 
“CREATE ” 16,640 33 
“INSERT ” 16,782 34 
“REPLACE ” 17,964 36 
“ REPLACE” (1,386) (3) 
Total 50,000 100 
 
Table 41: Profile for data set A (non-mutated) 
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C.2  First Experimental Run 
 
This section describes experimental data set B and the results of the first experimental 
run. Before starting the first experimental run, eight sets of 10,000,000 mutated input 
values were randomly generated using different random seed values by Dr. Jacob 
Mulenga using several machines at Shrivenham. The input values accepted by MySQL 
were collated and duplicates were removed from the set. A total number of 329,035 
accepted mutated (invalid) input values were collated, from which 238,205 unique input 
values were collected. The invalid input values used in the first experimental run were 
drawn randomly from this set (data set B, file uniq.txt). The profile of input values in 
the mutated (invalid) data set B is shown in Table 42. 
 
SQL Statement Number % of Total 
“CREATE ” 67,233 28 
“INSERT ” 63,052 26 
“REPLACE ” 116,220 49 
“ REPLACE” (8,300) (3) 
Total 238,205 100 
 
Table 42: Profile for data set B (mutated) 
 
The experimental procedure was automated using batch files run1c.bat and run2b.bat 
and the results of executing the procedure are summarised below: 
 
Sun Jul 15 2007 
run1c.bat 10000 0 No failure (inconclusive) 
run1c.bat 10000 1 No failure (inconclusive) 
run1c.bat 10000 2 Lost connection in step 3 
   Restart MySQL 
run2b.bat 10000 2 No failure (positive outcome) 
run1c.bat 10000 3 No failure (inconclusive) 
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run1c.bat 10000 4 Lost connection in step 3 
   Restart MySQL 
run2b.bat 10000 4 No failure (positive outcome) 
run1c.bat 10000 5 No failure (inconclusive) 
run1c.bat 10000 6 No failure (inconclusive) 
run1c.bat 10000 7 Lost connection in step 2 (inconclusive) 
run1c.bat 10000 8 No failure (inconclusive) 
run1c.bat 10000 9 No failure (inconclusive) 
run1c.bat 10000 10 Lost connection in step 2 (inconclusive) 
run1c.bat 10000 11 No failure (inconclusive) 
run1c.bat 10000 12 No failure (inconclusive) 
run1c.bat 10000 13 No failure (inconclusive) 
 
Detailed results for positive outcomes in the first experimental run are shown in Table 
43. The step numbers correspond to the experimental procedure as described in Chapter 
5, 1st Experiment Part I. 
 
Step Seed Executed Failed Accepted Succeeded Time (sec) 
(2) 2 10,000 4 9940 56 36 
(3) 2 10,000 0 9975 25 31 
(4) 2 4195 (*) 0 4109 86 26 
(2) 4 10,000 5 9910 85 37 
(3) 4 10,000 0 9950 50 32 
(4) 4 5338 (*) 2 5154 182 36 
 
(*) Lost connection to MySQL server during query; see Table 44. 
 
Table 43: Positive outcomes in the first experimental run 
 
The last logged statement for each positive outcome was as shown in Table 44. 
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Seed Last logged statement 
2 INSERT HIGH_PRIORITY INTO o4 SET col5 = DEFAULT /* 42911 */; 
4 REPLACE DELAYED m2 
 SET col6 = DEFAULT ,col0 = DEFAULT ,col9 = 'v' /* 16018 */; 
 
Table 44: Last logged statements for positive outcomes 
 
C.3  Data Set C (Mutated) 
 
This section describes experimental data set C. Before starting the second experimental 
run, a second initial data set of 14,844 accepted mutated (invalid) input values was 
prepared by executing batch file build2.bat. Of the 14,845 statements accepted, one was 
a single “;” and so this was deleted from the set. The invalid input values used in the 
second experimental run were drawn randomly from this set (data set C). All statements 
in this set were unique; however the set consisted only of CREATE statements. 
 > build2 3000000 0 
 init.pl 
 Sun Aug 5 2007 
 inv2.pl 
 Random generator seed value = 0 
 454 lines read 
 31 lines modified 
 10% mutated 
 expand2.pl 
 216 non-duplicate lines 
 0 warnings 
 Random generator seed value = 0 
 3000000 statements generated 
 48961 seconds elapsed 
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 xx.pl 
 Mon Aug 6 2007 
 2813219 statements executed 
 2798346 failed 
 14845 accepted 
 28 succeeded 
 5325 seconds elapsed 
 
C.4  Second Experimental Run 
 
This section describes the results of the second experimental run. The experimental 
procedure was automated using batch files run1b.bat and run2b.bat and the results of 
executing the procedure are summarised below. 
 
Mon Aug 6 2007 
run1b.bat 10000 0 Lost connection in step 3 
   Restart MySQL 
run2b.bat 10000 0 No failure (positive outcome) 
run1b.bat 10000 1 No failure (inconclusive) 
run1b.bat 10000 2 No failure (inconclusive) 
run1b.bat 10000 3 Lost connection in step 3 
   Restart MySQL 
run2b.bat 10000 3 No failure (positive outcome) 
run1b.bat 10000 4 No failure (inconclusive) 
run1b.bat 10000 5 No failure (inconclusive) 
run1b.bat 10000 6 No failure (inconclusive) 
 
Detailed results for positive outcomes in the second experimental run are shown in 
Table 45. The step numbers correspond to the experimental procedure as described in 
Chapter 5, 1st Experiment Part I. 
 
 
 230 
 
Step Seed Executed Failed Accepted Succeeded Time (sec) 
(2) 0 10,000 4 9952 44 33 
(3) 0 10,000 0 9998 2 16 
(4) 0 9265 (*) 3 9000 262 65 
(2) 3 10,000 5 9965 30 32 
(3) 3 10,000 0 10,000 0 15 
(4) 3 5431 (*) 3 5345 83 31 
 
(*) Lost connection to MySQL server during query; see Table 46. 
 
Table 45: Positive outcomes in the second experimental run 
 
The last logged statement for each positive outcome was as shown in Table 46. 
 
Seed Last logged statement 
0 CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS a1 INSERT_METHOD FIRST 
 CHECKSUM = 0 MIN_ROWS 0 ENGINE = MRG_MYISAM 
 IGNORE SELECT * FROM u0 /* 28724 */; 
3 REPLACE DELAYED INTO h4 SET col6 = DEFAULT /* 40055 */; 
 
Table 46: Last logged statements for positive outcomes 
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C.5  Experimental Configurations 
 
This section describes the program and data files used to automate the experimental 
procedure for the 1st experiment using MySQL. 
 
C.5.1  MySQL Data Files 
 
/mysql/data/bnf5.txt BNF specification for MySQL version 5 
/mysql/data/inv.txt Output file for inv2.pl 
/mysql/Results/uniq.txt Output from uniq.pl 
 
C.5.2  MySQL Program Files 
 
/mysql/programs/build1.bat Batch program to build valid data 
/mysql/programs/build2.bat Batch program to build invalid data 
/mysql/programs/expand2.pl Expand BNF specification 
/mysql/programs/inv2.pl Generate invalid BNF by mutation 
/mysql/programs/run1c.bat Batch program to run experiment part 1 
/mysql/programs/run2a.bat Batch program to run experiment part 2 
/mysql/programs/run2b.bat Batch program to run experiment part 2 
/mysql/programs/rx.pl Execute SQL statements in random order 
/mysql/programs/uniq.pl Make sorted lines unique 
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C.5.3  Batch File Listings 
 
build1.bat 
 
rem batch program to build valid data 
rem July 2007 
rem statements parameter %1 
rem seed value parameter %2 
perl init.pl 
echo %0 >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo ## building valid data ## >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo ## valid (non-mutated) ## >> ..\data\summary.txt 
copy ..\data\bnf5.txt ..\data\inv.txt /Y 
perl expand2.pl %1 %2 
copy ..\data\x.txt ..\data\valid.txt /Y 
copy ..\data\summary.txt ..\data\blog1.txt /Y 
rem end of file 
 
 233 
 
build2.bat 
 
rem batch program to build invalid data 
rem August 2007 
rem statements parameter %1 
rem seed value parameter %2 
perl init.pl 
echo %0 >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo ## building invalid data ## >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo ## invalid (mutated)     ## >> ..\data\summary.txt 
perl inv2.pl %1 %2 
copy ..\data\inv.txt ..\data\inv2.txt /Y 
perl expand2.pl %1 %2 
find "?" ..\data\x.txt >..\data\tmp.txt 
echo ## Resetting database ## >> ..\data\summary.txt 
copy ..\data\reset.txt ..\data\x.txt /Y 
perl xx.pl 
echo ## Setting preconditions ## >> ..\data\summary.txt 
copy ..\data\bnf5.txt ..\data\inv.txt /Y 
perl expand2.pl 10000 0 
perl xx.pl 
copy ..\data\summary.txt ..\data\blog2.txt /Y 
perl init.pl 
echo ## Collecting acc and suc ## >> ..\data\summary.txt 
copy ..\data\tmp.txt ..\data\x.txt 
perl xx.pl 
copy ..\data\acc.txt ..\data\invalid.txt 
type ..\data\suc.txt >> ..\data\invalid.txt 
type ..\data\summary.txt >> ..\data\blog2.txt 
rem end of file 
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run1c.bat 
 
rem batch program to run experiment part 1(b) 
rem modified August 2007 
rem uses invalid data from ..\Results\uniq.txt 
rem uses rx.pl 
rem statements parameter %1 
rem seed value parameter %2 
perl init.pl 
echo %0 >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo ## Resetting database ## >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo ## Resetting database ## >> ..\data\acc.txt 
echo ## Resetting database ## >> ..\data\err.txt 
echo ## Resetting database ## >> ..\data\log.txt 
echo ## Resetting database ## >> ..\data\suc.txt 
type ..\data\reset.txt >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo . >> ..\data\summary.txt 
copy ..\data\reset.txt ..\data\x.txt /Y 
perl xx.pl 
echo ## First run (non-mutated) ## >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo ## First run (non-mutated) ## >> ..\data\acc.txt 
echo ## First run (non-mutated) ## >> ..\data\err.txt 
echo ## First run (non-mutated) ## >> ..\data\log.txt 
echo ## First run (non-mutated) ## >> ..\data\suc.txt 
copy ..\data\valid.txt ..\data\x.txt /Y 
perl rx.pl %1 %2 
echo ## second run (mutated) ## >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo ## second run (mutated) ## >> ..\data\acc.txt 
echo ## second run (mutated) ## >> ..\data\err.txt 
echo ## second run (mutated) ## >> ..\data\log.txt 
echo ## second run (mutated) ## >> ..\data\suc.txt 
copy ..\Results\uniq.txt ..\data\x.txt /Y 
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perl rx.pl %1 %2 
echo ## third run (non-mutated) ## >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo ## third run (non-mutated) ## >> ..\data\acc.txt 
echo ## third run (non-mutated) ## >> ..\data\err.txt 
echo ## third run (non-mutated) ## >> ..\data\log.txt 
echo ## third run (non-mutated) ## >> ..\data\suc.txt 
copy ..\data\valid.txt ..\data\x.txt /Y 
perl rx.pl %1 %2 
rem end of file 
 
 236 
run2a.bat 
 
rem batch program to run experiment part 2 
rem Single run 
rem December 2007 
rem no parameters required 
perl init.pl 
copy ..\data\reset.txt ..\data\x.txt /Y 
echo %0 >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo # Resetting database # >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo # Resetting database # >> ..\data\acc.txt 
echo # Resetting database # >> ..\data\err.txt 
echo # Resetting database # >> ..\data\log.txt 
echo # Resetting database # >> ..\data\suc.txt 
type ..\data\reset.txt >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo . >> ..\data\summary.txt 
perl xx.pl 
echo # Single run (non-mutated) # >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo # Single run (non-mutated) # >> ..\data\acc.txt 
echo # Single run (non-mutated) # >> ..\data\err.txt 
echo # Single run (non-mutated) # >> ..\data\log.txt 
echo # Single run (non-mutated) # >> ..\data\suc.txt 
copy ..\data\valid.txt ..\data\x.txt /Y 
perl xx.pl 
rem end of file 
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run2b.bat 
 
rem batch program to run experiment part 2 
rem July 2007 
rem statements parameter %1 
rem seed value parameter %2 
perl init.pl 
copy ..\data\reset.txt ..\data\x.txt /Y 
echo %0 >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo # Resetting database # >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo # Resetting database # >> ..\data\acc.txt 
echo # Resetting database # >> ..\data\err.txt 
echo # Resetting database # >> ..\data\log.txt 
echo # Resetting database # >> ..\data\suc.txt 
type ..\data\reset.txt >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo . >> ..\data\summary.txt 
perl xx.pl 
echo # First run (non-mutated) # >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo # First run (non-mutated) # >> ..\data\acc.txt 
echo # First run (non-mutated) # >> ..\data\err.txt 
echo # First run (non-mutated) # >> ..\data\log.txt 
echo # First run (non-mutated) # >> ..\data\suc.txt 
copy ..\data\valid.txt ..\data\x.txt /Y 
perl rx.pl %1 %2 
echo # second run (non-mutated) # >> ..\data\summary.txt 
echo # second run (non-mutated) # >> ..\data\acc.txt 
echo # second run (non-mutated) # >> ..\data\err.txt 
echo # second run (non-mutated) # >> ..\data\log.txt 
echo # second run (non-mutated) # >> ..\data\suc.txt 
perl rx.pl %1 %2 
rem end of file 
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APPENDIX D. CONFERENCE PAPER (TAIC PART 2006) 
 
Conference paper presented at the Testing Academic & Industrial Conference – Practice 
And Research Techniques (TAIC PART) 2006. 
 
Delayed Failures in Software 
Using High Volume Automated Testing 
 
http://www.woomerang.com/research/PhD/jgardiner-hvat.pdf 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The research described studies delayed failures in software using high volume 
automated testing (HVAT) and investigates the effectiveness of different HVAT 
techniques; such techniques include genetic algorithms, model-based testing, 
penetration testing, robustness testing, and random (stochastic) testing. A delayed 
failure is a failure that occurs some time after the conditions that lead to the failure are 
applied. There appear to be no studies of delayed failures of software in the literature 
and no comparative studies of the effectiveness of different HVAT techniques; therefore 
research in this area can make an important contribution. Delayed failures in software 
are unlikely to be revealed by conventional testing techniques; a HVAT technique that 
systematically reveals delayed failures could lead to improved reliability of software 
and reduced costs. Experimental work is in progress using the MySQL database server 
as the software under test.  
 
Keywords: Automated testing, database testing, delayed failures, high volume, HVAT, 
software testing, testing techniques. 
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APPENDIX E. CONFERENCE PAPER (UKSMA 2009) 
 
Conference paper presented at the 20th Annual Conference of the United Kingdom 
Software Metrics Association (UKSMA) 2009. 
 
Benchmarking Software Components 
Using High Volume Automated Testing Techniques 
 
http://www.woomerang.com/research/PhD/jgardiner-uksma09-v2d.pdf 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Component-based software engineering (CBSE) seeks to build software systems by 
composition of pre-existing software components. Two related problems are how to 
predict the properties of the assembled system given the properties of individual 
components, and how to guarantee that one component can be substituted for another 
without changing the properties of the overall system. A starting point is to establish 
metrics that characterise a given type of software component and to use these metrics to 
benchmark individual components. Two important properties of software components 
are reliability and robustness. Metrics for reliability and robustness are discussed in the 
context of empirical evaluation of software components using high volume automated 
testing (HVAT). The particular type of software component considered is a database 
management system (DBMS) and benchmark results obtained for the MySQL DBMS 
are presented. It is concluded that random testing is potentially useful for reliability and 
robustness benchmarking of software components. The benchmark input profile can be 
generated and executed automatically, provided a suitable component specification is 
available. Future work will examine criteria for selecting an appropriate input profile 
and will compare and contrast measurements obtained with another DBMS component. 
 
Keywords: Database management system, metrics, random testing, reliability, 
robustness, software engineering. 
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APPENDIX F. NORMAL PROBABILITY PLOTS 
 
This appendix presents normal probability plots of F-measure results. These results 
appear to be approximately normally distributed (falling approximately on a straight 
line). 
 
Normal order statistic values Ni for i = 1 to n are approximately 0.5 × log(m + x / m – x) 
where x = i – m and m is the mean value of i for n data values (taking the natural 
logarithm). 
 
Normal probability plots of F-measure results for MySQL (Table 14) are shown in 
Figure 33. 
 
F-measure 
 
Normal order statistic 
 
Figure 33: Normal probability plot for MySQL 
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Normal probability plots of F-measure results for Oracle XE 10 tables (Table 21) are 
shown in Figure 34. 
 
F-measure 
 
Normal order statistic 
 
Figure 34: Normal probability plot for Oracle XE 10 tables 
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Normal probability plots of F-measure results for Oracle XE 100 tables (Table 22) are 
shown in Figure 35. 
 
F-measure 
 
Normal order statistic 
 
Figure 35: Normal probability plot for Oracle XE 100 tables 
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Normal probability plots of F-measure results for Oracle XE 500 tables (Table 23) are 
shown in Figure 36. 
 
F-measure 
 
Normal order statistic 
 
Figure 36: Normal probability plot for Oracle XE 500 tables 
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Normal probability plots of F-measure results for Oracle XE 1000 tables (Table 24) are 
shown in Figure 37. 
 
F-measure 
 
Normal order statistic 
 
Figure 37: Normal probability plot for Oracle XE 1000 tables 
 
